Siti Arifah, Agung Nur Probohudono


The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of tunneling indicated transactions on the profitability of SOEs banks. Tunneling indication can be seen from the related transactions in the form of related receivables and related debt. The data processed in the form of transaction data from the annual report of the SOEs Bank as many as 4 banks with a observation period for 9 years, from 2010-2018. Data obtained through the website of the Ministry of SOEs and the website of the SOEs Bank directly. The statistical analysis used is a regression model to determine the effect of related transactions on profitability using the eviews 9 application. The results of this study indicate that in the partial receivable from related impact significantly on the profitability of state-owned banks, while the related debt has no effect. But simultaneously there is an influence on transactions related to the profitability of SOEs banks. This indicates that the government as the largest shareholder of SOEs should make regulations related to related transactions so that there are no injured parties. Much research has been done regarding related transactions, tunneling and company performance which generally uses private companies as research objects, while in this study the authors use the SOE Bank object. Furthermore, the results of this study are expected to provide a picture of consideration for the government at preparing regulations related to related transactions in SOEs.

Bahasa Indonesia Abstrak: Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui pengaruh transaksi terindikasi tunneling terhadap profitabilitas Bank BUMN. Indikasi tunneling dilihat dari transaksi berelasi berupa piutang berelasi dan utang berelasi. Data yang diolah berupa data transaksi dari laporan keuangan (annual report) Bank BUMN sebanyak 4 Bank dengan periode pengamatan selama 9 tahun yaitu dari tahun 2010-2018. Data diperoleh melalui website Kementerian BUMN maupun website Bank BUMN secara langsung. Analisis statistik yang digunakan yaitu model regresi untuk menentukan pengaruh transaksi berelasi terhadap profitabilitas dengan menggunakan aplikasi eviews9. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa secara parsial piutang berelasi berpengaruh secara signifikan terhadap profitabilitas Bank BUMN, sedangkan utang berelasi tidak berpengaruh. Namun secara simultan terdapat pengaruh atas transaksi berelasi terhadap profitabilitas Bank BUMN. Hal demikian mengindikasikan bahwa pemerintah sebagai pemegang saham terbesar BUMN hendaknya membuat regulasi terkait transaksi berelasi agar tidak terdapat pihak-pihak yang dirugikan. Banyak penelitian telah dilakukan mengenai transaksi berelasi, tunneling dan kinerja perusahaan yang pada umumnya menggunakan perusahaan privat sebagai obyek penelitian, sedangkan dalam penelitian ini penulis menggunakan obyek Bank BUMN. Selanjutnya hasil dari penelitian ini diharapkan dapat memberikan gambaran pertimbangan bagi pemerintah dalam menyusun regulasi terkait transaksi berelasi di BUMN.


related transactions, tunneling, profitability, BUMN banks


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