KETIKA KESENJANGAN GAJI GAGAL MEMOTIVASI: PERAN KEPASTIAN INFORMASI DALAM TURNAMEN PROMOSI
Keywords:
Kesenjangan Gaji, Kepastian Informasi, Turnamen Promosi, Perilaku Kompetitif, EksperimenAbstract
Kesenjangan gaji yang besar secara teori seharusnya memotivasi karyawan untuk bersaing mendapatkan promosi. Namun dalam praktiknya, tidak jarang kesenjangan tersebut justru gagal mendorong perilaku kompetitif. Penelitian ini berargumen bahwa kegagalan tersebut disebabkan oleh ketidakpastian informasi tentang nilai hadiah promosi. Studi eksperimen ini bertujuan menguji bagaimana tingkat kepastian informasi berinteraksi dengan kesenjangan gaji dalam membentuk perilaku karyawan. Menggunakan desain eksperimen 2×2 antar-subjek dengan 90 mahasiswa akuntansi sebagai partisipan, penelitian ini memanipulasi kesenjangan gaji (tinggi vs. rendah) dan kepastian informasi (kuat vs. lemah) untuk mengamati pilihan partisipan antara strategi kompetitif dan kooperatif dalam turnamen promosi. Hasil menunjukkan pola interaksi yang signifikan: kesenjangan tinggi dengan kepastian kuat mendorong perilaku kompetitif (54,5%), tetapi ketika kepastian lemah, kesenjangan tinggi justru menghasilkan kerja sama tertinggi (84,6%). Temuan ini mengungkap bahwa kepastian informasi merupakan kondisi yang diperlukan agar insentif berbasis kesenjangan dapat memotivasi kompetisi. Dalam kondisi ketidakpastian, karyawan cenderung memilih kerja sama sebagai strategi aman. Penelitian ini berkontribusi pada akuntansi keperilakuan dengan mengintegrasikan rasionalitas terbatas ke dalam teori turnamen.
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