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Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional

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The Reasoning behind Philippine's Strategy to Combat Global Terrorism: Under the Administration of President Rodrigo Duterte (2016 – 2018)

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Jurusan Hubungan Internasional, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik
Universitas Pelita Harapan
UPH Tower, Lippo Village
Karawaci, Tangerang 15811
Telp. (021) 5460901; Faks. (021) 5460910; E-mail: verity@uph.edu

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Biodata

PENGANTAR REDAKSI

Jurnal Verity pertama di tahun 2019 berisi 5 tulisan dengan beberapa isu Hubungan Internasional yang relevan di tahun ini. Dua tulisan pertama berfokus pada hubungan bilateral antar negara-negara di kawasan Asia Tenggara terutama terkait dengan kerjasama keamanan non-tradisional dengan tujuan meningkatkan keamanan di negara-negara yang terlibat. Tulisan ketiga dan keempat membahas mengenai keadaan di satu negara di Asia Tenggara yang terkait dengan kepentingan regional dan internasional seperti rezim baru di Malaysia dengan pemain lama dan pembelajaran yang dapat dipetik dari pengalaman program lokal dalam resolusi konflik antar suku di Indonesia.

Tulisan pertama membahas kerjasama Indonesia dengan Malaysia dan Indonesia dengan Singapura dalam mengatasi meningkatnya perompakan di selat Malaka. Penelitian yang ditulis oleh Bustanul Arifin dan Nur Afni Damanik mengusulkan bahwa melalui beberapa usulan kerjasama patrol seperti pemantauan laut yang terkordinasi, upaya penanggulangan perompakan membawa hasil yang positif dan meningkatkan keamanan di selat Malaka. Keterlibatan Amerika Serikat dan Jepang dalam keamanan selat juga menjadi penanda pentingnya perairan ini terutama bagi alur pelayaran di kawasan. Tulisan kedua menghadirkan alasan dibalik strategi Filipina dalam menghadapi ancaman terorisme global di Malawi, bagian Selatan Filipina, bagi gerakan Islamic State. Penelitian oleh Rachel Kumendong ini mengidentifikasi lima strategi yang diterapkan termasuk penggunaan kekuatan militer, penegakan hukum, kerjasama keamanan, rehabilitasi sosial dan program pembangunan dan terakhir kerjasama regional. Tulisan ketiga mengangkat hasil pemilu Malaysia tahun 2018 dengan kemenangan Mahathir sebagai perdana menteri Malaysia untuk kedua kalinya. Penelitian yang dilakukan oleh Sigit menghasilkan temuan bahwa pemerintahan Mahathir periode kedua ini sedikit berbeda dengan fokusnya di periode tahun 1981 – 2003 mengenai Look East Policy. Mahathir menggunakan sikap keras terhadap Cina dan hubungan dekat Cina dengan lawan politiknya, Najib Rajak, sebagai agenda utama untuk meraih kekuasaan.

Tulisan berikutnya oleh Jerry Indrawan mengangkat kearifan lokal dua masyarakat di Indonesia yang dapat menjadi contoh rekonsiliasi setelah terjadinya konflik. Kearifan lokal suku Sasak dan Bali dengan dua agama yang berbeda menimbulkan pemisahan budaya dan cara hidup yang sarat dengan potensi konflik. Penulis mengusulkan penyelesaian konflik dari dalam atau melalui campur tangan pemerintah dengan program-program tertentu seperti program keserasian sosial atau dengan memanfaatkan penguatan Lembaga adat. Resolusi konflik yang terjadi di tingkat internasional dengan semakin tingginya tingkat pengungsi dunia dapat menggunakan pendekatan lokal dari kedua belah pihak. Topik tulisan ini terkait dengan tulisan selanjutnya dalam edisi ini dari Herry Wahyudi mengenai peran European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) sebagai rezim HAM di Eropa. Alasan utama ECHR menjadi rezim pejuang HAM di Eropa dengan melalui dua proses yaitu norma dan embeddedness. Norma yang terbentuk dan secara berangsur dilebur menjadi sistem internasional dan memiliki aspek hukum yang mengikat. Kekuatan hukum ini memberikan otoritas penting dalam pelaksanaan kebijakan oleh ECHR. Tulisan terakhir dari Muhammad Fauzan Malufti dan Arfin Sudirman membahas mengenai faktor-faktor yang menyebabkan hadirnya kekuatan maritime AS di Yokosuka Jepang. Tulisan ini mengangkat isu militer AS di Jepang dengan meningkatnya kekuatan laut Tiongkok di daerah yang disebut dengan China Near Seas Region dalam periode waktu antara tahun 2013 sampai 2017.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INDONESIA'S COUNTER PIRACY STRATEGIES THROUGH MULTILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE MALACCA STRAIT (2004-2009)

Bustanul Arifin & Nur Afni Damanik
Supernova Education Center
bustanul2arifin@gmail.com

Abstract

International Maritime Organization data shows that the trend in piracy in the Malacca Strait was significant from 2000-2004. In 2005, Malacca Strait was categorised as a high-risk zone by the Lloyd's Joint War Risk Committee. In 2000s, post 9/11 terrorist attack has galvanised the rising concern of international community over the security of Malacca Strait since there was a notion of sea piracy could lead to sea terrorism. Prior to 2004, apart from conducting unilateral patrols, Indonesia has bound itself to engage in bilateral cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore respectively. During 2004-2009, there were multiple multilateral cooperation initiatives proposed to Indonesia of which Indonesia responded in different ways. This research employs qualitative method utilising journals, reports, official documents, and books to analyse the implementation of Indonesia's counter piracy strategy in the Strait from 2004-2009. Indonesia's counter piracy strategy was implemented through MALSINDO Coordinated Patrol, Eyes in the Sky, which is later followed by Malacca Strait Patrol – Intelligence Exchange Group (MSP-IEG). The launch of coordinated sea patrols of MALSINDO in 2004 was followed with the air patrol of the Eyes in the Sky in 2005 and completed with the information sharing system through MSP-IEG in 2006. The multilateral cooperation conducted by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore has shown a positive result regarding the strategy to counter piracy in the Malacca Strait.

Keywords: Counter Piracy, Strategy, Malacca Strait, Multilateral Cooperation

Abstrak

Data Organisasi Kelautan Internasional menunjukkan tren perompakan di Selat Malaka dengan keberadaan yang signifikan dari 2000-2004. Pada tahun 2005, Selat Malaka dikategorikan sebagai zona berisiko tinggi oleh Komite Risiko Perang Bersama Lloyd. Pada tahun 2000-an, pasca serangan teroris 11 September telah membangkitkan keprihatinan masyarakat internasional atas keamanan Selat Malaka karena ada gagasan perompakan laut dapat beresiko terhadap terorisme laut. Sebelum tahun 2004, selain melakukan patroli sepihak, Indonesia telah mengikat diri untuk terlibat dalam kerjasama bilateral dengan Malaysia dan Singapura. Dalam periode 2004-2009, ada beberapa inisiatif kerjasama multilateral yang diajukan untuk penanggulangan perompakan di Selat Malaka dimana Indonesia memberikan respon yang berbeda. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode kualitatif berdasarkan jurnal, laporan, dokumen resmi, dan buku untuk menganalisa pelaksanaan strategi Indonesia dalam penanggulangan perompakan di Selat Malaka dalam periode 2004-2009. Strategi penanggulangan perompakan Indonesia diimplementasikan melalui Patroli Terkoordinasi MALSINDO, Eyes in the Sky, yang kemudian diikuti dengan Patroli Selat Malaka - Pertukaran Informasi Intelijen. Peluncuran patroli laut terkoordinasi MALSINDO pada tahun 2004 diikuti dengan patroli udara Eyes in the Sky pada tahun 2005 dan dilengkapi dengan sistem pembagian informasi melalui MSP-IEG pada tahun 2006. Kerjasama multilateral yang dilakukan oleh Indonesia, Malaysia, dan Singapura menunjukkan hasil positif terhadap strategi untuk menanggulangi perompakan di Selat Malaka.

Keywords: Kerjasama Multilateral, Penanggulangan Perompakan, Strategi, Selat Malaka

Introduction

Straits of Malacca is listed as one of the most strategic waterways since many of the world's largest economies are concentrated in Asia-Pacific region now (Calamur, 2017). It is entitled as the energy lifeline for countries like China, Japan, and South Korea considering the condition that more than 80 percent of energy imports and exports should be passed through the Strait to reach its destination in East Asia (Purushothaman, 2016). The Strait as well holds a vital role to carry the world's most used energy source—oil. Moreover, referring to the volume of oil transited through the Strait, Energy Information Administration (EIA) has listed Malacca Strait as the second largest oil chokepoint after Hormuz Strait with nearly half of world's oil passing through the Strait (EIA, 2017). Another thing should be noted is that Malacca Strait is the shortest waterway connecting Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean which makes the Strait is well-known as Sea Lines of Trade (SLOT) and Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) (Vadm & Rampih, 2005).

Stakeholders in Malacca Strait consist of littoral states, user states, and non-governmental actors. As endorsed by United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982; Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are recognised as the littoral states followed with user states which consist of foreign countries holding the interests in the Strait. China, Japan, South Korea, and United States are prominently classified as user states which have high stake most likely the littoral states in determining the security of the Strait as they rely on its existence to fulfil the countries' energy needs which somehow is critical for their economy. Another party is the non-governmental actors such as shipping companies which manage the sea vessels and crew directly (Filipe, n.d.).



Figure 1. Strait of Malacca Map (Encyclopædia Britannica)

Started from the early 2000s, the concern of piracy has raised along with the continuous incidents of piracy in Malacca Strait until the piracy was linked to the act of maritime terrorism—although there was no evidence of terrorist attack—hence, the international community became worried and through International Maritime Organisation (IMO), littoral states were suggested to have stronger cooperation in the Strait to counter the growing piracy attacks (Pira, 2011). Prior to 2004, in dealing with piracy issue, Indonesia never took a chance to engage in multilateral cooperation. Indonesia's counter piracy's strategy in Malacca Strait has always been taken through unilateral or bilateral form. Apart from conducting unilateral patrol in its water territory, Indonesia build bilateral cooperation with Malaysia (MALINDO) and Singapore (INDOSIN) respectively (Matthews, 2015). In accordance with the UNCLOS 1982, piracy has been defined as follows:

“Piracy is any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas against another ship or aircraft, or against person or property on board such ship or

aircraft (ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” (UNCTAD, 2014)

IMO has reported that most of the world's piracy incidents including attacks on energy vessels have occurred in Indonesia and Strait of Malacca in the period of 2000-2009. In its report, IMO has recorded 357 piracy attacks within the period of 2000-2009 (IMO, 2017). Strait of Malacca was ranked the second after Indonesia in collecting the number of piracy attacks. It is said that the record could be worst since IMO has estimated that nearly half of the piracy attacks in Malacca Strait go unreported due to the reluctant of the ship owners or the captain to hold an investigation that might delay the ship. In 2004, IMO issued a report that of the 330 attacks of piracy incidents worldwide, Malacca Strait ranked the second to collect the number and together with the South China Sea having more than half of the global total incidents (United States Department of Transportation, 2018). The record continued until the first half of 2005, until it came to worst since Lloyd's Joint War Risk Committee has classified Malacca Strait as a war zone in June 2005 (Insurance Journal News, 2005).

Since 2004, there were four significant multilateral security initiatives proposed to littoral states in Malacca Strait; Regional Maritime Security Initiatives (RMSI), Malsindo Malacca Strait Coordinated Patrol (MALSINDO) which was continued with Eyes in the Sky (EiS), and Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). Indonesia, however, gave different responses to those initiatives. In 2004, Indonesia made a highlight on its counter piracy measures since it was for the first time coming to an agreement to join multilateral cooperation through MALSINDO. In the same year, there was a proposal coming from United States (US)—

RMSI in which Indonesia rejected to join. As a continuing effort from the MALSINDO, Indonesia agreed along with other littoral states on the air surveillance programme—EiS in 2005, while the initiative from Japan, ReCAAP, launched in 2006 was rejected (Merdeka.com, 2007).

Therefore, this study would like to explore on how did Indonesia implement its counter piracy strategy in Malacca Strait through multilateral cooperation from 2004-2009? Indonesia's strategy to counter piracy in Malacca Strait will be a very important move in order to secure the condition of the strait during 2004-2009. Indonesia has stressed a strong message that the Malacca Strait security and control are very sensitive sovereignty issue. This condition automatically influenced by national interest of Indonesia. Therefore, this condition drives Indonesia to accept only littoral states and it rejects the present of US and Japan in the Malacca Strait. This assumption is based on the ideology of realism that puts national interest regarding sovereignty and territorial integrity as the main focus of Indonesia in the Malacca Strait. In the assumption of realism, states employ the rational model of decision making by obtaining and acting upon complete and accurate information. The state is sovereign and guided by a national interest defined in terms of power (Goodin, 2010). Littoral states in Malacca Strait at one point also show interdependence in terms of security since they share the territorial border in the water area within piracy as the existential threat (Pant, 2007). The cooperation is needed within such interdependence galvanised by different interests of the actors in the Strait to respond to such threat that later forms a complexity. According to Keohane, multilateralism is the practice of coordination of national policy of three or more states into a cooperative group (Roberth O. Keohane, 1990). Hence, multilateral cooperation can be defined as a

form of cooperation involving three and more countries which share the same vision to promote the common interests. In Malacca Strait, multilateral cooperation is conducted by the three littoral states; Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore with the existence of IMO to facilitate multilateral cooperation among member states. IMO has been working since 1993 by conducting international conferences and regional workshops in 1993, 1996, 1999, and 2001 and working closely together with ASEAN through ASEAN Regional Forum (IMO, 2005). This thesis employs a qualitative scientific research with the information based on several instruments consisting of news articles, publications, speeches, interviews, and internet-based sources. This research relies on publications including annual reports, press releases, and working paper that have been made sure coming from verified sources.

Strategic Importance of Malacca Strait

With the various assets of Malacca Strait, the most important one goes to the significance of the strait for transportation as it becomes the busiest and oldest shipping lanes in the world with goods and services worth millions of dollars passed through the region every year (BBC News, 2006). The strait is the main line for cargo and human traffic between the Indo-European region and other areas of Asia and Australia. The route from East to West will become way shorter through the strait compared with another alternative through the strait of Makassar and Lombok in Indonesia (Hans-Dieter & Solvay, 2006).

Malacca Strait is classified as one of the most important shipping lanes in the world, just as important as the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal with between 60,000 to 94,000 annual Tanker vessels carrying one-third of the world's global trade went through the strait (Sven, 2018). The Malacca Strait also serves as an energy lifeline for major economies such as China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as

more than 80 per cent of energy should pass through the Strait of Malacca to reach its destination in Asian countries. As for instance, Japan which imports more than 98% of the consumption of crude oil is wholly dependent on the Malacca Strait, as most of the vessels are using the strait to carry essential oil from the Middle East and West Asia (Forbes, 2008).

It has been recorded historically that Malacca Strait is a base of trade for countries in its surrounding areas and it has played a significant role in the formation of coastal areas like Aceh, Malacca and Johor. The Malacca also contributes greatly to the economic and social development of littoral states such as Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. If the security and stability in the strait are well-maintained; regional development, energy supply, and international trade between the EU and East Asia will automatically be safe (Hussin, 2009).

The political situation could be seen during the announcement of US proposal in 2004 to secure Malacca Strait from piracy threat as part of its counter-terrorism initiative. It sparked protest from Indonesia and Malaysia and resulted rejection from both countries while Singapore threw a support to US. This situation reinforces the importance of the Malacca Strait into the pulse of Southeast Asian economies and hold strategic value in terms of politics and security. Similarly, Japan response on the security of the Strait has caused sensitivity to Indonesia and Malaysia since Japan has been historically in favour on the matter of Malacca Strait. It was back on the time during the claim of Indonesia status as archipelagic state where Japan firmly rejected and asserted the status of Malacca Strait as international water following its highly dependent energy security in the Strait (Alfred, 2015).

One of the important values of the Malacca Strait in the economic sector functions as suppliers of marine resources in

large numbers and driving the economy of littoral states. It was counted that more than 380,000 tons of fish (more than 60% of the amount fishing per year) worth 2 million RM a year goes to Malaysia from the Malacca Strait. In Indonesia, the Malacca Strait is the second largest fish expenditure after the Java Sea. High quality fish from the Strait is very important to ensure socio-economic development; and sustainable and prosperity of the people (Gerke & Hans-Dieter, 2011).

Referring to the high trade activity and oil transportation and given the existence of marine resources, security is an important aspect of the Strait. Piracy as a threat in Malacca Strait has been known for long existence and somehow could threat the interests of littoral and user states. Since the attack was gradually increasing and not to mention the classification of the Strait as high-risk zone in 2005, the intention of user states in the security of Malacca Strait was its effort to protect its interest.

Piracy in Malacca Strait

Piracy in the Malacca Strait is currently a very complicated issue for countries involved in the activity of the strait especially Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore as littoral states which are responsible to rule over the strait for the security management (Hays, 2018). The Malacca Strait has been considered as a paradise and an ideal place to engage in criminal activities in the sea, since it performs high activities while it has been regarded as one of the narrowest chokepoints in the world. It is heavily crossed by large and small ships employed the strait for energy and trade shipping lanes (BBC News, 2006).

According to the UNCLOS 1982, the definition of piracy refers to the illegal acts or violence occur outside the jurisdiction of any states or international waters while most of the attacks in Malacca Strait took place in territorial waters falling under the sovereignty

control of littoral states. Therefore, technically illegal acts occurred in Malacca Strait cannot be classified as piracy using this definition. UN, then, came up with another term to define the illegal incidents in the Malacca Strait that falls under the jurisdiction of one country—armed robbery to refer to the attacks occur in a state's jurisdiction (UNCTAD, 2014).

To give an overview on global threat concerning on piracy and armed robberies, International Maritime Organisation (IMO) began publishing reports on actual and attempted acts since 1982 (IMO, 2018). IMO is the UN's specialised agency for shipping in international trade. It was established in 1959 as an Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation. The organisation focuses on issues such as maritime safety, maritime law, protection of the environment, shipping facilitation, and technical cooperation. In dealing with maritime piracy and terrorism, IMO established IMO's Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) (IMO, 2018). The IMO obtains reports from member states and regional and international organisations. The reports issued by IMO does not include any incidents occur in Singapore Strait. The report includes name and description of the ships; position and time of incident; consequences for ship, crew, and cargo; and response of crew and littoral states (IMO, 2018).

IMO has recorded piracy attacks occurred in Malacca Strait from 2004 to 2012 as presented on the Table 1 below.

Year	Malacca Strait	Worldwide
2004	60	330
2005	20	266
2006	22	241
2007	11	282
2008	2	306
2009	0	409

Table 1. Piracy Incidents reported by IMO (IMO, 2018)

According to the data above, Piracy trend in Malacca Strait has been fluctuated since 2000. In 2004, the number showed a decrease from 2003 as an impact of tsunami in Aceh in 2004. In this regard, international pressure did not give significant contribution in reducing the number of piracy attacks although it has been taken into more pressure (Thomas, 2013). Therefore, in 2005, the three littoral states put an effort on a joint meeting in Batam in 2005 and continued with Jakarta meeting in the same year. It should be noted that the decrease of piracy incidents in Malacca Strait until it reached on zero point, has shown the success of littoral's states strategy in countering piracy. The meeting in Batam which later resulted the Batam Statement was an effort of the littoral states to commit with cooperation in handling the problem in Malacca Strait including piracy (Ocean Policy Research Foundation, 2006).

The security of Malacca Strait was brought at the first time by the Tripartite Technical Expert Group (TTEG) which resulted the decision to establish MALSINDO coordinated patrol in 2004. It was followed with the two-day meeting represented by each country's foreign minister in Batam resulting a joint agreement on the concern of littoral states over the threats exist in Malacca Strait. It was seen as the first-time littoral states shown a commitment to conduct more comprehensive security in Malacca Strait. The committee addressed the decision of Lloyd Joint War Committee in listing Malacca Strait as a high-risk zone and agreed to conduct the forthcoming meeting in Jakarta in September. At that time, referring to the existence of incidents in the Strait, Malaysia came up with the initiative on the air patrol program, Eyes in the Sky to complete the existing patrol which were in favour of all the participating countries (Ocean Policy Research Foundation, 2006).

Indonesia's Counter Piracy Strategy through Multilateral Cooperation in Malacca Strait from 2004-2009

As explained in the Strategy Theory, a state's strategy is a function of its national interests along with the threats perceived as influenced by the strategic environment which includes external actors. Indonesia's counter piracy strategy in Malacca Strait, thus, was a function of its national interests—as mentioned in previous chapter consisting of national security and economic development—and its perception of threats—piracy and extra regional actors' intervention caused by its strategic environment (Yarger & Strategic Studies III, 2014).

Malacca Strait as the shortest waterway connecting Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean is vital to the global trade route and oil chokepoint that form as SLOC and SLOT. It becomes the oldest and busiest shipping lane in the world. Becoming the shortest sea lane between the two oceans, the Malacca Strait is the most economically favourable sea route. In 2004, there were about 70,000 ships of which 20,000 were super-tankers using the Strait as route transportation. It means that 200 ships have crossed the Strait each day (Darin, 2005). Overall, the Malacca Strait represents 80 percent of the trade volume of Asia Pacific countries or equal to 25 percent of the world's total of trade commodity (Darin, 2005).

As shown by the data of piracy incidents from IMO, the trend of piracy attacks was at the highest number in 2000. Although, it decreased gradually in the following year, however, the existence of the incidents was still of particular concern for user states and littoral states.

As stated in the strategy theory; strategy is needed in assisting decision making process to provide direction on how to maximise positive outcomes and minimise negative outcomes (Harry, 2006). Thus, in

dealing with piracy in Malacca Strait, a counter piracy strategy of Indonesia can be best explained through the definition of its national interests and threat perception within its strategic environment. Providing piracy as the existential threat, there was a need to enhance the security in the region. Indonesia, as littoral state, proposed MALSINDO Coordinated Patrol right after Indonesia threw a rejection to US Proposal (Yale, 2018). Later, there was an initiative from Malaysia and Japan which got different responses from Indonesia. Yarger through his Strategy Theory pointed out the existence of external actors will create a clashing interest that might threat state's own interest. Indeed, Indonesia should consider its national interests and threats perceived within its strategic environment (Harry, 2006). In this regard, Indonesia has firmly stated its stance towards the cooperation conducted in Malacca Strait in its Defence White Book 2008 in which no other country except the littoral states have the authority to rule over the Strait (Harry, 2006).

Considering Indonesia's national interests in the Strait and the threats perceived, Indonesia's counter piracy strategy was appeared on its decision to reject extra regional actor initiatives as it came from US and Japan which have been known to have a clash interest with Indonesia in an attempt to internationalise the Malacca Strait to be free passage (Senia, 2014). The sensitivity over sovereignty was a lesson learned from Indonesia back in the 1967 when Japan declined to recognise the precondition of 12 NM territorial water breadth of Indonesia and Malaysia. Japan, has historically been known to put effort to internationalise the Strait as its strategy to protect its interest on the need of energy security (Matthews, 2015). It is understandable since Japan's energy security is heavily dependent on its import, especially oil from Gulf countries which 90 percent was counted passing the strait to reach its destination to

Japan. The internationalisation of the Strait will benefit Japan, since it will make the Strait a free transit for the user states. Also, littoral states will lose its authority to rule over the Strait. Accordingly, as US has shown the same response with Japan in the 12 NM territorial claim of Indonesia and not to mention the ambiguity of US proposal to develop its forces in littoral states' territorial water, if Indonesia pursued with multilateral cooperation it could become a new threat that endangers the territorial integrity of Indonesia as the state end goal.

Referring the initiative to Malacca Strait, the basic idea of Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) is to establish standby forces which were ready to execute once the decision was made during the urgency. Thus, there were three components as structure of the RMSI (1) compilation of traffic picture in Malacca and Singapore Strait to be used for data and analysis, (2) decision-making procedure to determine the actions to be taken when a situation occurs, and (3) maritime forces to execute the decision made. Although this might be a good idea to track and execute pirate in the Strait, however, who would become the standby forces in the Strait and who have the authority to command an order are the two questions remained unclear (Matthews, 2015).

Indonesia, through the Foreign Ministry's Spokesman, Marty Natalegawa, responded with rejection over the US proposal as issued in his statement on 16 April 2004:

"The security of the Strait is the responsibility of the littoral states; the waters of the Strait of Malacca are part of the territorial waters of the coastal states over which they have sovereignty; and any activities or manoeuvres in the Strait by foreign vessel, which are not exercising the right of transit

passage—whether they are for civilian or military purposes—are subject to the consent of the respective coastal states.” (Senia, 2014)

By the same token, Malaysia was in the same stance with Indonesia which was right after the meeting conducted with Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Hasan Wirajuda in Jakarta; the Foreign Ministry of Malaysia, Dato' Hamid Albar publicly contended that the safety navigation and security in Malacca Strait were in the sole responsibility of littoral states (Senia, 2014). Unlike Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore gave different response over RMSI proposal by welcoming the initiative and invited countries outside the region to assist the patrol of Malacca Strait. In response with Singapore's decision; Indonesia's Minister of Politics and Security, Hari Sabarno, demonstrated the strong statement that consultation with Indonesia and Malaysia were needed before Singapore pursued with such decision in inviting extra regional country—US, to patrol the Malacca Strait territory. The statement was also supported by the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tun Abdul Razak as he brought the concern of sovereignty that could not be compromised in dealing with security issues and arguably stated that *“Singapore could not unilaterally invite US to patrol the Strait.”* (Gerald, 2006)

Seeing the misunderstanding on US position in RMSI, there have been efforts from US officials to clarify their positions with Indonesia and Malaysia. To Indonesia, the US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, in his visit, stated that there was no intention of US to send military forces and establish a military base in the Strait. The same clarification came from US Ambassador to Indonesia, Ralph L. Boyce, stressed that Admiral Fargo's statement was purely hypothetical (Hamzah,

n.d.). To Malaysia, Admiral Fargo clarified by himself during his meeting with Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak on 20 June 2004. He contended that RMSI proposal did not have any intention to deploy forces in the Strait, instead, he claimed the proposal was to assist littoral states in its security measure by providing intelligence and information exchanges (Hamzah, n.d.).

The clarification from US with clear intention not to involve in direct surveillance by deploying forces in the Strait did not affect Indonesia's decision over RMSI proposal. The rejection was clearly stated by Admiral Bernard Ken Sondakh, Chief on Indonesia Navy, *“There is a grand strategy to paint a bad picture over our waters, as if the Indonesian Navy is not strong and the crimes at sea are increasing. ... Indeed, if we cannot show the ability to guard the Strait of Malacca, the International forces may get in.”* (Watkins, 2004) Equally important, the issue of piracy and US proposal was discussed in the House of Representatives and Amris Hasan, the Chairman of Commision I (Foreign Affairs and Defense) classified the proposal as an act of intervention which further violates Indonesia's sovereignty. Other parliament members also made a warn to US to not commit any intervention in Indonesia's sovereign territory, instead, declared to support military budget to assist the development of naval capacity.

The same goes to the initiative of Japan. Given the fact that not only did ReCAAP gain regional support but also, its existence had been acknowledged internationally; Indonesia, however, was not party on the agreement. They did not sign the agreement nor ratify it. Following its rejection, Indonesia has given three main reasons on its decision. First, the condition in Malacca Strait was not in need of a new cooperation. Besides, there had been MALSINDO and EiS to provide coordinated sea patrol and air

surveillance to secure the Strait. Second, the representative of Indonesia's Foreign Minister reasoned that the rejection of Indonesia was based on its experience of false data reported by IMB. Indonesia had experienced the misinterpretation of data in which IMB list piracy attacks occurred in Malaysia territory belonged to Indonesia since IMB reporting centre was located in Malaysia (Antara News, 2018). Juwono Sudharsono, Minister of Defense, asserted that the delay of ratification of ReCAAP agreement was related to the sovereignty issue following the growing intention of Japan to internationalise the Strait.

The Implementation of Indonesia's Counter Piracy Strategies in Malacca Strait through Cooperation from 2004-2009

Considering its national interests and the threat Indonesia has to deal, Indonesia preferred to conduct counter piracy strategies with Malaysia and Singapore which were implemented through MALSINDO Coordinated Patrol, Eyes in the Sky, and further became Malacca Strait Patrol with the additional Intelligence Exchange Group program.

1. MALSINDO Strait Patrol

After rejecting RMSI, Indonesia proposed a trilateral cooperation for naval patrol in Malacca Strait to Malaysia and Singapore (MALSINDO) as response to the rising concern of international community over the security of Malacca Strait (Yale Global Online, 2018). It was for the first time, the littoral states pledged to work together as the proposal on the establishment of a joint task force within a trilateral cooperation framework on 18 June 2004 was accepted (Yale Global Online, 2018). As a result, the littoral states launched MALSINDO coordinated patrol on 20 June 2004. In its operation, the cooperation was agreed as to conduct cooperation through year-round

coordinated patrol, not to conduct joint coordinated patrol. Based on the definition, each country will build a naval base centre respectively in the region to conduct the patrol. Three naval command-centres, then, established in Batam, Changi, and Lumut to patrol each water territory. General Endriantono Sutarto, Indonesia's armed forces commander, during the opening ceremony in Batam, stressed the goal of the coordinated patrol was to tackle transnational crimes by enhancing the safety and security of the Strait, particularly subjected to counter piracy and armed robbery against ship (Collin, n.d.). He highlighted that, MALSINDO coordinated patrol was established to carry out the responsibility of littoral states to secure the strait and in the name of security of the Strait, the chance for other countries to join direct or indirectly remained open. However, it should be noted that, in his statement follows, *"if they want to join, it should be first approved by the three countries"*, the consents of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are of importance. For this reason, littoral states have showed its commitment on the security of its water territory as demanded by international community by finding a way to cooperate in multilateral framework as suggested.

As a matter of fact, the cooperation raised criticism started on the early establishment. IMB commented that the cooperation was not significant since the patrol cannot be conducted crossing territory, even in the condition to overtake pirates. In time of attacks, the limitation by littoral states could be used as a way out for the perpetrators (Amri, 2014). For instance, when a piracy incident occurs in Malaysia territory, and the perpetrator tries to escape, they would make a way out outside the jurisdiction of Malaysia's territory. Similarly, the criticism came from ASEAN member states which showed its worriedness on the military pact that might be raised in the establishment of multilateral

cooperation in the framework of security in the region. Indonesia, however, through Admiral Sondakh, firmly clarified in *The Jakarta Post*, that although MALSINDO was created in multilateral framework, there was no single intention of Indonesia to have a military pact in the region (Wu & Zou, 2009). He thoroughly assured the fellow ASEAN member states, that MALSINDO was not a military pact, hence, it has a strong support of Indonesia to secure Malacca Strait. Another criticism raised was that MALSINDO was just a public relations campaign of littoral states especially Indonesia and Malaysia as to show its commitment on taking serious action to secure the Malacca Strait from any transnational crime as they rejected US proposal (Wu & Zou, 2009). Apart from all the criticism, it turned out that the cooperation made a good light in addressing the piracy incidents as the data showed the significant decrease from 60 in 2004 to 20 in 2005 (Collin, n.d.). Thus, with support from the littoral states MALSINDO as a multilateral cooperation was a success on countering piracy incident in Malacca Strait.

2. The Eyes in the Sky (EiS)

Although the number of attack was in decrease and MALSINDO signed a success, however, the incidents still existed as showed in IMO's report. Hence, the effort to secure the Malacca Strait still needed to be enhanced. Moreover, in 20 June 2005, Joint War Committee, a specialized agency under Lloyd's Market Association which provide the list of higher-risk area for shipping around the world, included Malacca Strait as a high-risk war zone (RSIS-NTU). This brought a significant impact since it caused the increase of insurance premium for the shipping companies whose ships transited in Malacca Strait. Not only did it burden the cost to shipping companies, but also it affected the economy of littoral states especially

Singapore, whose territory was the smallest but carried the high economy activity. Under those circumstances, initiative of Malaysia to enhance the security in Malacca Strait was the most possible solution at that time to eliminate Malacca Strait from the JWC's list. The littoral states finally agreed upon the initiative and established EiS coordinated air patrol in Malacca Strait on 13 September 2005 (One Earth Future, 2018).

Under the program, Indonesia's patrol was enhanced by the additional maritime aircraft. Littoral states had to provide two aircraft per week for the Strait's patrol. Just as Indonesia limited the patrol on the sea up until 3 NM territorial border of the country, the same went for air surveillance through EiS, where the aircraft could fly to another littoral's state territory not less than three miles from the country's land. This limitation was agreed by all the participating countries (Simon, 2011). In the operation, each aircraft would involve a military officer from each littoral state to create a combined maritime patrol team. In the framework of EiS; Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore welcomed Thailand to join since its territory lays next to Malacca Strait. Furthermore, EiS has inspired Indonesia on the enhancement of MALSINDO coordinated patrol framework. To improve the MALSINDO framework, Colonel Surya Wiranto, Indonesian Navy's Western Fleet Command, informed that Indonesia had delivered its proposal on the additional membership to include Thailand and to allow the conduct of hot pursuit by the enforcement forces up to five miles to the neighbouring water (Senia, 2014).

3. Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) – Intelligence Exchange Group

The MSP Intelligence Exchange Group (MSP-IEG) was established in 2006 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand as an effort to support marine and air patrols

through the Malacca Strait Information System Patrol. It was formalised under the agreement of Malacca Strait Patrol (MSP) signed on April 21, 2006 governing the two on-going cooperations: MSSP and Eyes in the Sky. It was employed by optimising air and sea assets at the water to convey information from on-going incidents and for all time monitoring conducted. MSP-IEG is a data sharing system that enables users to share information about shipping vessels to enhance security in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore. The system includes a reference database of over 150,000 vessels and is capable of marking changes such as ships with false identities, as well as enabling information from an incident to be deployed rapidly to agencies in four coastal countries so that a coordinated response can be immediately followed up (Ministry of Defense of Singapore, 2018).

Since MALSINDO was established, the list of proposal continues to enhance the security in Malacca Strait initiated by littoral states. To conduct the three programs of MALSINDO, as a result, the participating countries, littoral states with additional country Thailand established a Joint Coordinating Committee (JCC) a place that is used by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand for head-to-head meetings of each country to discuss and define the policies taken related to security in the Malacca Strait. The JCC is chaired by the head of each naval operation which also act as the decision-making body of the MSP. JCC is a provider of communication channels between high-ranking officials from four countries participating in intelligence exchanges and coordination for all operational security measures related to the Malacca Strait and Singapore. JCC is an intelligence exchange group (IEG) formed in 2006, consisting of naval intelligence agencies from participating countries. IEG meets regularly to exchange information and every event in the MSP operation area is carefully studied by

various intelligence agencies. The observations will be shared and discussed during the meeting for further recommendations related to the implementation of future marine and air patrols.

Based on the figure above, the coordinated patrols in the Malacca Strait were first undertaken by Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore on July 20, 2004. On the patrol, each country launched five elements of marine patrol and two elements of air patrol (Gerard, 2006). In 2005, there was a proposal of the enhancement of security in the Strait from Malaysia, EiS, where it was accepted and launched in the same year to complement MALSINDO. The Malacca Strait Patrol is a coordinated military patrol conducted by the littoral states of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (RSIS-NTU). This patrol involves only the military of the three nations of the sea and air elements and does not involve the foreign military. This is because the three countries of the Strait are of the opinion that the security of the Strait of Malacca is the right and responsibility of the three countries of the Strait, so that other countries are not entitled to conduct security in the Strait of Malacca. However, the three countries of the strait do not close themselves to cooperate with other countries on the safety of the Strait of Malacca, but the cooperation is more to help the procurement of equipment and procurement system for security, while the military regarding actors to conduct the security remains on the military of the three countries (Department of Defense of Indonesia, 2008).

The Patrol Command Centre was formed by member states of MALSINDO (Yale Global Online, 2018). Indonesia has two command centres in Batam and Belawan. The marine patrol conducted by each country is not a joint patrol as it can enter the territory of another country but rather a coordinated patrol. That is, when in daily pursuit or patrol of the

military of other countries is not allowed to enter other sovereign territory of the country. The cooperation that was held in the Malacca Strait also involved other dimensions, such as the air force called Eyes in The Sky (EiS) (Senia, 2014). The EiS activities are coordinated monitoring and patrolling of the air by the three countries operating under a coordinated command structure. Under the EiS initiative, each country is required to patrol the air twice per week. Each flight carries a joint patrol team mission composed of personnel from participating countries (Senia, 2014). In 2006, later, Indonesia involved with the sharing information system with the other two littoral states and Thailand through the Intelligence Exchange Program. The participating countries increase the security through updated information on the condition of the Strait through Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG).

As a result of the implementation of multilateral cooperation for the security of Malacca Strait conducted by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore; Malacca Strait has shown a more conducive situation as the number of piracy indicated in data from IMO reported a significant decrease. In 2004, piracy there were 60 piracy attacks reported. One year after the implementation of MALSINDO Coordinated patrol, the number became 20 in 2015 until it was effectively implemented and showed in significant result with no incident reported in 2009. The data of piracy incidents during the implementation of MALSINDO Coordinated Patrol, the Eyes in the Sky, and Malacca Strait Patrol – Intelligence Exchange Group was provided in the table above.

Conclusion

Indonesia's strategy to counter piracy is a function of definition of its national interests and the threat perceived. As for Indonesia's national interest in the strait: the vital interest referred to the territorial integrity

of Indonesia regarding its survival as archipelagic state whose sovereignty has been recognised. From 2004 to 2009, Indonesia's counter piracy strategies were implemented through the launch of coordinated sea patrol of MALSINDO in 2004 and it was followed by the air patrol of the Eyes in the Sky in 2005 and completed with the information sharing system through Malacca Strait Patrol – Intelligence Exchange Group (MSP-IEG) in 2006. The multilateral cooperation conducted by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore has shown a positive result on the strategy to counter piracy in Malacca Strait. It should be noted as well, Indonesia interest in Malacca Strait relied on the economic aspect as the Strait is of utilisation for the global trading and oil chokepoints. With the consideration of its vital national interest in territorial integrity, multilateral cooperation to counter piracy attack should be taken cautiously. As US and Japan have shown its reluctance on Indonesia's territorial claims of 12 NM and pursued the intention to internationalise the Strait, Indonesia would rather conduct multilateral cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore as Regional Actors. That said, Indonesia's strategy to counter piracy in Malacca Strait through multilateral cooperation would better pursue with the cooperation with littoral states. In 2004, Indonesia proposed MALSINDO Coordinated Patrol as a possible solution instead of RMSI proposed by US. The success of MALSINDO followed with the initiative coming from Malaysia, The Eyes in the Sky in 2005. The strategy later was improved with the additional program, Intelligence Exchange Group in 2006.

In its implementation, MALSINDO after a year of operation of coordination patrol resulted on the decrease of the number of piracy incident from 60 in 2004 to 20 in 2005. Later, along with the implementation of Eyes in the Sky, the piracy trend showed a decrease compared to 2004, however, the number was

slightly increase from 20 in 2005 to 22 in 2006. As the program improved with the additional Intelligence Exchange Group program, the implementation of Indonesia's counter piracy strategy in Malacca Strait from 2004-2009 through multilateral cooperation showed a significant impact as suggested by the data from IMO where the number of piracy incident has reached the zero point in 2009 based on the data from IMO.

The strategic importance of Malacca Strait triggered US and Japan to involve directly in the security of the Strait. In 2004, US proposed Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) to develop a more integrated partnership to deal with transnational maritime threat that can provide immediate forces during the urgent situation. Japan's initiative, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was proposed in 2006 aiming to provide information sharing, capacity building, and cooperative arrangement for antipiracy measures in Asia. Both initiatives were rejected by Indonesia considering the concern of Indonesia over its territorial integrity as part of its vital national interest that would be challenged by partnering with US and Japan as reflected back in the history during the struggle of Indonesia over its 12 NM territorial claim for archipelagic state—US and Japan showed the strong rejection

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THE REASONING BEHIND THE PHILIPPINE'S STRATEGY TO COMBAT GLOBAL TERRORISM UNDER THE ADMINISTRATION OF PRESIDENT RODRIGO DUTERTE (2016-2018)

Rachel Kumendong
Univeritas Pelita Harapan, Tangerang
Email:rkumendong@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Since 2014, the Islamic State has emerged as one of the deadliest threats to world peace and security, as evidenced by the increasing number of terrorist attacks carried out by IS worldwide, and the number of fatalities caused by these attacks. IS established its strongholds in Iraq and Syria and is determined to create a global caliphate through the creation of IS *wilayats* across the world. In 2016, IS began to weaken and lose territory in the Middle East which resulted in it strengthening its power in Southeast Asia by forming a *wilayat* in the Southern Philippines. The presence of IS in the Philippines has been perceived as a national security threat in the country. President Rodrigo Duterte has formulated a national strategy to combat global terrorism in the country. This study aims to determine the strategy to eradicate global terrorism in the Philippines and explain the considerations behind the formation of that strategy. This research uses neoclassical realist perspective with major concepts named national security, national interests, terrorism, and counterterrorism. The methodology used is a qualitative descriptive research methodology that provides detailed explanations and a thorough analysis. The results of this study found five strategies to eradicate global terrorism in the Philippines, namely the importance of using military force, supported by strengthening laws on terrorism, security alliances, social rehabilitation, and regional cooperation. Furthermore, the existence of these strategies derives from three main reasons, namely the increasing prevalence of IS in the Philippines, the siege of Marawi, and maritime security in the tri-border area.

Keywords: *National Security, National Strategy, Global Terrorism, Islamic State, the Philippines.*

ABSTRAK

Sejak tahun 2014, Islamic State muncul sebagai salah satu ancaman paling mematikan bagi keamanan dan perdamaian dunia, dibuktikan dengan meningkatnya jumlah serangan terorisme yang dilakukan oleh IS di seluruh dunia, diikuti dengan banyaknya korban jiwa yang disebabkan oleh serangan-serangan tersebut. Kelompok teroris internasional ini berbasis di Iraq dan Syria dan bertujuan untuk membangun khilafah global melalui pembentukan wilayah-wilayah yang tersebar di seluruh dunia. Pada tahun 2016, kondisi IS mulai melemah dan mulai kehilangan daerah kekuasaannya di Timur Tengah sehingga mendesak IS untuk memperkuat kekuatannya di Asia Tenggara dengan membentuk wilayah di Filipina Selatan. Kehadiran IS di Filipina telah dinyatakan sebagai ancaman bagi keamanan nasional. Pemerintah Filipina di bawah pemerintahan Presiden Rodrigo Duterte merumuskan strategi keamanan nasional untuk memberantas ancaman terorisme global di negara tersebut. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui strategi pemberantasan terorisme global Filipina tersebut dan menjelaskan pertimbangan-pertimbangan di balik pembentukan strategi tersebut. Perspektif yang digunakan ialah neoklasikal realis dengan konsep-konsep seperti keamanan nasional, kepentingan negara, terorisme, dan kontra-terorisme. Metodologi yang digunakan adalah metodologi penelitian deskriptif kualitatif yang memberikan penjelasan detail serta analisis yang menyeluruh. Hasil penelitian ini menemukan adanya lima strategi pemberantasan terorisme global di Filipina yaitu keutamaan penggunaan kekuatan militer, didukung dengan penguatan hukum mengenai terorisme, aliansi keamanan, rehabilitasi sosial, dan kerjasama regional. Selanjutnya, keberadaan strategi-strategi ini derangkat dari tiga alasan utama yaitu meningkatnya prevalensi IS di Filipina, pengepungan Kota Marawi, dan keamanan maritim di tri-border area.

Kata Kunci: *Keamanan Nasional, Strategi Nasional, Terorisme Global, Islamic State, Filipin*

Background

For over the past twenty years, the world has been dealing with a new level of security threats that affect the lives of thousands of people as well as states in the world. The attack on of World Trade Center twin towers in New York and the Pentagon on September 11, 2011 by Al-Qaeda terrorist group, revived the international awakening of combating terrorism particularly after the United States (U.S.) called for global campaign on “war on terror” (Castro, 2004). Terrorism, categorized as a non-traditional security, is defined as a threat or violence attack on random or symbolic targets including civilians which involves political aims and motives, designed to generate climate of extreme fear in a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The act of terrorism usually being done by individuals, groups, or states (Lutz & Lutz, 2004).

The U.S initiative of “war on terror” not only influences U.S. foreign policy, security policy, and public opinion toward terrorism, but also contributes to the evolve of modern international terrorism agreements and conventions. In October 2004, the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1566 on threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist act (United Nations Security Council, 2004). Shortly after the 9/11 attack, the Council passed Resolution 1368 on the day after, declaring that 9/11 was ‘a threat to international peace and security’ and that is willing to take ‘all necessary steps to respond to the attacks’ (UNSC, 2004). In the twentieth-century, Al-Qaeda terrorist group was very prominent because it had established a wide terrorist network across the world. However, after the incident of 9/11, this terrorist group became weakened since the death of Osama Bin Laden (Lutz, 2004). Unfortunately, the decline of Al-Qaeda from global terrorism

power gives rise to another global security threat known as ‘Islamic State’ (IS).


IS has announced its presence on the international scene on 2014 when they successfully seized large territory in Syria and Iraq (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2015). Moreover, IS was known with some different names such as ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant), and Daesh (Irshaid, 2015). The use of “Islamic State” depicts their global ambitions to establish caliphate and to upholds Syariah law all over the world.

IS declaration of itself as a state is designed to promote it as an Islamic caliphate and its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as the caliph (Ganor, 2015). Further, it upholds an ideology of waging offensive jihad to establish God’s rule on earth (*Hakimiyya*). To IS, all of the ‘crusaders’, ‘disbelievers’ or ‘apostates’ have to be defeated. In the propaganda magazine of IS called *Dabiq*, it has declared:

The flag of Khilāfah will rise over Makkah and al-Madīnah, even if the apostates and hypocrites despise such. The flag of Khilāfah will rise over Baytul-Maqdis and Rome, even if the Jews and Crusaders despise such. The shade of this blessed flag will expand until it covers all eastern and western extents of the Earth, filling the world with the truth and justice of Islam and putting an end to the falsehood and tyranny of jāhiliyyah, even if America and its coalition despise such...(Dabiq Magazine, 2014)

Based on the statistical data provided by ‘National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’, IS has shown a serious threat to global security due to the increasing numbers of attacks worldwide along with the mass of casualties brought by the attacks.

Figure 1. 1 IS' Attacks Worldwide 2014-2017



Derived from the data above, the highest point of IS activities happened in 2016 with total of 1,153 attacks worldwide, increased by 18,99 percent from 969 of total attacks in 2015. (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses [START], 2017). The total deaths caused by IS also has significantly increased by 48,59 percent with total deaths of 9,180 in 2016 from 6,178 in 2015. Furthermore, there was an increasing number of the total injured from 6,608 people in 2015 to 7,789 people in 2016, with an increase of 17,87 percent. Lastly, the most significant increase of IS activities in 2016 was the total kidnapped with 8,391 hostages in 2016, increased by 74,63 percent from 4,805 in 2015 (START, 2017).

The number of attacks attributed to IS outside of Iraq and Syria increased 80%, from 44 in 2015 to 79 in 2016. This does not include attacks attributed to other organizations that have pledged allegiance to IS (START, 2017). Beyond Iraq and Syria, IS and perpetrator groups that have pledged allegiance to IS carried out attacks in more than 20 different countries.

This shocking reality amplifies that IS as global security threat. Moreover, in expanding its ideology and propaganda all over the world, IS utilizes the sophisticated use of the internet and social networks such as Twitter, Facebook and Instagram to reach vast audiences while

evading censorship. They skillfully produce intimidating videos that full of vicious terrorist attacks in which have intensified IS' influence (Ganor, 2015).

Nevertheless, three months after the declaration of its caliphate, IS appears to be crumbling down and losing some of its territory in Iraq and Syria, revenue degradation, and has dropped the number of foreign fighters joining IS, from 2,000 recruits every month to less than 50 which makes IS has to contend with desertions and fighting between foreign and local fighters (Griff & McAuley, 2016). They are now facing ferocious attacks from a coalition of 67 countries led by the U.S. on the one hand and Russia and Iran on the other, and is now in retreat (Siyeche, 2016).

Figure 1. 2 Comparison of IS-controlled Territory in Syria



In October 2014, the radical Islamist group controlled the central Syria all the way to the outskirts of Baghdad therefore IS territory in Syria and Iraq was at its maximum (see Figure 1.2). However, the map showed in 2017 that IS had lost large of its territory and now is only limited to the sparsely inhabited border territories between Iraq and Syria (Kranz & Gould, 2017). Although IS is facing great territory losses in the Middle East, the threat remains challenging. According to UN research, there is still up to 300,000 of IS fighters in Iraq and Syria (McKernan, 2018).

IS remains committed to its operating slogan of “remaining and expanding”, fighting to retain control of existing territories or recover lost ones, and declaring provinces where there is substantial local support. IS has been clear about this intention to turn to Southeast Asia as one of its major sites for operations where more than 60 groups have pledged allegiance to IS, along with IS declaration of establishing *wilayat* in the Southern Philippines (Munos & Taylor, 2017).

Since 2016, many of IS strongholds in the Iraq and Syria were taken down by the local government and coalition attacks. Thus, this indicates that IS influence in the Iraq and Syria is lessened and becoming weaker (Gunaratna & Hornell-Scott, 2017). As the situation goes on, it has driven IS to seek for another potential region to be declared as its new stronghold that possess political instability and lack of governmental infrastructure. Until June 2016, the IS central announced to declare the Southern Philippines as its *wilayat* in the Southeast Asia.

The Philippines is an archipelago of more than seven thousand islands which consists of variety of ethnic, tribal, and religious group. It is the twelfth most populated country in the world with population of more than a hundred and five million. Demographically speaking, Philippines' ethnic is fragmented as more than one-fourth of the Philippines population does not belong to any of the country's six largest ethnic groups (Watts et al., 2014). Today around 81% of the country's citizens are Roman Catholic Christians. Of the remaining people, 11% are from other Christian denominations and around 5.6% are Muslim, mainly based in the southwest area of the country (World Population Review, 2018).

Furthermore, the Philippines has undergone long history of Islamic militancy began with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) that demanded for greater autonomy from the central government in Manila. In

1990, after several split and splintering within MNLF, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) continued to commit insurgency throughout the Southern Philippines (Patrick & Collin, 2017). There are others several terrorist organizations that are listed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) such as; New People's Army (NPA), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Maute Group, the Rajah Soliaman Revolutionary Movement, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), and Ansar Khilafah Philippines (AKP) (Fabe, 2013).

Since IS declaration of the caliphate, many of domestic terrorist groups in the Philippines pledged allegiance to IS. The terrorist group has expanded its reach to the region of Southeast Asia particularly to the Southern Philippines, marked by the raised of black flag of IS in the city of Marawi on May 23, 2017 (Griffiths, 2017). Not only that, there is rising number of attacks perpetrated by IS-affiliated groups across Mindanao which caused many of people died.

The Southern Philippines is the only part of the Philippines archipelago with a sizable Muslim population, since at least the 1970s and the government has battled for decades with multiple rebel groups fighting for an separate Islamic state in the South (McKerdy & Berlinger, 2017). However, the attack in Marawi did not necessarily committed by IS alone but also IS-affiliated terrorists group that came from Philippines' domestic terrorist group, other terrorists group in Southeast Asia, and incoming foreign terrorists.

Figure 1.3 Philippines' Terrorism Index



According to the Philippines Terrorism Index, the terrorism index in Philippines increased to 7.13 in 2016 from 7.10 in 2015 (see Figure 1.1). The average is 6.65 from 2002 until 2016, reaching an all-time high of 7.27 in 2014 (Trading Economics, 2018). Surprisingly, the Philippines ranks 12 out of 162 countries worst affected by terrorism, according to the Institute for Economics and Peace's Global Terrorism Index for 2014 (Guzman, 2016). By the data shown, it depicts the emerging threat of the terrorism, particularly coming with the presence of IS in the Philippines which conducts attacks on government forces, and bombings in the country.

Considering the casualties and fatalities caused by the IS-affiliated activities in the Philippines, their existence become a threat to national security of the country as well as endanger the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. Also, the fragile location of the Southern Philippines known as the tri-porous borders, provides ease movement for terrorists to travel and infiltrate the Southern Philippines. In the other words, the Southern Philippines could be a fertile ground for the IS to executes its mission as well as recruiting people to fight with them.

As the response of this national security threat, the government of the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte utilizes the military power as the front line of strategy to combat global terrorism. By recognizing the real threat of global terrorism in the country, the

government reinforces its rule of law regarding terrorism act. Also, taking into account its alliance with the U.S., the government of the Philippines strengthens its counter-terrorism cooperation with the country. Moreover, in the regional cooperation, the government enhances its cooperation with Indonesia and Malaysia to tackle the issue of maritime security in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas.

Regarding the explanation above, there is an urgency to study on the national strategy of the Philippines to combat global terrorism, and the reasoning behind those strategies. Not only that IS will expand its influences in the Philippines to turn the Southern Philippines into its *wilayat*, but also the growing threat of IS in the Philippines presents a regional and international threat that needs to be addressed promptly. Hence, there is an urgency for the government of the Philippines to eradicate the threat with a solid and manageable counter-terrorism strategy.

However, there is still lack of resources or researches that discuss about the strategy of the Philippine under the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte to combat global terrorism, and particularly the reasoning behind those strategies.

This research aims to know the strategies to combat global terrorism in the Philippines under the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte and to describe the reasoning behind the formulation of the strategy. The following is the research question: "What are the reasonings behind the Philippines' strategy to combat global terrorism under the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte?"

Literature Review

To give a fundamental understanding of this study and to achieve the objectives of this research, the literature review will be classified into four categories which are the history and development of global terrorism, national strategy to combat global terrorism, the history

and development of Philippine's national strategy to combat global terrorism, and the national strategy of the Philippines to combat global terrorism under the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte.

The Nature of Global Terrorism and the Development of Global Counter- terrorism

The 9/11 tragedy convinced the world that terrorism had been a significant problem to international peace and security. Considering the complexity of terrorism itself, terrorism is perceived as a threat to the environment, human rights violation, in which it represents a global phenomenon (Carberry, 1999). The complexity of terrorism is elaborated comprehensively in the book of 'Global Terrorism'. Terrorism is defined as follows:

Terrorism involves political aims and motives. It is violent or threatens violence. It is designed to generate fear in a target audience that extends beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The violence is conducted by an identifiable organization. The violence involves a non-state actor or actor as either the perpetrator, the victim of the violence, or both. Finally, the acts of violence are designed to create power in situations in which power previously had been lacking (i.e. the violence attempt to enhance the power base of the organization undertaking the action (Lutz & Lutz, 2004).

According to Carberry (1999), there are three global nature of terrorism. First, terrorism is not limited to any one region, one state, or jurisdiction; but the impact goes beyond one designated area. Second, the advancement of terrorists' mobility to cross borders. Third, the victims of terrorist attacks might be varied and not necessarily even member of the same state (Carberry, 1999). Renato Castro De Cruz understands the nature of global terrorism as "threat without threateners." (Castro, 2004).

In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack, states agree that international

cooperation and global movement are required in combating this issue. Therefore, the post 9/11 world has been actively developing and pursuing its counter-terrorism strategy. An article by Michael Stohl about global terrorism explains Global War on Terrorism as the first global respond and the U.S.' strategy to combat global terrorism. This strategy focused on the use of military power through the launching of Operational Enduring Freedom in 2001 and later the attack on Iraq by the deployment of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 (Stohl, 2008). This article presents a critique to the U.S.' counter-terrorism strategy that opted a war-fighting strategy rather than criminal justice approach to counter-terrorism. Stohl (2008) argues that the Bush administration's counter-terrorism strategy had to be more likely as a state repression in states.

But what has not been examined closely is the relationship between these choices and the subsequent increase in both human rights violations and state repression in states that the U.S. has recruited into its War on Terror.

Other examples of counter-terrorism strategy in general, in addition to the use of military, are from functionalist approach and cyber counter-terrorism. In his article, De Cruz concludes that the best strategy to counter-terrorism is through cooperative security or functionalist approach rather than military mode. Taking the example of the U.S. approach to Southeast Asia after the 9/11, the functionalist approach emphasized on giving support to other states' counter-terrorism program, intelligence sharing, law-enforcement cooperation, initiating poverty alleviation measures, and institutionalizing international economic reforms (Castro, 2004). In addition to that, Stohl shows the actual implementation of De Cruz's argument through Global Coalition Against Terrorism by the U.S. which provide significant diplomatic

assistance to their partners in the coalition building (Stohl, 2008).

Rohan Gunaratna argues that the best way to counter-terrorism is through strategic counter-terrorism. He emphasizes the core of strategic counter-terrorism through the community engagement to build social resilience and counter extremism and rehabilitation and reintegration to deradicalize terrorist and extremists (Gunaratna, 2017). This article proposes that strategic counter-terrorism, alternately referred to as countering violent extremism (CVE), could assist in preventing the radicalization of those who are vulnerable.

Moreover, I found an interesting article which discuss about the use of internet as a tool for counter-terrorism. The advancement of technology also greatly influences the development of global terrorism as of now the world has witnessed the growing use of the internet by terrorists in spreading ideology. According to Lewis, the internet facilitates global terrorism for a basis planning, command, control, and communication among their organizational structure; and is primarily uses if for propaganda (Lewis, 2005).

Despite the development of counter-terrorism strategies, these efforts remain hindered by several reasons such as states' varying definition of terrorism, differing international legal system, and conflicting conceptions of the proper role of government (Carberry, 1999). Carberry (1999) argues that the global terrorism threat must compel states to look beyond its national border and national interest to be more cooperative with other states' policies. Through this, a better integration, uniformity, and harmonization can be fully achieved.

Since 2014, the world is facing the newly global threat known as IS. In the first half of 2016, it dominated the global threat scene by escalating its attacks in North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, the

Caucasus and Asia (Gunaratna, 2016). According to Hudson, although IS has managed to build its global terrorism network, it has lost 47 percent of its territory in Iraq and Syria, and is under several pressure by coalition attacks (Hudson, 2016). Likewise, Rohan Gunaratna reveals that the threat of IS remains challenging because IS still committed to its operating slogan "remaining and expanding", and need to be taken into account its expansion to declare a *wilayat* in the southern part of the Philippines as its caliphate in Southeast Asia (Gunaratna, 2016).

He ends the article by providing four recommendations to counter the global terrorism threat by IS. First, he argues that the center of gravity of terrorism is ideology, thus the Arab and Muslim world should promote tolerance and moderation among vulnerable segments of the Muslim communities. Second, there is a need of global leadership to counter-terrorism, thus the major power should collaborate to build military, intelligence, economic and strategic communication capabilities. Third, the promotion of inter-religious harmony and social cohesion is very important to prevent terrorist from spreading disunity and rupture in the society. Lastly, Gunaratna successfully explains that IS growing activities in the cyber space should be dismantled with partnership between government and technology firms and service providers (Gunaratna, 2016). Thus, Gunaratna's article completes the Lewis' writing about *The Internet and Terrorism* by providing a more comprehensive recommendation on how government and non-governmental organization can collaborate to counter-cyber-terrorism.

Neighboring Countries National Strategy

The previous category presents a broader and deeper understanding about the nature of global terrorism and the development of global counter-terrorism strategy. In fact, some of

academics and practitioners also contributes to excellent general recommendations that can be done by states in regard with counter-terrorism strategy. Hereinafter, I will elaborate in a more specific way counter-terrorism strategy that had been used by countries such as India and Australia. This category aims to provide a review of states' national strategy to combat global terrorism that in the future might become consideration or option for the Philippines' government to combat global terrorism. I have compiled some significant articles discussing about the implementation of national strategy to combat global terrorism, in which can be divided into two strategy: global strategy and national strategy.

In an article written by Puroshotham and Prasad, there is an in-depth discussion about how India improved its strategies to combat and counter-terrorism through its global counter-terrorism strategy. The global effort of India to counter-terrorism is adopted from Global Counter Terrorism Strategy issued by UN in 2006, in which all member states gave their signatures. The global instrument to counter-terrorism contains wide array of measures ranging from strengthening state capacity to counter terrorist threats to better coordinating United Nations System's counter terrorism activities (Puroshatham & Prasad, 2009). This article suggests the five-d-strategies to demolish global terrorism: Dissuasion, Denying, Deterring, Developing, Defending. In brief, the effort to counter-terrorism should involve active participations for governments, UN, and the private sector, by sending firm message that terrorism is unacceptable in any form thus all acts of terrorism should be eradicated.

On its national strategy, this article criticizes that India still has weak intelligence gathering and weak preventive measure (from Parliament to Judiciary) in combating global terrorism. However, there is merely a few articles that discuss about the national strategy

of India to counter-terrorism but rather provide suggestions on how to improve India's national strategy to counter-terrorism. Puroshotham and Prasad (2009) suggest that in order to have a strong counter-terrorism strategy in India, it should have firm national policy makers to create deterrent effect to terrorist. Also, it requires efficient and reliable intelligence system along with effective intercourse between the security forces of the country and its intelligence agency. Moreover, there is a need of high-level anti-terrorist squad which would have its branch in every state and trained taskforce for handling the situation after terrorist attack.

As for Australia, an article titled 'Degrading and Managing Risk: Assessing Australia's Counter-terrorist Strategy' by Andrew O'Neil questions if Australia has a coherent strategy with its counter-terrorism approach. On the global scale, Australia is more leaning to the American-led campaign on Global War on Terrorism. O'Neil (2007) argues that,

Australia has seriously compromised its capacity to counter terrorist threats by becoming too closely involved in supporting the American-led 'global war on terrorism' and associated (mis)adventures, especially the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003.

By this means, O'Neil claims that the Howard government has acted directly against Australia's interests by increasing the terrorist threat through the irrational pursuit of closer ties with the U.S.

On the other hand, Australia's national strategy for counter-terrorism is incorporated within these three pillars: domestic legislation, intelligence, and regional assistance and engagement. Its domestic legislation had been focusing on the draft of anti-terrorist legislation and amendments to existing Acts passed since 2001 (O'Neil, 2007). Besides domestic legislation, Howard administration fully optimistic with the Australian

Intelligence Community (AIC) as the ‘front end’ of Australia’s counter-terrorist strategy. As part of its national strategy, Australia tighten its relationship with Southeast Asia’s countries to counter-terrorism included expanded intelligence exchanges with consentient states, particularly Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand, as well as enhanced cooperation with Indonesian authorities in bolstering joint investigative and forensic evaluation techniques (O’Neil, 2007). Moreover, the most momentous initiative under Howard administration is the creation of the National Counter-Terrorism Committee (NCTC), two weeks after the Bali bombings. The government claims NCTC as ‘an effective nationwide counter-terrorism capability’ and ensuring the sharing of ‘relevant intelligence and information between agencies and jurisdictions.

The explanation above depicts the dynamic of the national counter-terrorism strategies of India and Australia as it is following the global situation of terrorism and the relevance to their domestic situation. Also, those strategies highlight the importance of strong intelligence system of the state and intercourse of security forces, agencies, and jurisdiction to create an effective national counter-terrorism strategy.

The National Strategy of The Philippines to Combat Global Terrorism Under the Administration of President Rodrigo Duterte.

Many articles have discussed about the history of terrorism in the Philippines and the national counter-terrorism strategy in the Philippines. However, only few have mentioned about the growing activities of global terrorism in the Philippines and the national counter-terrorism strategy of the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte. Therefore, the following review intends to elaborate literature of the current global

terrorism activities in the country and how the Duterte’s administration responds to it.

In regard to global terrorism in the Philippines, most of studies have discussed Mindanao as the most critical region used as the terrorist’s sanctuary in Southeast Asia. In his article, Collier discusses the growing role of Mindanao as the regional terrorist crossroads and as the weakest link in the entire regional counter-terrorist effort (Collier, 2006). Further, more complete exposure about global terrorism activities in the Philippines has been discussed in two articles titled ‘Southeast Asia Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Online Extremism, and Assessing the Feasibility of a *Wilayah Mindanao*’, which highlight the presence of IS in Southeast Asia, especially when IS militants managed to capture control of parts of Marawi City in Mindanao in 2017 (Habulan et al., 2018).

Some articles reveal the strategy of IS to penetrate the Southern Philippines is through propaganda called “The Solid Structure” in which inviting sympathizers in Southeast Asia, stating: “If you cannot go to [Syria], join up and go to the Philippines” (Habulan et al., 2018). IS also promotes Mindanao to be a permanent haven for foreign fighters or to be the caliphate of IS in Southeast Asia (Franco, 2017). Another reason of why the Southern Philippines becomes a fertile ground for IS-affiliated terrorists and rising foreign fighters are because of its strategic location as the porous borders in the tri-border area between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia that has facilitated the easy movement of jihadists to travel undetected from one country to another (Gunaratna, 2017). In order to deter the Philippines to be transformed into IS global caliphate, through her article, Angelica Habulan suggests that the Southeast Asian nations need to work together to counter such narratives through collective CVE and policy-based initiatives promoting tolerance,

moderation and coexistence (Habulan et al., 2018).

The urgency to discuss more about the issue of global terrorism in the Philippines is not fully supported by the availability of information regarding the current national counter-terrorism strategy of the Philippines under Duterte's administration. Surprisingly, I only found an article related with this issue. An article by Joseph Franco discussing the national counter-terrorism strategy of President Rodrigo Duterte which emphasizes the use of intelligence-driven and peace talks negotiation through the Mindanao Peace Process. Through that peace process, the government is making sure that the draft Bangsamoro Basic Law passes into law (Franco, 2017). Also, the government is now focusing on rebuilding Marawi after the catastrophe result from IS attack known as "The Battle of Marawi". At the end, this article concludes that Duterte should immediately formulate a nationwide CVE that brings together civilian and military stakeholders as an effective national counter-terrorism against global terrorism in the Philippines.

Theoretical Review

In conducting its counter-terrorism strategy, the Philippines is focusing its effort to the AFP (military power), declaring martial law, strengthening the criminal justice system, peace-building efforts of the government (Government of Philippines, 2017). These strategies reflect that the state is the central and therefore, the most relevant perspective of International Relations to understand this issue is through the lenses of realism.

Realism

The focal point of realism lies on the debates over state's national security and foreign policy. Realism argues that the priority of state is the state's national interests in which whatever enhances or preserves a state's

security, its influence, and its military and economic power (Rourke, 2009).

There are six basic shared features that identify realist theory. First, realist believe that the international system exists in a state of anarchy in which there is no entity more powerful than states and because of that there is lack of authority in international system and thus the international system is depicted as an arena of struggle for power (Goldstein & Pevhouse, 2009). Second, power is the defining feature of the international environment and that states are to act in an anarchic world through self-help to achieve their national interests (Collins, 2016). Third, realism regards states as unitary actors, meaning that the choices and strategies taken represents the state as a whole. Fourth, realism sees states as rational actors. Fifth, realism defines that states assess each other in terms of their power and capabilities. Sixth, realists see states as the key actors in the international system and argues that international institutions play less important role than states.

Following the various type of realism, I decided to use Neoclassical Realism as the theoretical foundation of this research because the theory can be best explained the relation between state's national security strategy through the means of military power toward potential threat, particularly the threat coming from non-state actor. This not only influences the states' domestic behavior, but also their behavior in the international system in term of the foreign policy.

National Security

In the book titled *Politik Global*, Jemadu argues that the concept of national security remains highly related with the use of military threat in solving disputes between international actors (Jemadu, 2017). Moreover, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (1998), proposed a study analysis for security that maintains the priority of military

aspect in defining the concept of national security as response to development of security studies in globalized world. There are three criteria for certain issue to be categorized as “security threat”, that are it is an existential threat (which is anything that questions the recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority), an emergency policy needed to solve the issue, and the conduct of mechanism outside of political procedure in normal situation. The security concept is therefore being revised and broadened to include sectors such as economic, environmental, transnational issue and societal developments.

Given an example, there is a plague of bird flu spreading rapidly across the country. In this context, this disease becomes national security issue because it rises ‘existential threat’ (Jemadu, 2017). Similar thing with the issue of terrorism, realists tend to assume that terrorism is an existential threat and of that the military can handle the threat for the sake of national security (Nincic, 1992). Therefore, the concept of national security will help us to analyze how the Philippines responds to a national threat (existential threat) that comes from non-state actor (terrorist group) with the utilization of military power.

Nevertheless, the issue of national security cannot be discussed comprehensively without taking into account the national interest of the state. Miroslav Nincic (1992) introduces three principles that should be fulfilled in order to interpret national interest. First, the interest must be vital to the state and the achievement should be the priority for the government and the people. Second, the interest should be related with international affairs, or affected by it. Third, the interest should be beyond the interests of particular groups but belong to the whole people of the state. Moreover, realism describes national interest as the state interest’s as a unitary actor which emphasizes its national power to preserve national security and survival of that

state (Jemadu, 2017). Given the understanding, the connection between national security and national interest can be described that national security means military power capable of protecting national interests. Sam C. Sarkesian (1989) provides definition which show the important relation between national security and national interest, as follows:

The confident held by the great majority of the nation’s people that the nation has the military capability and effective policy to prevent its adversaries from effectively using force in preventing the nation’s pursuit of its national interest.

Terrorism and Counter-terrorism

As mentioned above, Neoclassical Realism acknowledges potential threat to the state which comes from non-state actors. This research will emphasize the state’s strategy in facing potential threat coming from non-state actors named global terrorism.

A. Terrorism

By any means, the conduct of terrorism can never be justified. Before discussing the objectives of terrorism, it is important to establish some keywords of terrorism act (Sarkesian, 1989): 1) Violence; 2) Carried out by individuals, non-governmental organizations, or covert governments agents or units; 3) Target civilians; 4) Uses clandestine attack methods, such as car bombs and hijacked airliners; 5) Attempts to influence politics. Rourke (2009) argues that the objectives of terrorism is not merely about killing and wounding people or destroying physical material. Beyond that, terrorism aims to create fear in a civilian population in order to use its discontent as leverage on national government or other parties to a conflict (Goldstein, 2009).

Although the conduct of terrorism is seen as similar, it should be distinct between domestic terrorism and international terrorism. Domestic terrorism is the attacks by local

nationals within their country against a purely domestic target for domestic reasons. However, international terrorism defines as terrorists attacking a foreign target, either their own country or abroad (Rourke, 2009).

Moreover, many scholars had studied about the underlying factors that have been theorized to contribute to the existence of terrorism into three factors: political, economy, and changes brought by globalization. In the book of 'Global Terrorism' by Lutz & Lutz (2004), it explains that terrorism rises from dissidents who are not satisfied with the current government and demand for political changes. Government repression to some groups can also generate violent struggle to overthrow the regime. Further, Lutz argues that economic globalization has caused unequal distribution of wealth and this have fueled frustrations within states that can breed terrorism. Lastly, modernization and globalization bring changes into the structure of values and norms, including religion as a belief system. As globalization greatly marks with western culture and values, those are seen as threatening to local religions and cultures which indirectly contributing to terrorism.

B. Counter-terrorism

The threat of terrorism should be contended by state through some of counter-terrorism techniques included: 1) Security and Intelligence; 2) Law Enforcement; 3) Military; 4) Judicial; 5) Diplomatic; and 6) Political Cooperation. In the book of 'Combating Terrorism', Gunaratna mentions that the exchange of information between security and intelligence services across the world has been the oldest form of counter-terrorism techniques which it manifests through conducting joint operations against terrorist. This effort also supported by law enforcement that provides collection and analysis of counter-terrorism intelligence (Gunaratna,

2005). When the intelligence and law enforcement fail to achieve an effective counter-terrorism, the deployment of military operations takes role to combat terrorism (taking example of U.S. military operation in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda).

Another type of counter-terrorism techniques is judicial. Gunaratna argues that it requires governments to be more committed in developing up to common standards in its legislation, at least regionally. However, this remains difficult to be met due to the diverse legal system (Gunaratna, 2005). Diplomatic can also be a counter-terrorism technique as it is considered the first line of action against foreign terrorist groups operating overseas. An effective diplomatic measure should be supported by economic carrots and military sticks in order to yield desire result. Lastly, Gunaratna (2005) explains that terrorism can be countered politically when head of governments and states places terrorism on their national agenda. This should be reflected on their national strategy and policy so that the real action of counter-terrorism can be done effectively.

The Presence of IS in the Philippines

In 2015, IS officially declared their existence in the Philippines by appointing Isnilon Hapilon (senior leader of ASG group¹) to be the leader of IS in the Philippines. Tracing back to his records, Isnilon Hapilon was the leader of ASG in Basilan for five years and the deputy leader for six years (Gunaratna, 2016). The strategy of IS in designating a highly experienced terrorist leader to lead IS *wilayat* in the Philippines projects a long-term threat to the security of the country as well as the region. The most significant development of global terrorism threat in the Philippines was the support given by its domestic terrorist groups to IS. Thus, the IS possesses the

¹ ASG refers to Abu Sayyaf Group

biggest terrorist threat to the Philippines by numbers of domestic terrorist groups pledging their loyalty to IS and its caliph Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Earlier in December 2015, IS released a video featuring four battalions – ASG, Maute Group, AKP, and BIFF, led by Hapilon, pledging fealty to IS (Weiss, 2016).

Choosing the Southern Philippines as the basis of IS in the Southeast Asia region can be understood from two significant reasons: Philippine's history in dealing with domestic and international terrorist groups, and geographic reason. For the last two decades, the Philippines has been an important arena for domestic, regional and global terrorist groups. Since 1994, when JI established their first training camp (*Hudaybiyah*), the Philippines emerged as the training ground for Indonesians, Malaysians, Singaporeans, Thai Muslims and Arabs trained by Al-Qaeda (Gunaratna, 2016). Further, in terms of its geography, its porous borders in the tri-border area between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the area known for smuggling networks, arms trafficking and kidnappings, has become a hotbed for extremism and jihadism.

The Philippines' Strategies to Combat Global Terrorism

As the response of this national security threat, the government of the Philippines under President Rodrigo Duterte utilizes the military power as the front line of strategy to combat global terrorism. This is shown by the preeminent role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in tackling *terrorisma* and enforcement of martial law at the time of Marawi attack (Franco, 2017). In recognizing the real threat of global terrorism in the country, the government reinforces its rule of law through the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2018 (House of the Representatives of the Philippines, 2018).

Also, the government of the Philippines strengthens its counter-terrorism cooperation with the U.S., implementing development program (PAMANA) to promote peace building across the country, and enhance its regional cooperation through the Trilateral Maritime Patrol (Indonesia – Malaysia – the Philippines).

Reasonings of the Strategies

The formation of strategies to combat global terrorism under the administration of President Rodrigo Duterte needs to be understood by discussing the previous counter-terrorism strategies in the Philippines and further elaborating logic behind the construction of the current strategies.

I divide the history of Philippine's counter-terrorism strategies into three period. The first period emphasizes on the use of military repression by Ferdinand Marcos in which he heavily relied on the AFP role to combat terrorism and with the imposition of martial law across the country from 1972-1981 (Watts et al., 2014). The second period also known as transitional period which often involved conventional operations in which force was applied indiscriminately and began to forge peace agreements with each major terrorist groups. The third period signifies the cooperation between the U.S. – the Philippine in combating terrorism. Further, the government reduced the emphasis on force and instead focusing on development popular support and peace negotiations, and the increasing role of the police in maintaining internal security in conflict-affected areas (Watts et al., 2014)

Table 3.1 Philippine's Strategies on Counter-terrorism

Period	Strategy
1972-1986	Strong State Repression, Containment
1987-2000	Containment
2001-2015	Classic-counter insurgency, Conciliation

However, considering that global terrorism remains the most potent security threat to the Philippines, these variety of strategy are perceived inadequate to eradicate the terrorism threat from its grass hoot. Mostly, the problem happened because of lack of the previous governments capacity to implement these strategies effectively in the face of military opposition which hindered the success of their implementation.

Hereinafter, the following is analysis on the reasoning factors behind the establishment of President Rodrigo Duterte's strategy to combat global terrorism in the Philippines.

The Rising Prevalence of Terrorism in the Region

Philippines has had a long history of terrorism whereby terrorists have perpetrated a series of terror attacks across various installations within the country. The penetration of IS into the country has increased the number of terrorist attacks in the Philippines in which caused serious casualties including deaths of thousands of people and destruction of property worth billions of dollars.

Figure 3.1 Terrorism Activities in the Philippines 2014-2017



The figure above shows that from 2015, terrorist attacks in the Philippines were around 480 to 500 incidents (see Figure 4.4). The total deaths are increasing significantly until it reached its peak point in 2017 with 327 victims from 260 victims in 2015 (START, 2017). This data proves that the presence of IS in the country has inspired the IS-affiliated group such as AKP, Maute, and BIFF to commit more of terrorist attacks. The government has been officially acknowledged some attacks which suspected IS-affiliated groups as the perpetrator.

Moreover, below is some of the most fatal accidents of terrorism attacks perpetrated by IS-affiliated groups in the Philippines:

April 2016

The incident as a fight between government forces and IS, the group that fought the AFP was actually led by Hapilon. The counter-offensive led to the killing of 18 AFP members and injuring of 53 others, a significant setback for the government (Gunaratna, 2016).

September 2016

One of the most serious terrorist attacks by pro-IS militants in 2016 was the bomb attack in September in Davao City. The blast was masterminded by the Maute Group.

May 2017

During the Battle of Marawi City, radical groups aligned with IS attacked, occupied, and destroyed several key public buildings and held dozens of civilians' hostage as human shields. They also

reportedly massacred and beheaded captive civilians (Amnesty International, 2017).

From the accidents above, most of the incidents happened in the region of Mindanao. The high prevalence of terrorist attacks in Mindanao is largely due to the fact that the region hosts many terrorist groups, particularly those that were already pledging allegiance to IS. Some of the cities also have adversely affected by the activities of these terrorist groups across Mindanao include Davao, Zamboanga, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao and Cotabato provinces (Gunaratna & Stephanie, 2016).

Generally speaking, these attacks were not executed without any determined objective from the perpetrator. Concentrating their attacks in Mindanao indicates that these terrorist group would like to actualize the chief purpose of removing the entire Mindanao district from its allegiance to the government of the Philippines, establish an independent Islamic state in the Southern Philippines, and eventually declaring the Southern Philippines as the IS' *wilayat*. This is obviously a political-driven motive in which these terrorist groups aim to overthrow the central government by establishing their own government.

The real threat shown by the terrorist in separating the Southern Philippines also directly threaten the territorial integrity of the country in which this issue should be counted as a national security threat to the Philippines. If the government fails in its efforts to control and stop the activities of these terrorist groups, in the long run, the entire country of the Philippines, would be controlled by the terrorist.

Siege of Marawi

The siege of Marawi is the most recent and most serious crisis perpetrated by IS terrorist groups taken place in Marawi, the capital city of Lanao del Sur province in the southern

Philippine island of Mindanao. Marawi became the first city outside the Middle East and North Africa to fall to IS (Samuel, 2017). Before that, the Islamic State Philippines (ISP), led by Isnilon Hapilon, had been planning for the siege of Marawi since March-April 2017, and that the instructions came from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi himself (Buan, 2017).

The siege was conducted on 23 May 2017, led by the Maute Group also known as the Islamic State Lanao (ISL), with IS fighters infiltrating Marawi under the cover of attending a Tablighi Jamaat convention. They began on capturing key government buildings and setting fire to churches and schools (Gunaratna, 2017). It was estimated that IS had some 300 fighters at the start of the attack in Marawi. They comprised of 150 ISL fighters, 40 foreign fighters (mostly Indonesians and Malaysians), 50 *Yakans* and *Tausog* from the Abu Sayyaf Group, 30 *Balik Islams* (converts to Islam) and 30 Maguindanaon people. As the ongoing-armed conflict intensified, they received reinforcements from Lanao, Maguindanao and Basilan provinces.

According to the information released by the government, more than 800 militants including terrorist leaders Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute and 160 government troopers were killed in armed clashes since May 23. The crisis also displaced about 360,000 individuals or 72,000 families. (Romero, 2017). This is the highest military death toll in recent Philippines history.

Not only by launching physical attack, IS also attempted to gain Muslim support and legitimacy for its military action in Marawi through propaganda in social media. In the Telegram chat groups, IS proclaiming that Marawi is an 'Islamic State' and labeled the siege as an expansion of the Islamic State into East Asia. Furthermore, IS portrays government soldiers as 'crusaders' and frame the siege as a fight between good and evil, and between Islam and non-believers.

Regional Maritime Security in the Tri-Border Area

Maritime security in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas plays prominent role in determining the development of global terrorism, particularly IS' operation in the region. Due to its strategic location, the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas are important because they facilitate the cross-border movement of millions of people as well as international navigation. According to one recent estimate by the Indonesian foreign ministry, every year more than 100,000 ships pass through the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas carrying 55 million metric tons of cargo and 18 million passengers (Parameswaran, 2016).



Figure 3.2 Map of the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas

However, the tri-border area had been long exploited by terrorists as a key transit hub between the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia (see figure 4.5) (Ayunida, 2015). The porous with almost no control of the government in Southern Philippines suits IS designs to reinforce and consolidate its presence in the region (Gunaratna, 2017). In relation to the IS' attack in Marawi, they used the existing linkages among Southeast Asian jihadists which make Mindanao vulnerable to infiltration by returning foreign fighters. Proven during the IS siege in Marawi, at least 40 foreigners engaged in combat with the security forces.

The 'terrorist transit triangle' is also known for the ease of movement for other

undocumented individuals. For example, General Santos City in Eastern Mindanao is a known ingress point for Indonesian militants but has limited intelligence coverage available. This distinct geography and border configuration once provided JI a conducive environment for the movement of logistics to launch its attacks. Further, Maute and Abu Sayyaf terrorists in Mindanao have often kidnapped tourists, fishermen and sailors in the Sulu archipelago, which includes the Sulu Sea and the northern limit of the Celebes Sea (Chan & Soeriaatmadja, 2017).

From March to July 2016, ASG conducted a total of five separate kidnap-for-ransom attacks in the area. The newest case involved the hijacking of a South Korean cargo ship sailing through the Sulu Sea (Channel News Asia, 2016). Transnational criminal activities sustain the group's operations; ASG is reported to have accumulated USD 7.3 million in ransom money just in the first half of 2016.

Therefore, reminding that the threats in that area have also grown more serious, the government should be able to tackle this maritime issue by conducting a more coordinated response from the countries involve namely the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Ensuring security in the tri-border area requires the cooperation of those parties which could be implemented in the form of more advance joint military patrol and joint military exercise.

Conclusion

Since 2014, IS declared its existence to the international scene that promotes itself as an Islamic caliphate and to establish God's rule on earth. Starting from the Syria, it began to spread fear across the world by conducting attacks worldwide with the mass casualties brought by the attacks. The terror of IS as global threat reached its peak in 2016. In 2017, IS facing great territory losses in the Middle East and led them to amplify their forces in the

Southeast Asia by declaring the Southern Philippines as IS *wilayat* in the region.

There are two major reasons of why IS chose the Southern Philippines to be its *wilayat*. First, the Southern Philippines is home for domestic terrorist groups in the country and basis for Southeast Asia's terrorist training camp. Secondly, the tri-border area in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas is recognized as a hotbed for extremism and jihadism. The presence of IS in the Philippines was supported by several domestic terrorist groups in which they believe that by supporting IS, it can liberate Mindanao from the central government to be an independent Islamic state for Filipino Muslim. Therefore, the presence of IS in the Philippines possesses a national security threat to the country.

In combatting this issue, the government took six courses of actions: amendment of the legal basis of terrorism, military power through AFP, martial law, U.S. – Philippines Security Cooperation, PAMANA programs, and the enforcement of Trilateral Maritime Patrol. Among the six strategies mentioned, military is the primary strategy of the

Philippines to eradicate the threat of terrorism in the country.

Subsequently, there are three reasonings upon the formulation of the strategy. The first reasoning is the rising prevalence of terrorism in the region and long history of armed movement operation in the area. The IS-affiliated groups have committed more attacks across the country which mainly taken place in Mindanao, and also resulted in rising death toll. The most serious crises of the attacks are the siege of Marawi which became the second reasoning of the formulation of the strategy to combat global terrorism. The siege of Marawi had proven that IS was establishing its *wilayat* in the Southern Philippines by involving domestic fighters and foreign fighters and had caused hundreds of people killed. Considering the casualties caused by this incident, the siege of Marawi is the highest military death toll in recent Philippines history. Lastly, the government took into account the aspect of maritime security in the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas that had been exploited by terrorist groups as their key transit hub in Southeast Asia due to the lack of governance or government control in that area.

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MALAYSIA AND MAHATHIR IN THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE

Sigit
WASEDA University, Japan
Email: sigetcandrawiranatakusuma89@gmail.com

ABSTRAK

Tujuan *paper* ini adalah untuk menganalisis kebijakan Mahathir melalui perspektif sejarah terhadap perkembangan politik dan tantangan di Malaysia. Selain itu, Penulis menggunakan data sekunder untuk mengumpulkan berbagai literatur terkait dengan topik tersebut. Kembalinya Mahathir Muhammad, Bapak Modernisasi Malaysia, dalam Pemilihan Umum ke-14 setelah meninggalkan panggung politik lebih dari satu dekade telah menarik perhatian masyarakat global. Sebagai kritikus pada korupsi dan kemunduran ekonomi Malaysia, dia memutuskan untuk maju dalam pemilihan umum sekali lagi. Selama pemerintahan sebelumnya, Mahathir dengan proyek megah yaitu Pembangunan Putra Jaya dan kebijakan luar negerinya, terkenal dengan “*Look East Policy*” menjadi bagian dari identitasnya. Kebijakan “*Look East Policy*” dikembangkan untuk meningkatkan pertumbuhan ekonomi domestik dan karena Malaysia perlu belajar dan mengadopsi budaya dari Jepang dan Korea, seperti kedisiplinan dan kerja keras. Melalui Kebijakan tersebut, Malaysia telah melakukan kerjasama dengan negara Timur (Jepang dan Korea). Selain itu, Mahathir menolak penerapan nilai-nilai Barat dan menganggap bahwa nilai Barat tidak sesuai dengan Asia. Negara-negara Barat menganggap Mahathir sebagai penghalang persatuan negara Barat dengan negara Asia sejak berkembangnya paham “*Asian Values*” pada tahun 1990an. Secara Keseluruhan, *paper* ini berpendapat bahwa Mahathir hanya fokus kepada kepentingan dan kedaulatan negaranya dan menjaga eksistensi Malaysia di dunia internasional.

Kata kunci: Mahathir, Nilai Asia, Kebijakan Melihat ke Timur, Malaysia

ABSTRACT

The aim of this study is to analyze Mahathir’s policy through a historical approach to the political developments and challenges in Malaysia. In addition, the author uses secondary data in order to collect several resources related to the topic. The comeback of Mahathir Mohammad, the Father of Malaysian modernization, in the Malaysian 14th general election after leaving the political stage for more than a decade draws many global eyes. As the great critics of the corruption and downturn of Malaysian economic conditions, he decided to run in Malaysia once again. During his previous administration, his mega-project named Pembangunan Putra Jaya and his famous foreign policy “*Look East Policy*” became a part of his identity. The “*Look East Policy*” was developed in order to increase domestic economic growth and because Malaysia needed to learn and adopt cultural features from Japan and Korea, such as discipline and hard work. Through this policy, Malaysia began cooperating with East countries (Japan and Korea). In addition, Mahathir had been opposing Western values and deemed them incompatible with Asia. The West considers Mahathir to be an obstacle in uniting Western and Asian countries following the emergence of Asian values since the 1990s. Overall, this study suggests that Mahathir is only focused on his country’s national interest and sovereignty and maintaining Malaysia’s international standing.

Keywords: Mahathir, Asian Values, Look East Policy, Malaysia.

Introduction

The return of Mahathir Mohammad on the Malaysian political stage after retiring for 15

years from his position as Prime Minister and leader of the Barisan Nasional party (UMNO / United Malay National Organization) since

2003 produced a separate discourse. It's becoming one of the trending topics in several international media because of his age, 93 years as a Prime Minister candidate when the election took place in Malaysia. After completing medical studies, Mahathir opened a clinic his birthplace along with his wife who is also a medical expert. However, after a few years Mahathir understood that the country's economic conditions related to the welfare of the Malaysian people were still experiencing a downturn. This prompted Mahathir to decide to enter politics which began membership in the UMNO party. But his decision right now was motivated by the corruption such the issue on 1Malaysia Development Berhad (IMDB), the lowest national economic growth and huge debt under previous government. Regarding the background, this study will analyze on "How does Mahathir's policy impact toward Malaysia economy and political development?"

Mahathir Administration

Mahathir's long journey in Malaysian politics led him to occupy a number of positions, starting with parliamentarians, Ministers, and was elected as Prime Minister from 1981 to 2003 (Muda, 2008). During his 22 years in leading Malaysia, Mahathir has scored various successes. From the aspect of infrastructure, he has built public transport such as: MRT (Mass Rapid Transit), LRT (Light Rail Transit), and trains that connect several major cities on the Malay Peninsula. The saturation of the capital city of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur as the core of business, education, and tourism, underwent a significant change when Mahathir created a mega-project namely Pembangunan Negeri Persekutuan Malaysia, Putra Jaya. Pembangunan Putra Jaya is a solution for the Malaysian government to be more effective and efficient. Putra Jaya was also highlighted by the International Community for Malaysia's success in moving its central government. To

meet the electricity needs, Mahathir built the "Bakun Dam" Giant Dam in (Sarawak) East Malaysia. It is expected that the project can meet domestic energy needs.

In 1997/1998, Mahathir was the key in protecting his economy when the neighboring countries experienced economic crises (Dosch, 2014). He firmly "REFUSED" offers of "soft loans" from the IMF and World Bank. However, this is what makes Malaysia a survivor of the huge debt felt by other countries, such as Korea and Indonesia. Mahathir said that the economic crisis was his country's responsibility and that debt with American institutions (IMF and World Bank) was not a solution and guarantee of the future. However, when other countries have difficulty facing the economic crisis, they are inaugurated the twin towers (Twin Tower) of PETRONAS. The existence of the tower is a symbol of the progress and civilization of Malaysia in the international community. The rapid development of infrastructure in Malaysia in the 1990s indicated that Malaysia had succeeded in increasing the country's economic growth.

Mahathir's Foreign Policy

To increase domestic economic growth, improve human resources, develop technology and strengthen relations with other countries, Mahathir introduced his foreign policy, namely "Look East Policy" (Furuoka, 2007). The policy became the identity of Mahathir in leading Malaysia for more than two decades. Mahathir clearly said that Malaysia deserves to learn and adopt cultures from Japan and Korea, such as discipline and hard work. Through Look East Policy, in the aspect of education, Mahathir sent tens of thousands of Malaysian students to continue their higher education in Japan and Korea. This indirectly results in closer relations between countries. Students who have completed education at the University become a bridge for Japanese and

Korean companies to invest in Malaysia. In addition, Malaysia itself provides easier access to Japanese and Korean investors. In the aspect of technology, Japan indirectly transfers technology with the construction of public transport, such as: MRT and LRT. This certainly makes the Malaysian Community understand and enjoy global technological advancements that have been developed by developed countries.

Regarding national cars, Mahathir offers cooperation in the automotive sector with Japanese companies, such as Mitsubishi, Toyota, Honda, and Kawasaki to help Malaysia produce national car products popularly known as PROTON (Furuoka, 2007). PROTON's presence became a symbol of reinforcement for the progress of Malaysia at that time, because Malaysia became the first country in Southeast Asia to have a National Car. Furthermore, PROTON is produced in large quantities to be sold to neighboring countries. ASEAN member countries, such as Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines and Thailand, have become PROTON markets at the regional level. Even in Indonesia alone, PROTON showrooms are perched in several major cities including Jakarta.

Technological developments and the economic shift of Malaysian society towards a middle-income society have brought many changes to domestic development. Communities are increasingly critical of government programs, such as infrastructure development in the form of toll roads and highways to facilitate goods and human mobility. Malaysia adopted a development model adopted by Japan in its country to make improvements to the physical infrastructure and culture of the people. However, Mahathir's policy in the form of Look East Policy invited critics from western countries, such as the UK and U.S. Western countries advise Malaysia not to fully see

Japan and Korea as the country's development models. The UK also stressed the importance of cooperation between Commonwealth countries. However, the labels and assumptions of the western state turned out to be like a passing wind for Mahathir. The West's distrust of Malaysia to become a developed country is a challenge for Mahathir. Of course, the West is aware that the deterioration of their relationship with Malaysia has an impact on the slow pace of economic growth. In addition, Mahathir also emphasized its citizens to continue higher education in Japan and Korea not to UK, US, or other European countries. Mahathir's policy became a warning and slap for western countries, especially the UK, which at that time carried out controversial policies with increases in tuition fees for all foreign students in the U.K. Universities (Furuoka, 2007). This made Mahathir send a protest note and hold a limited meeting to avoid negative effects for Malaysian students studying in the UK.

Mahathir, Asian Values, And Economic Growth

Together with the Former Singapore Prime Minister, Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, Mahathir firmly rejected the western state project labeled Human right and Democracy. The Human rights conference held in Vienna in 1993 and attended by dozens of countries from various regions, did not seem to produce a consensus that could be accepted by all state representatives present, especially countries in Asia, such as: Malaysia, Singapore and China. Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew, the two explained that Asia does not need to adopt and introduce western values (western values), because Asia itself has a strong cultural foundation and is familiar with the Asian Values. The definition of human rights has many interpretations for Western and Asian societies. For Western society, freedom is a priority in several aspects. However, this is

contrary to the application of freedom for Asian people who still need discipline and hard work, respect the older, and maintain family values (Ciorciari, 2012). Western Values described in the form of human rights and Democracy are clearly not in line with Asian Values (Thompson, 2004). The emergence of Asian Values, which has become a discourse in International Relations since the 1990s has resulted cross ideas between the East and the West, even Asia insisted to maintain his own values. However, the existence of the East Asian Miracle from 1965-1985 led by Japan, followed by South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and several other Southeast Asian countries, such as Malaysia and Indonesia, became a strong reason to reject and become a fence iron against the entry of western culture in Asia (Furuoka, 2007). Malaysia as one of the nations in Asia has shown the World that its country is able to stand in line with other developed nations. The Malaysian economy has progressed very rapidly, and national politics has been stable with minimal domestic conflict.

Mahathir and 14th General Election

Mahathir's long journey on the Malaysian political stage from 1981 to 2003 has provided many changes so he was called the Father of Malaysian Modernization. Mahathir's name has never vanished from political conversation in Malaysia and Asia. Even his policy is a reference and model of development for countries in Asia and Africa. After leaving the political stage for more than a decade, Mahathir began to speak out and criticize the government because Malaysia's economic conditions experienced a downturn. The Ringgit exchange rate fell, foreign debt swelled, economic growth was very slow, people's welfare was far from the standard, and the cost of living was increasingly expensive. Mahathir's sharp criticism is increasingly overflowing and has the support of Malaysian

society. This still continues ahead of the 14th Malaysian Prime Minister or PRU election when 93-year-old Mahathir decides to contest the election of the Prime Minister in order to overthrow corrupt Governments and improve the Malaysian economy.

The appearance of Mahathir in the 14th PRU not only shocked the Malaysian community, but also the international community. Mahathir's presence in Malaysian politics indirectly strengthens the position and image of Malaysia in the international community. The world knows and is familiar with him, especially the western countries that have been and are often hostile to Mahathir in aspects of international policy ideas. Mahathir reaps a variety of predictions, for ASEAN, he is a breath of fresh air to reaffirm the establishment of ASEAN by promoting the basic principles of ASEAN, namely increasing the welfare of ASEAN people and maintaining ASEAN regional stability. In contrast to western countries, they have concerns if Mahathir is re-elected as Prime Minister of Malaysia. The West considers Mahathir to be one of the obstacles and a gap to unite Western and Asian countries (Bernama, 2019). Mahathir's idea that is always sensitive and opposing to the western countries is also a stumbling block in producing consensus.

Mahathir was not only careful and understood well about the dynamics of international politics, but also mastered the domestic problems of his country that was in debt. On September 8, 2016, Mahathir has formed a new party in Malaysia, the Malaysia United Native Party (PPBM). However, to advance to the election of the Prime Minister, Mahathir decided his Party joined the opposition (Pakatan Harapan) which consisted of several parties, such as the Democratic Action Party (DAP), the People's Justice Party (PKR), and the National Amanah Party (AMANAH).

After going through the campaign period, general elections and vote counts as part of the democratic process, Mahathir who ran as Prime Minister of Malaysia through the Pakatan Harapan coalition party won 112 parliamentary seats out of a total of 222 seats. Finally, on May 10, 2018, Mahathir Mohammad was officially appointed as the 7th Malaysian Prime Minister replacing Najib Razak (Mahathir Mohamad sworn in as new leader of Malaysia, 2018).

Mahathir's Policy And Chinese Project

Malaysia's political event which is still held by Mahathir is a concern for its neighbors. Within weeks of serving as the new Prime Minister, Mahathir conducted an evaluation of all mega-projects in Malaysia, most of which were included in the China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project. Mahathir emphasized the importance of the project on a priority scale for Malaysia's current needs given the increasing amount of state debt. Through his economic advisors and ministers, Mahathir decided to cancel several major Chinese projects and postpone other projects until the Malaysian economy recovered (Erickson, 2018). Mahathir's policy certainly made China angry because Mahathir indirectly opposed the Chinese agenda in the frame of "One Belt and Road" or OBOR by reevaluating all cooperation that had been approved by the previous government, such as the Kuala Lumpur-Singapore Fast Train, which was included in the SKRL project (Singapore-Kunming rail link).

Mahathir And Singapore Relation

International communities, such as: China, Japan and Korea cannot underestimate Mahathir's policies. He is not only the key to entering investment in Malaysia, but also an obstacle to intervention from other countries. Mahathir has pledged to the Malaysian community to improve the economy of his

country which is in decline. So that various policies are used to get out of debt. Not only with China, Mahathir also evaluated cooperation with Singapore (Sidhu, 2006), which has been going on for decades regarding the sale of clean water to Singapore. Mahathir will force change in consensus regarding the selling price of Malaysian clean water to Singapore because according to him the current selling price is very inappropriate and detrimental to Malaysia (Sidhu, 2006).

Reflecting on Mahathir's political actions when his old friend, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew led Singapore, Mahathir once threatened to stop the supply of clean water to Singapore from Johor. This certainly becomes a serious problem for relations between the two countries. It is undeniable, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong who is also the son of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew certainly needs to learn from Mahathir to find out how to maintain relations with other countries. Indirectly, concerns were clearly felt by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong when Human Half Gods, a term for Mahathir to lead Malaysia back. Not only the issue of Clean Water, Singapore also has to deal with border issues with Malaysia. Mahathir made an agenda to make a mega-project in the form of Artificial Islands, which is larger than Batu Island Puteh (Branca Islands).

Mahathir And Japan Relation

However, the return of Mahathir to the Malaysian political scene was a breath of fresh air for Japanese and Korean investors. Japan and Korea, both of which are ready to take over various projects launched by Mahathir. This was proven by Mahathir's first state visit to Japan after being appointed as Prime Minister of Malaysia. Mahathir's agenda to Japan is certainly clearly related to economic cooperation and reminds Japan of the longstanding relationships that have been

established and has succeeded in increasing economic growth for both countries (Japan and Malaysia eye close ties based on Mahathir's 'Look East' policy, 2019). Without circumvention, Malaysia currently needs Japanese assistance to improve Malaysia's fallen economy. On the other hand, this is an opportunity for Japan to become a leading investor in Malaysia, because in recent decades China has dominated investment in Malaysia.

Conclusion

The political and economic shift is a challenge for Mahathir to bring Malaysia to a better direction. During his visit to Beijing, China, after meeting with President Xi Jinping, Mahathir emphasized the importance of mutual trust for the relationship between the two countries in the future. Mahathir conveyed directly the cancellation of the mega-project in front of President Xi Jinping because Malaysia's economic conditions were very bad. Malaysia certainly wants to cooperate with China because China is the country with the second largest economic power in the World after U.S and one of the countries that have helped several ASEAN countries during the economic crisis. But for now, Mahathir is only focused on restoring his country's economy. Within a few months as Prime Minister, Mahathir clearly did not prioritize the interests of the individuals compared to his State. In addition, Mahathir's policies support his country's national interest and sovereignty. He did not want Malaysia to break apart and to suffer under oppression in the long run if it relies too heavily on China. Nevertheless, he threads carefully the path of cooperation to promote healthy diplomatic and trade relations with other countries, especially China, to maintain peace in the region and the World.

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KEARIFAN LOKAL SUKU SASAK DAN SUKU BALI DI LOMBOK SEBAGAI UPAYA REKONSILIASI KONFLIK

SASAK TRIBE AND BALI TRIBE LOCAL WISDOM IN LOMBOK AS AN EFFORT TO CONFLICT RECONCILIATION

Jerry Indrawan
UPN “Veteran” Jakarta
jerry.indrawan@upnvj.ac.id

ABSTRAK

Masyarakat yang memiliki perbedaan etnis, agama, adat istiadat, dan kedaerahan senantiasa berpeluang untuk berhadapan dengan konflik. Konflik antar-masyarakat berimplikasi pada pola interaksi keseharian masyarakat, sebagaimana terlihat di masyarakat Lombok yang terdiri dari Muslim (Sasak) dan Bali (Hindu). Pola domisili yang tidak membur, melainkan mengelompok, menjadikan adanya segregasi sosial. Walaupun demikian, dalam suku Sasak dan suku Bali terdapat kearifan lokal tentang cara-cara rekonsiliasi jika terjadi konflik. Setiap masyarakat mempunyai potensi untuk menyelesaikan konflik di dalam budaya mereka sendiri. Daripada melibatkan pihak luar, metode resolusi konflik seperti ini terbukti lebih efektif. Tulisan ini akan menelaah bagaimana kearifan lokal masing-masing masyarakat, yaitu Sasak dan Bali, digunakan sebagai upaya rekonsiliasi konflik antar-keduanya di Lombok.

Kata Kunci: Kearifan Lokal, Suku Sasak, Suku Bali, Konflik, Rekonsiliasi

ABSTRACT

Communities that have differences in ethnicity, religion, customs, and regionalism always have the opportunity to deal with conflict. Inter-community conflict has implications for the pattern of everyday interactions, as seen in Lombok communities that consist of Muslims (Sasak) and Balinese (Hindu). Domicile patterns that group rather than blend create social segregation. Nevertheless, in the Sasak and Balinese tribes, there is local wisdom about ways of reconciliation in the event of a conflict. Every community has the potential to resolve conflicts within their own culture. Instead of involving outsiders, conflict resolution methods like this have proven to be more effective. This paper will examine how the local wisdom of each community, namely Sasak and Balinese, is used as an effort to reconcile the conflict between the two on Lombok.

Keywords: Local Wisdom, Sasak Tribe, Bali Tribe, Conflict, Reconciliation

Pendahuluan

Pulau Lombok adalah sebuah pulau di kepulauan Sunda Kecil atau Nusa Tenggara yang terpisahkan oleh Selat Lombok dari Bali di sebelah barat dan Selat Alas di sebelah timur dari Sumbawa. Pulau ini kurang lebih berbentuk bulat dengan semacam “ekor” di sisi barat daya yang panjangnya kurang lebih 70 km. Luas pulau ini mencapai 5.435 km² sehingga menempatkannya pada peringkat 108 dari daftar pulau berdasarkan

luasnya di dunia. Pulau ini sendiri dibagi menjadi empat kabupaten dan satu kotamadya. Sedangkan, etnis yang mendiami pulau Lombok terdiri dari beberapa etnis diantaranya etnis sasak sebagai etnis mayoritas, etnis Samawa, dan etnis Mbajo sebagai etnis asli pulau Lombok. Sedangkan, yang lainnya seperti etnis Bali, Tionghoa (Cina), Timur Tengah (Arab) merupakan etnis minoritas yang adalah pendatang (Lukman, 2008: 33).

Etnis Bali merupakan etnis terbesar kedua setelah penduduk asli Sasak yang jumlahnya hampir 95%. Mereka lebih banyak bertempat tinggal di Lombok Barat, terutama di sekitar kota Mataram dan Cakra Negara. Masyarakat etnis Bali dan Sasak selain memiliki kedekatan secara geografis, juga memiliki ikatan sejarah yang mendalam. Karena itu, keberadaan etnis Bali di pulau Lombok, lebih khusus lagi di Lombok Barat dan Mataram, tidak hanya dilihat sebagai etnis yang minoritas. Walaupun dalam kuantitas mereka sedikit, perjalanan sejarah pulau Lombok pernah diputar dan ditentukan oleh kekuatan dari suku Bali ini (Lukman, 2008: 33).

Selain karena secara geografis memang berdekatan, penguasaan kerajaan Bali di pulau Lombok membuat masyarakat Bali banyak yang tersebar di pulau Lombok. Jika kita mengacu pada penguasaan dan pengaruh, maka sejak abad XVII orang Bali berusaha menempatkan pulau Lombok di bawah kekuasaan dan pengaruhnya. Yang dimaksud di sini adalah kerajaan Karang Asem yang melakukan ekspansi dan menaklukkan seluruh pulau Lombok, kemudian kerajaan Karang Asem Bali membagi daerah kekuasaannya di pulau Lombok tersebut menjadi beberapa bagian atau kerajaan-kerajaan kecil, yaitu Kerajaan Pangesangan, Kerajaan Kediri, Kerajaan Sengkongo, Kerajaan Pagutan, Kerajaan Mataram, dan Kerajaan Singasari. Tujuan pembagian tersebut adalah untuk memberikan kedudukan kepada keluarga raja yang terdekat (Lukman, 2008: 36).

Menurut sejarah, orang Bali tinggal di Lombok bukan karena transmigrasi, melainkan datang karena perang antar-kerajaan pada zaman dahulu sekitar tahun 1700. Pada tahun 1960-an, etnis Bali di Lombok selalu diejek oleh umat lain ketika ada salah satu etnis Bali yang sedang melakukan persembahyangan *trisandya*. Ketika orang Bali membawa *sesajen* atau *bebantenan*, umat lain mengatakan bahwa Tuhan dalam Hindu suka makan. Biasanya semua etnis Bali telinganya dilubangi agar etnis

Bali yang lain saling mengetahui sesama etnis Bali. Tapi sekarang tidak diijinkan karena akan dianggap brandal dan susah kalau mencari pekerjaan. Etnis Bali juga biasanya dilarang memakai pakaian adat Bali ketika pergi ke sekolah (Lukman, 2008: 36-37).

Selain itu, setiap kepala keluarga etnis Bali yang tinggal di Lombok pasti memiliki keris dan tombak di rumahnya masing-masing. Mereka selalu siap tempur. Mereka berpendapat, haram hukumnya jika tidak membela diri karena membela diri adalah dibenarkan oleh hukum. Jadi zaman sekarang, kebenaran tidak cukup hanya dibicarakan. Tapi perlu dipraktikkan jika tidak jadi korban dan mati konyol. Seperti yang tersurat dalam kitab Canakya Nitisastra 4-15 bahwa ilmu pengetahuan yang tidak diterapkan dalam praktek kehidupan akan menjadi racun (Lukman, 2008: 37).

Jika etnis mayoritas Sasak di sana berkonflik dengan etnis Bali pasti ada alasan-alasan lain, seperti pola pemukiman masyarakat di Lombok yang sering terkotakkan atas dasar agama, organisasi keagamaan, suku atau partai politik yang menjadi pilihan masing-masing masyarakat. Pola keberagaman masyarakat Hindu dan Islam misalnya, adalah membentuk desa-desa atau gubuk-gubuk sendiri. Kondisi ini berimplikasi pada pola interaksi keseharian masyarakat Lombok Muslim dan non-Muslim. Sementara suku Bali (Hindu) yang berada di Pulau Lombok, mereka membentuk komunitas sendiri seperti yang ada di Sindu, Karang Medain, Karang Bedil Mataram dan Narmada, Lombok Barat.

Pola domisili yang tidak membaur, melainkan mengelompok, menjadikan adanya segregasi sosial. Hindu berkumpul dengan sesama Hindu, muslim pun demikian, diperparah dengan tidak ada komunikasi yang efektif antara kedua belah pihak. Bara dalam sekam tampak dalam sikap sinis masing-masing pihak, contohnya seperti; orang Islam itu kedok, Hindu teman anjing, orang Lombok itu *lumbuk*, Bali *dateng kadu perang*, *ulik kadu*

perang. Segregasi sosial seperti ini mengakibatkan terjadinya konflik dalam skala masif. Persoalan sepele pun bisa bereskalasi menjadi konflik besar.

Tempat transaksi ekonomi pun memiliki identitas tersendiri. Untuk umat Hindu lebih banyak terkonsentrasi di pasar Sindu, Cakra Negara. Demikian juga tempat-tempat penguasaan ekonomi, juga dibedakan berdasarkan pada etnis tertentu. Di daerah Cakra Negara, yang merupakan pusat perekonomian di Mataram misalnya, semua lahan pertanian dibeli dan dijadikan toko dan *mall*, dan dikuasai oleh para imigran yang sebagian besar adalah etnis Tionghoa dan diidentikkan dengan umat Kristen. Sementara kecenderungan buruh kasarnya adalah masyarakat etnis Sasak. Kondisi ini menyebabkan terjadinya kemiskinan dan kebodohan yang tak terselesaikan di masyarakat yang beretnis Sasak. Kondisi semacam ini membentuk daerah tersebut rentan terjadinya konflik horizontal.

Konflik yang sifatnya horizontal tersebut adalah yang paling sering terjadi di pulau Lombok, meskipun demikian, bukan berarti bahwa konflik horizontal tersebut tidak memiliki keterkaitan dengan konflik vertikal. Bahkan, bisa dikatakan bahwa konflik horizontal bisa semakin parah atau justru mereda tergantung dari langkah atau kebijakan yang dilakukan oleh pihak pemerintah bersama-sama dengan masyarakat.

Melihat sejarah Lombok membuat kita dapat mengambil kesimpulan sementara bahwa daerah-daerah di Indonesia ragam budaya dan masyarakat yang lain daripada yang lain. Kompleksitas struktur sosial dan budaya bangsa ini membuat ciri khas tersendiri bagi Indonesia. Struktur masyarakat kita memungkinkan perbedaan-perbedaan yang ada

Sebagai contoh, struktur masyarakat Indonesia ditandai oleh dua ciri yang bersifat unik. Pertama, secara horizontal hal itu ditandai oleh kenyataan adanya kesatuan sosial berdasarkan perbedaan suku bangsa, agama,

adat istiadat, dan kedaerahan. Masyarakat dengan perspektif perbedaan etnis, agama, adat istiadat, dan kedaerahan akan senantiasa melahirkan perbedaan kepentingan yang meruncing, serta dapat memancing terjadinya konflik. Secara horisontal juga, konflik ditandai oleh perbedaan di dalam lapisan yang sama, tetapi memiliki perbedaan-perbedaan yang mendasar. Kedua, secara vertikal konflik biasanya ditandai oleh adanya perbedaan antara lapisan atas dan lapisan bawah yang cukup tajam (Nasikun, 1984: 30).

Permusuhan dan kekerasan terhadap sebuah kelompok etnis tidak pernah bersifat murni etnis. Perbedaan etnis, perbedaan budaya, dan perbedaan ras bisa menimbulkan kesulitan berkomunikasi, tetapi tidak dengan sendirinya menimbulkan dendam antar-etnis yang mendalam dan membawa pada kekerasan, hanya karena kedua kelompok etnis itu mempunyai ciri fisik yang berlainan, atau sifat-sifat budaya yang berbeda. Hubungan antar-etnis baru menimbulkan permusuhan dan kekerasan, jika perbedaan-perbedaan itu disertai dominasi etnis yang satu terhadap etnis lainnya, yang terjadi di berbagai bidang.

Hubungan dominasi disertai kekerasan yang bersifat struktural karena ditandai oleh keunggulan yang dominan pada yang satu dan ketergantungan yang relatif besar pada pihak lainnya. Jika dominasi ini menimbulkan perbedaan besar pada penguasaan ekonomi, cepat atau lambat akan muncul perlawanan dari pihak yang mengalami ketidakadilan pembagian sumber daya. Lalu, menyusul kemudian konflik antara pihak yang menguasai dan pihak yang dikuasai, di mana konflik ini kalau mengalami eskalasi akan berkembang menjadi kekerasan (Kleden, 1999: 126).

Konflik sosial yang terjadi selama ini antara masyarakat yang saling berdekatan antara tempat tinggal etnis Bali dan masyarakat Sasak lebih mengarah pada adanya sentimen agama masing-masing yang tidak melibatkan masyarakat kedua belah pihak pada umumnya, kecuali dalam lokalitas yang kecil. Hal ini

membuat konflik tersebut hanya berupa gaung dari luar bahwa terdapat konflik etnis di Pulau Lombok.

Penulis merasa perlu mengangkat isu kearifan lokal karena kajian ini berangkat dari konsep dan cara berpikir asli sebuah daerah di Indonesia. Daripada menggunakan konsep asing, lebih baik memanfaatkan secara optimal konsep lokal untuk dikembangkan sebagai salah satu sarana rekonsiliasi konflik. Atas dasar itulah, tulisan ini akan melihat bagaimana kearifan lokal masing-masing masyarakat, yaitu Sasak dan Bali, digunakan sebagai upaya rekonsiliasi konflik antar keduanya di Lombok

Tinjauan Pustaka

Teori yang digunakan dalam penulisan ini adalah teori rekonsiliasi. Rekonsiliasi sering kali dicantumkan sebagai sasaran dalam proses perdamaian nasional. Oxford English Dictionary (1989: 352-353), mendefinisikan “*reconcile*” sebagai “*to bring (a person) again into friendly relation relations ... after an estrangement ... to bring back into accord, to reunite (person or things) in harmony* [Berbaik kembali dengan seseorang ... setelah masa-masa keterasingan ... mengakurkan kembali, menyatukan kembali (orang atau barang) ke kondisi harmonis].

Dalam konteks politik atau kekerasan politik, rekonsiliasi dijabarkan sebagai “mengembangkan saling penerimaan yang bersifat damai antara orang-orang atau kelompok yang bermusuhan atau dahulunya bermusuhan”. Sering kali muncul anggapan bahwa mengetahui kebenaran tentang masa lalu merupakan syarat mutlak demi terjadinya rekonsiliasi (Hayner, 2005: 264).

Menurut beberapa penulis dari Afrika Selatan, rekonsiliasi adalah menghadapi kebenaran yang menyakitkan untuk menghormoniskan pandangan-pandangan yang tidak berimbang sehingga konflik-konflik dan perbedaan yang masih akan terjadi paling tidak berada dalam satu lingkup pemahaman. Rekonsiliasi dalam artian secara luas, adalah

“tutup buku” tentang masa lalu. Satu elemen penting dalam proses ini adalah penghentian siklus menuduh-membantah-balas menuduh yang memecah belah. Rekonsiliasi terjadi bukan dengan melupakannya, namun dengan menyelesaikannya melalui proses evaluasi (Asmal et al., 1996: 46).

Rekonsiliasi memiliki beberapa area cakupan sebagai sebuah disiplin ilmu, khususnya dalam bidang resolusi konflik. Beberapa ahli telah menyusun setidaknya lima kategori rekonsiliasi. Kategori pertama, berdasarkan teori-teori dan model-model, seperti pilihan rasional atau *game theory*, teori kebutuhan manusia, sosial emosional vs model-model instrumental, dan model pengampunan (Muluk, 2009: 109-110).

Kategori kedua, berdasarkan ruang lingkup rekonsiliasi, mengacu pada bidang hubungan antarmanusia, seperti identitas, sikap, kepercayaan, dan perilaku. Kategori ketiga, berhubungan dengan komponen-komponen rekonsiliasi yang terkait dengan kebutuhan sosial dari pihak-pihak yang terlibat, seperti keadilan, kebenaran, penyembuhan, dan keamanan. Kategori keempat, rekonsiliasi bisa diklasifikasikan menurut tingkatan dari intervensi yang digunakan, apakah dalam tingkat antarpersonal, komunitas, atau level nasional. Dan kategori terakhir adalah berdasarkan “pendekatan politis” yang digunakan dalam proses rekonsiliasi, apakah sifatnya pendekatan pola *bottom-up* atau *top-down*, atau juga keduanya (Muluk, 2009: 109-110).

Rekonsiliasi memiliki implikasi membangun atau membangun kembali hubungan yang tidak lagi dihantui konflik dan kebencian masa lalu. Namun, bagaimana mengukur kemajuan rekonsiliasi? Jika ada proses rekonsiliasi yang sedang berjalan, atau suatu masyarakat sudah mulai mencapai rekonsiliasi, apa tanda-tandanya? Singkatnya, bagaimana rupa rekonsiliasi? Untuk melihat proses rekonsiliasi yang terjadi diantara masyarakat yang bertikai, dengan

menggunakan teori rekonsiliasi, menurut Priscilla Hayner untuk mengukur apakah rekonsiliasi sudah atau mulai berakar, ia menyarankan tiga pertanyaan (Hayner, 1999: 363-364).

Pertanyaan pertama, bagaimana masa lalu disikapi di lingkup publik? Apakah ada rasa pahit tentang masa lalu dalam hubungan politik atau publik lainnya? Apakah konflik atau pelanggaran di masa lalu diproses atau diserap sedemikian rupa sehingga orang bisa membicarakannya (bila tidak mudah, paling tidak secara sopan, bahkan dengan mantan lawan?

Pertanyaan kedua, apakah ada banyak versi tentang masa lalu? Melakukan perdamaian atau rekonsiliasi tidak semata-mata mengembalikan hubungan baik, namun juga mendamaikan fakta-fakta atau kisah-kisah yang bertentangan, membuat fakta-fakta atau pernyataan-pernyataan yang bertentangan menjadi konsisten, bersesuaian atau kompatibel satu sama lain.

Pertanyaan ketiga, bagaimana hubungan antara pihak-pihak yang dahulunya bertikai? Terutama, apakah hubungan masih didasarkan pada masa lalu? Referensi terus-menerus pada masa lalu mungkin menandakan permusuhan. Terdapat banyak contoh ingatan yang pahit yang justru bisa mendorong kekerasan baru atau sengaja digunakan para pemimpin untuk menimbulkan ketegangan antar komunitas. Hubungan yang baru terbentuk antara pihak-pihak yang semula bermusuhan bisa bergantung pada kepentingan atau tantangan baru yang berpengaruh pada semuanya. Pengikat-pengikat ini bisa berupa proyek pembangunan atau rekonstruksi ekonomi, ikatan keluarga atau komunitas, bahkan perang dengan musuh lain. Contoh, Perang Malvinas untuk sementara menyatukan warga Argentina untuk mendukung angkatan bersenjata, meskipun selama bertahun-tahun menjadi penindas.

Jika pertanyaan-pertanyaan di atas membantu mengidentifikasi apakah

rekonsiliasi terjadi, lalu apa faktor atau elemen spesifik yang bisa memberikan sumbangannya pada perkembangannya? Pertanyaan ini sebaiknya dipertimbangkan dari sudut pandang para korban, karena para pelaku cenderung menganggap bahwa rekonsiliasi telah tercapai, sementara tidak demikian dengan para korban. Priscilla Hayner juga menyarankan lima elemen sebagai elemen pendukung, yang perlu untuk membuat rekonsiliasi berakar (Hayner, 2005: 279).

Pertama, penghentian kekerasan atau ancaman kekerasan. Sebuah transisi ke perdamaian memiliki arti bahwa konflik terbuka sudah berakhir, namun tidak berarti bahwa semua kekerasan politik atau ancaman kekerasan sudah berakhir. Bila ancaman demikian berlanjut, rekonsiliasi bisa tidak berakar.

Kedua, pengakuan dan pemberian pemulihan. Pengakuan resmi terhadap fakta-fakta masa lalu bisa memiliki peran krusial dalam proses penyembuhan masyarakat.

Ketiga, pengikat masyarakat. Dalam banyak kondisi, sebaiknya didorong proyek yang menyatukan kelompok-kelompok yang tadinya bertikai untuk mendapatkan keuntungan bersama, seperti program pembangunan atau rekonstruksi. Tingkat kontak yang terjadi antara pihak-pihak tersebut akan menentukan apakah terjadi rekonsiliasi. Untuk mendorong rekonsiliasi perlu dijawab pertanyaan tentang bagaimana membangun atau membangun kembali ikatan tersebut (Hayner, 2005: 280-281).

Terakhir, keempat, menyelesaikan ketidaksetaraan struktural dan kebutuhan material. Di mana terjadi ketidaksetaraan yang parah akibat penindasan di masa lalu, rekonsiliasi tidak bisa dijadikan sekedar proses psikologis atau emosional. Rekonsiliasi membutuhkan komitmen, terutama dari mereka yang pernah diuntungkan dan terus diuntungkan oleh diskriminasi di masa lalu, untuk menyikapi ketidaksetaraan yang tidak

adil dan kemiskinan yang merendahkan martabat kemanusiaan (Hayner, 2005: 282).

Terakhir, adalah waktu. Rekonsiliasi jarang terjadi dengan segera, bahkan bisa sampai puluhan tahun. Pada akhirnya, rekonsiliasi di tingkat masyarakat akan bergantung pada faktor-faktor dan dinamika-dinamika yang tidak selalu bisa diramalkan atau dikendalikan. Salah satu cara melakukan proses rekonsiliasi adalah dengan membawa para pelaku dan korban dalam mendengar pendapat. Melalui kesaksian korban dan pengakuan pelaku, kemungkinan penyembuhan dan perubahan diri tentang pengalaman yang sudah terjadi bisa membawa pada proses rekonsiliasi yang efektif (Teitel, 2004: 183).

Proses Kearifan Lokal pada suku Sasak

Nilai kearifan lokal suku Sasak merupakan objek non-materiil yang sulit diukur dengan tolak ukur yang bersifat materiil. Namun, sesungguhnya nilai kearifan lokal itu dapat dirasakan sebagai pemandu setiap orang secara naluri, intuitif, dan akurat kepada kebajikan. Dengan demikian, maka nilai-nilai kearifan lokal akan meningkatkan kualitas seseorang apabila diamalkan dan ditegakkan dalam menjalani kehidupan bermasyarakat dan bernegara (Asmara & Maladi, 2010: 11).

Sehubungan dengan penyelesaian konflik, pada masyarakat suku Sasak dikenal adanya prinsip-prinsip pokok penyelesaian sengketa, sebab dalam masyarakat hukum adat Sasak tidak menghendaki adanya putusan kalah menang dalam penyelesaian suatu sengketa. Sengketa yang terjadi harus diarahkan kepada perdamaian yang diselesaikan dengan musyawarah mufakat. Dalam upaya penyelesaian itu, kedua pihak bisa saling menjaga perasaan masing-masing (*tao saling undur pasang*) (Asmara & Maladi, 2010: 1).

Pada masyarakat suku Sasak, penyelesaian sengketa seringkali dilakukan di luar pengadilan formal dengan cara musyawarah untuk mencapai mufakat, maupun juga melalui mediasi. Mereka juga melibatkan pihak ketiga,

seperti Tuan Guru, tokoh agama, pemuka adat, dan kepala desa. Dalam masyarakat adat Sasak, tata cara penyelesaian sengketa dilakukan dengan cara:

1. Pertama-tama, para pihak yang bersengketa duduk bersama untuk menyelesaikan sengketanya dengan cara negosiasi.
2. Jika cara negosiasi ini tidak bisa menghasilkan kesepakatan bagi para pihak, maka pihak yang dirugikan melaporkan perselisihannya tersebut kepada kepala dusun atau kepala adat atau pemuka agama.
3. Selanjutnya, kepala adat atau pemuka agama tersebut memanggil para pihak atau keluarga dekat dan tetua-tetua adat untuk menyaksikan proses musyawarah tersebut.
4. Dalam musyawarah tersebut, yang bertindak selaku penengah adalah pemerintah (pemerintah desa atau kecamatan), pemuka agama (kyai, tuan-tuan guru), atau tokoh adat/pemangku adat/pengemban adat yang bijaksana.
5. Keputusan yang diambil didasarkan pada musyawarah mufakat yang saling menguntungkan kedua belah pihak.
6. Kesepakatan kedua belah pihak tersebut dibuat secara tertulis berupa akta perdamaian yang ditandatangani oleh para pihak, saksi-saksi, dan penengah (Asmara & Maladi, 2010: 9).

Suku Sasak juga mengenal lembaga bernama "*krama*" sebagai institusi yang terkait kearifan lokal. *Krama* adalah sebuah institusi adat yang memayungi kearifan lokal. Terdiri dari dua macam, *krama* sebagai lembaga adat dan *krama* sebagai aturan pergaulan sosial. Penerapan institusi adat *krama* dalam kehidupan etnis Sasak memiliki tujuan untuk ikut mendorong lahirnya berbagai bentuk kearifan lokal dalam komunitas tersebut, yang mengandung nilai-nilai yang masih cocok dengan kehidupan kekinian, dan relevan digunakan sebagai metode pencegahan konflik. Ada tiga kategori bentuk kearifan lokal masyarakat Sasak Lombok, yaitu:

1. Bidang politik, sosial, kemasyarakatan, tercermin dari sepuluh macam saling sebagai pengikat tali silaturahmi masyarakat Sasak, yaitu saling *jot/perasak* (saling memberi atau mengantarkan makanan), *pesilaq* (saling undang untuk suatu hajatan keluarga), saling *pelangarin* (saling layat jika ada kerabat/sahabat yang meninggal), *ayoin* (saling mengunjungi), dan saling *ajinan* (saling menghormati atau saling menghargai terhadap perbedaan, menghargai adanya kelebihan dan kekurangan yang dimiliki oleh seseorang atau kelompok tertentu), saling *jangoq* (silaturahmi saling menjenguk jika ada di antara sahabat sedang mendapat atau mengalami musibah), saling *bait* (saling ambil-ambilan dalam adat perkawinan), *wales/bales* (saling balas silaturahmi, kunjungan atau semu budi (kebaikan) yang pernah terjadi karena kedekatan-persahabatan), saling *tembung/sapak* (saling tegur sapa jika bertemu atau bertatap muka antarseorang dengan orang lain dengan tidak membedakan suku atau agama) dan saling *sadug* (saling mempercayai dalam pergaulan dan persahabatan, terutama membangun peranakan Sasak Jati (persaudaraan Sasak sejati) di antara sesama sanak (saudara) Sasak dan antar orang Sasak dengan *batur luah* (non Sasak), dan *saling ilingan/peringet*, yaitu saling mengingatkan satu sama lain antara seseorang (kerabat/ sahabat) dengan tulus hati demi kebaikan dalam menjamin persaudaraan atau silaturahmi.
2. Bidang ekonomi perdagangan, tercermin dari tiga praktik kearifan lokal (tiga saling) yaitu: saling *peliwat* (suatu bentuk menolong seseorang yang sedang pailit atau jatuh rugi dalam usaha dagangannya), *saling liliq/gentik* (suatu bentuk menolong kawan dengan membantu membayar hutang tanggungan sahabat atau kawan, dengan tidak memberatkannya dalam

bentuk bunga atau ikatan lainnya yang mengikat), dan saling *sangkul/sangkol/sangkon* (saling menolong dengan memberikan bantuan material terhadap kawan yang sedang menerima musibah dalam usaha perdagangan).

3. Bidang adat budaya, tercermin dari saling *tulung* (bentuk tolong menolong dalam membajak sawah ladang para petani), saling *sero* (saling tolong dalam menanam sawah ladang), *saur alap* (saling tolong dalam mengolah sawah ladang, seperti dalam hal *ngekiskis*/membersihkan rerumputan dengan alat potong kikis atau *ngoma/ngome*/mencabuti rumput, dan *besesiru/besiru* yaitu nilai kearifan lokal ini juga hampir sama dengan *saur alap*, yaitu pekerjaan gotong royong bekerja di sawah dari menanam bibit sampai panen (Asmara & Maladi, 2010: 9-10).

Berdasarkan uraian di atas, terdapat sepuluh unsur atau komponen nilai demokrasi yang tercermin dalam kearifan lokal masyarakat Sasak, yaitu demokrasi berketuhanan, toleransi, kerja sama dengan orang lain, menghargai pendapat orang lain, memahami dan menerima kultur dalam masyarakat, berpikir kritis dan sistematis, penyelesaian konflik tanpa kekerasan, kemauan mengubah gaya hidup dan kebiasaan konsumtif, sensitif terhadap kesulitan orang lain, kemauan dan kemampuan berpartisipasi dalam kehidupan sosial. Transformasi nilai tersebut membuat hidup bermasyarakat akan tetap harmonis, apabila lembaga adat ditopang *awig-awig* adat secara arif dapat dihidupkan, dirancang kembali, disesuaikan kebutuhan dan tuntutan masa kini.

Proses Kearifan Lokal pada Suku Bali

Masyarakat Bali sebagai satu kesatuan geografis, suku, ras, agama memiliki nilai kearifan lokal yang telah teruji dan terbukti daya jelajah sosialnya dalam mengatasi berbagai problematika kehidupan sosial. Nilai kearifan lokal yang berkembang dan diyakini

sebagai perekat sosial yang kerap menjadi acuan dalam menata hubungan dan kerukunan antar sesama umat beragama di Provinsi Bali, di antaranya: nilai kearifan *Tri Hita Karana*; suatu nilai kosmopolit tentang harmonisasi hubungan manusia dengan tuhan (*sutata parhyangan*), hubungan manusia dengan sesama umat manusia (*sutata pawongan*) dan harmonisasi hubungan manusia dengan alam lingkungannya (*sutata palemahan*). Nilai kearifan lokal ini telah mampu menjaga dan menata pola hubungan sosial masyarakat yang berjalan sangat dinamis dan tidak terjadi konflik antarsuku (Lukman, 2008: 41).

Nilai kearifan lokal *tri kaya parisuda*, sebagai wujud keseimbangan dalam membangun karakter dan jatidiri insani, dengan menyatukan unsur pikiran, perkataan dan perbuatan. Tertanamnya nilai kearifan ini telah melahirkan insan yang berkarakter, memiliki konsistensi dan akuntabilitas dalam menjalankan kewajiban sosial. Nilai kearifan lokal *Tatwam Asi*, “kamu adalah aku dan aku adalah kamu”, nilai ini memberikan fibrasi bagi sikap dan perilaku mengakui eksistensi seraya menghormati orang lain sebagaimana menghormati diri sendiri. Nilai ini menjadi dasar yang bijaksana dalam membangun peradaban demokrasi modern yang saat ini sedang digalakkan (Lukman, 2008: 41).

Nilai *Salunglung sabayantaka, paras paros sarpanaya*, suatu nilai sosial tentang perlunya kebersamaan dan kerjasama yang setara antara satu dengan yang lainnya sebagai satu kesatuan sosial yang saling menghargai dan menghormati. Nilai *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* sebagai sikap sosial yang menyadari akan kebersamaan ditengah perbedaan, dan perbedaan dalam kebersamaan. Semangat ini sangat penting untuk diaktualisasikan dalam tantangan kehidupan sosial yang multikultural. Nilai kearifan lokal *menyama braya*, mengandung makna persamaan dan persaudaraan dan pengakuan sosial bahwa kita adalah bersaudara. Sebagai satu kesatuan sosial persaudaraan maka sikap dan perilaku dalam

memandang orang lain sebagai saudara yang patut diajak bersama dalam suka dan duka (Lukman, 2008: 41).

Sederetan nilai-nilai kearifan lokal tersebut akan bermakna bagi kehidupan sosial apabila dapat menjadi rujukan dan bahan acuan dalam menjaga dan menciptakan relasi sosial yang harmonis. Sistem pengetahuan lokal ini seharusnya dapat dipahami sebagai sistem pengetahuan yang dinamis dan berkembang terus secara kontekstual sejalan dengan tuntutan kebutuhan manusia yang semakin heterogen dan kompleks (Lukman, 2008: 41-42).

Proses Rekonsiliasi antara Suku Sasak dan Suku Bali

Hubungan manusia dengan sesama umat manusia (*sutata pawongan*) dalam adat Bali adalah peluang sekaligus tantangan bagi orang Bali secara khusus dalam menerapkan sebuah pola hubungan yang harmonis dengan orang Sasak. Sedangkan, *krama* sebagai lembaga adat dan *krama* sebagai aturan pergaulan sosial juga menawarkan suku Sasak pilihan yang sama untuk hidup bersama dalam sebuah masyarakat pluralis. Penerapan *krama* dalam kehidupan etnis Sasak telah ikut mendorong lahirnya berbagai bentuk kearifan lokal yang masih cocok dengan kehidupan kekinian, sehingga muncul sepuluh unsur atau komponen nilai demokrasi yang tercermin dalam kearifan lokal masyarakat Sasak. Beberapa di antaranya adalah, toleransi, kerja sama dengan orang lain, dan penyelesaian konflik tanpa kekerasan (Lukman, 2008: 43).

Dua contoh pada masing-masing suku di atas membuktikan bahwa kearifan sebenarnya adalah peluang sekaligus tantangan bagi mereka. Peluang untuk hidup harmonis tercantum dengan sangat jelas dalam adat mereka. Begitu pula tantangannya, karena mempraktikkannya dalam kehidupan sehari-hari pastilah sulit. Ketika faktor-faktor non-teknis, seperti masalah kemiskinan contohnya, menghalangi, maka kondisi ini menjadi

tantangan bersama bagi mereka dalam mengaplikasikan proses kearifan lokal tersebut (Lukman, 2008: 43).

Dalam penelitian I Wayan Suwindia yang mengambil lokasi di tiga desa, Pemogan (Denpasar), Budakeling (Karangasem) dan Pegayaman (Singaraja), terungkap adanya faktor-faktor lain yang membuat hubungan Islam-Hindu selalu erat. Salah satu faktor itu adalah tingkat pendidikan. Semakin tingginya tingkat pendidikan masyarakat Bali membuat hubungan pemeluk Hindu dan Islam menjadi semakin baik. Berikutnya adalah faktor historis. Sejak di masa lalu, ketika Bali masih berbentuk kerajaan, pendatang beragama Islam tidak sekedar diterima dengan tangan terbuka, melainkan juga dilindungi. Oleh raja-raja di Bali, bahkan para pendatang diberi hibah tanah untuk ditempati dan diolah (Lukman, 2008: 43-44).

Hasil penelitian ini bisa kita bawa di Lombok, di mana suku Sasak mayoritas adalah orang muslim. Ketika seorang individu mencapai tingkatan intelektual tertentu dalam hidupnya, di mana toleransi menjadi tolak ukur tingkat peradaban bangsanya, tidak akan terlihat lagi darinya upaya-upaya penyelesaian konflik lewat jalur kekerasan. Logika, akal sehat, dan hati nurani dikedepankan, sehingga proses menghindari konflik (apalagi hanya karena masalah sepele) menjadi opsi utama baginya. Untuk itu, tantangan juga bagi pemerintah daerah untuk bagaimana mengembangkan kualitas pendidikan yang merata di Lombok, sehingga keluarannya nanti dapat berperan sebagai agen-agen pencegah konflik di masyarakat Lombok itu sendiri. Jadi, penggalian kembali kearifan lokal memang dapat menjadi salah satu upaya merekonsiliasi konflik horizontal.

Asalkan jangan sampai terjadi sebuah kondisi saat kohesi sosial merosot dan kontrol sosial hancur. Ditambah dengan tidak berfungsinya kinerja aparat penegak hukum dan sistem peradilan, membuat kekerasan dapat berkembang ke level yang lebih besar lagi. Di

tengah-tengah kondisi seperti ini, masyarakat lokal akan terputus dari proses pembentukan budaya perdamaian (Wesselss, 2009: 349).

Bicara bagaimana rekonsiliasi antara Suku Sasak dengan Suku Bali, berarti kita bicara bagaimana proses rekonsiliasinya dilakukan. Secara umum, proses rekonsiliasi terkait beberapa upaya berikut ini, antara lain: memperkuat infrastruktur sosial masyarakat, pembagian sumber daya yang adil agar tercipta hubungan yang harmonis antar masyarakat, dan peningkatan peran pemerintah (pemda terutama) untuk membangun ikatan-ikatan persaudaraan antar suku yang berbeda di satu wilayah. Dari kesemuanya, yang paling penting adalah bagaimana praktik-praktik kearifan lokal menjadi bagian yang penting dalam proses rekonsiliasi di suatu masyarakat, walaupun tetap digunakan pendekatan-pendekatan ala barat di sana.

Kearifan lokal memungkinkan masyarakat untuk membangun kisah-kisah bermakna baru, meninggalkan kisah-kisah usang tentang konflik masa lalu, sehingga nilai-nilai perdamaian pun terkandung di dalamnya. Melalui praktek kearifan lokal, masyarakat mengekspresikan harapan, sebagaimana juga penderitaan mereka. Kondisi ini adalah jalan bagi terciptanya identitas kolektif masyarakat yang mampu mengembangkan sikap persatuan, harmoni, dan perdamaian tentunya (Kleden, 1999: 128).

Selain itu, proses menuju rekonsiliasi yang ideal juga tidak bisa dipecahkan secara etnis semata, misalnya melalui pembauran. Kita tahu dari segi pemukiman pun orang Bali tidak berada dalam satu wilayah yang sama dengan Sasak. Pembaruan tidak efektif dalam hal ini karena hanya bertujuan menciptakan integrasi antar etnis, padahal masalah utamanya disebabkan tidak adanya integrasi secara ekonomi. Integrasi ini akan tercipta jika suku Sasak mendapat kesempatan usaha yang sama dan mendapat bantuan yang diperlukan untuk mengimbangi kurangnya pengalaman mereka dalam bidang perdagangan. Tentunya, upaya

ini akan berhasil dengan baik jika ada peraturan daerah yang adil dan mengakomodasi kepentingan semua, agar kelompok etnis yang kuat dalam bidang ekonomi juga bersedia memberikan tanggung jawab sosialnya kepada masyarakat etnis lain, tidak hanya mengejar keuntungan ekonomi semata (Kleden, 1999: 129).

Konsepsi barat tentang rekonsiliasi, yang menekankan akan pentingnya meningkatkan hubungan sosial di antara masyarakat, ternyata sangat terbatas dan tergantung konteks. Sebuah kasus di Angola menunjukkan bahwa rekonsiliasi adalah sebuah konstruksi sosial, di mana pembentukannya dilakukan melalui konsepsi-konsepsi lokal. Bagi banyak masyarakat pedesaan di Angola, konsepsi sosial dan spiritual terhubung sangat erat, apalagi segi spiritualnya. Di sana, upaya rekonsiliasi sangat mengedepankan pendekatan yang sifatnya spiritual, karena itu penting bagi kita untuk mengetahui konsepsi dan makna-makna lokal Angola (Wesselss, 2009: 351-352).

Begitu pula di Lombok, konsepsi-konsepsi adat Sasak dan Bali harus diutamakan dalam upaya-upaya pencegahan, maupun rekonsiliasi sebuah konflik. Di bagian proses kearifan lokal yang sudah dijelaskan di awal, disebutkan beberapa metode kearifan lokal dari Sasak dan Bali yang bisa digunakan. Sesungguhnya, terbuka pada metode-metode rekonsiliasi yang mengedepankan budaya atau cara lokal dapat memainkan peranan penting dalam pembentukan budaya damai di dunia yang sangat beragam ini.

Contohnya, proses rekonsiliasi yang terjadi di antara masyarakat yang bertikai di Lombok dapat dilakukan melalui berbagai cara, salah satunya melalui program keserasian sosial, yang diusulkan oleh Pemkot Mataram. Ketika penulis mengunjungi Pemkot Mataram, disampaikan bahwa ada sepuluh lokasi rawan konflik, seperti di Kelurahan Pagutan, Pagutan Timur, Taliwang, Selagalas, dan Jempong Baru, akan diusulkan mendapat dana program keserasian sosial dari Kementerian Sosial. Dana

ini akan dimanfaatkan untuk pembangunan sarana dan prasarana yang dibutuhkan masyarakat.

Masyarakat yang memperoleh bantuan dana akan didampingi oleh tenaga pendamping yang direkrut dari kalangan tokoh agama, tokoh masyarakat atau tokoh pemuda dari lokasi rawan konflik. Pemkot berharap dengan adanya program tersebut, kondusifitas Kota Mataram sebagai Ibu Kota Provinsi NTB bisa terjaga sehingga berdampak terhadap pertumbuhan ekonomi dan kesejahteraan warga. Program keserasian sosial sendiri adalah program Kementerian Sosial untuk mencegah terjadinya konflik sosial dalam masyarakat seperti tawuran warga, pertikaian antar kelompok masyarakat yang terjadi karena kesenjangan maupun kecurigaan. Bantuan yang diberikan untuk daerah rawan konflik, selain melatih agen perdamaian juga untuk menggelar dialog antar warga sehingga terwujud kehidupan sosial yang terintegrasi.

Cara lainnya adalah melalui penggunaan kearifan lokal dalam upaya-upaya penyelesaian konflik. Kali ini yang berperan adalah Pemerintah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB), yang memperkuat peran lembaga adat (krama adat) untuk mencegah konflik sosial dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat. Kesadaran akan nilai-nilai luhur bangsa akan mencegah timbulkan berbagai konflik sosial dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat, terutama di wilayah NTB yang sarat konflik sosial. Kegiatan lainnya untuk mengimplementasikan program pengembangan wawasan kebangsaan itu yakni dialog antar umat beragama, pemantapan ketahanan bangsa dan dialog interaktif peningkatan toleransi dan kerukunan dalam kehidupan beragama di NTB.

Kearifan lokal yang dilembagakan melalui institusi formal membutuhkan kebijakan yang tepat. Kebijakan tersebut yakni memelihara dan mengembangkan hubungan antarlembaga, kerukunan sosial antar dan inter etnis, suku dan kelompok masyarakat lainnya sebagai potensi bangsa. Selain itu, adanya kebijakan

mengembangkan sistem identifikasi, pengkajian, analisis situasi dan kondisi konflik serta kerawanan sosial keamanan di daerah. Kebijakan lainnya, yakni meningkatkan peran dan fungsi serta peran serta lembaga sosial kemasyarakatan dalam mewujudkan keutuhan masyarakat, dan membangun kebersamaan dan kemitraan dengan komponen masyarakat untuk menciptakan sinergi.

Tanpa peran pemerintah, bisa pemerintah provinsi, kabupaten/kota, sampai pemerintah pusat, maka kearifan lokal yang ada hanyalah sebatas instrumen budaya. Sebuah tradisi yang dilanggengkan terus-menerus, namun tidak memiliki dampak yang kuat di era modern seperti ini. Penulis berpendapat bahwa kearifan lokal memang menjadi kunci bagi upaya rekonsiliasi konflik di Lombok, bahkan di daerah mana pun di Indonesia, namun peran yuridis negara sebagai “hakim” yang melegalkan instrumen kearifan lokal tersebut.

Terakhir, proses rekonsiliasi yang ideal menurut Bar-Tal adalah memulai proses rekonsiliasi ketika pihak-pihak yang berkonflik mulai untuk merubah keyakinan, sikap, tujuan, motivasi, dan emosinya terhadap konflik tersebut, dan juga bagaimana hubungan di masa depan antara kedua pihak yang bertikai itu. Agar proses rekonsiliasinya efektif, harus dilakukan secara *top down* dan *bottom up* secara bersamaan. Bar-Tal juga mengatakan bahwa kepercayaan akan sebuah tujuan bersama di suatu masyarakat, yang mendasari timbulnya sebuah konflik, harus dirubah. Sekarang, masyarakat harus mampu mengkompromikan tujuan bersama yang berguna bagi semua pihak, yang akan membawa pada hubungan baik antar sesama anggota masyarakat (Bar-Tal, 2009: 371).

Selain itu, perubahan psikologis dari seorang pemimpin sangat mempengaruhi masyarakat yang dipimpinnya. Karena itu, pemimpin menjadi elemen yang sangat penting dalam proses rekonsiliasi karena pemimpinlah yang menginisiasi terjadinya negosiasi untuk mencapai resolusi damai. Pemimpin juga dalam

posisi terdepan untuk memimpin proses rekonsiliasi, khususnya apabila di antara mereka memiliki komitmen besar terhadap proses tersebut dan memelihara hubungan baik antar sesama pemimpin. Pemimpin memiliki peran penting untuk memulai dan mengimplementasikan kebijakan-kebijakan yang terkait upaya rekonsiliasi dan rekonstruksi, agar dipatuhi oleh semua masyarakat yang dipimpinnya (Bar-Tal, 2009: 369).

Pemimpin adat atau pemimpin politik sama-sama penting. Di sinilah letak sinergi yang positif antara kearifan lokal dengan otoritas pemerintah dengan aspek yuridisnya. Kombinasi keduanya akan membawa proses rekonsiliasi berjalan lebih baik, serta diterima oleh semua pihak. Kebijakan-kebijakan yang dibuat pun adil dan menguntungkan semua pihak, dan jangan lupa kebijakannya pun implementatif karena pemimpin politik memiliki kewenangan untuk mewujudkannya. Hal ini sesuai dengan teori yang disampaikan Hamdi Muluk di atas, bahwa rekonsiliasi dalam konteks pendekatan politis membutuhkan pendekatan pola *bottom-up* atau *top-down*, atau juga keduanya. Proses ini bisa dilakukan oleh para pemimpin tersebut.

Kesimpulan

Perbedaan yang terjadi dalam sebuah masyarakat dengan perbedaan etnis, agama, adat istiadat, dan kedaerahan memang dapat berujung pada terjadinya sebuah konflik. Begitu pula dengan apa yang terjadi di antara etnis Sasak dan Bali di Lombok.

Di Lombok, keberagaman masyarakat Hindu dan Islam ditunjukkan dari terpisahnya desa-desa atau gubuk-gubuk mereka. Pemisahan pemukiman dan pola domisili yang tidak berbaur ini berdampak pada interaksi antar-masyarakat di sana. Segeregasi sosial terjadi karena absennya komunikasi yang positif antar-mereka.

Dalam nilai kearifan lokal suku Sasak, tidak dikenal istilah putusan kalah atau menang

dalam penyelesaian suatu sengketa. Sengketa yang terjadi harus diarahkan kepada perdamaian yang diselesaikan dengan musyawarah mufakat. Masyarakat Bali pun sebagai satu kesatuan geografis, suku, ras, dan agama, memiliki nilai kearifan lokal yang mampu menjaga dan menata pola hubungan sosial masyarakat yang berjalan sangat dinamis dan tidak terjadi konflik antar suku.

Rekonsiliasi di Lombok dalam dilakukan lewat bantuan pemerintah daerah, tentunya dengan bersandar pada nilai-nilai kearifan lokal. Peran pemerintah daerah adalah dengan memperkuat peran lembaga adat (*krama*) untuk mencegah konflik sosial dalam kehidupan bermasyarakat.

Dalam tulisan ini, penulis juga menyarankan bahwa upaya rekonsiliasi harus dimulai dari bawah, melalui masyarakat sipil atau gerakan akar rumput. Gerakan ini tentunya melalui pendekatan yang diinisiasi dari atas, seperti melalui aktor-aktor negara yang didukung basis hukum dan kerangka politik yang formal.

Terkait contoh kasus konflik antara suku Sasak dan suku Bali penulis merasa bahwa upaya rekonsiliasi harus di mulai dari *grassroot* atau kalangan akar rumput. Pihak-pihak yang bertikai, dibantu masyarakat Lombok lainnya, harus mau menginisiasi terjadinya proses

rekonsiliasi. Proses rekonsiliasi sebaiknya di mulai melalui kesepakatan dan kesepahaman bersama. Jika hal ini dilakukan, maka proses resolusi konflik akan berjalan lebih mudah karena opsi perdamaianya berasal dari masing-masing suku. Peran pemerintah adalah membantu menjaga proses ini agar tetap dikedepankan dalam rangka menjaga perdamaian antarsuku.

Sebagai penutup, konflik antarsuku Indonesia bukanlah masalah kesukuan semata, tetapi lebih menyangkut hubungan kekuatan ekonomi politik. orang atau kelompok yang mempunyai kekuatan politik bisa mempertukarkan kekuatan politiknya dengan keuntungan ekonomi. Sebaliknya, pihak yang mempunyai kekuatan ekonomi dapat mempertukarkan kekuatannya untuk mendapatkan perlindungan dan kemudahan politik. kerjasama di kalangan kelompok-kelompok dominan ini jelas menguntungkan mereka. Memang selain kearifan lokal, dibutuhkan kematangan berdemokrasi bagi orang Indonesia untuk benar-benar dapat mengurangi konflik di negeri tercinta ini. Kematangan di mana penilaian atas individu bukan lagi didasarkan atas tampak fisik semata, tetapi di mana perbedaan dijunjung tinggi sebagai alat pemersatu bangsa

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**PENGARUH EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ECHR)
SEBAGAI REZIM HAM DI EROPA (TELAH MELALUI PENDEKATAN
REGIME-INTERPLAY)**

**THE INFLUENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(ECHR) AS A HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME IN EUROPE: ANALYSIS THROUGH
REGIME-INTERPLAY APPROACH**

Herry Wahyudi
Universitas Abdurrah, Pekanbaru
Email: herry.wahyudi@univrab.ac.id

ABSTRACT

The issue of human rights is a problem of great concern in the European Union. Previous alliances faced problems related to human rights in the areas of geopolitics and geo-economics. The ECHR (European Convention of Human Rights) is present as a regime carrying out human rights values that were previously influenced by COE (The Convention of Europe) in the European Union. The development of the ECHR as a human rights regime in the European Union is very dependent on the conditions of the EU member states themselves, which were previously fragmented into fascist and communism systems and must be transformed into democratic liberals. Data in this research will be explored through literature method (library research). The process of developing the ECHR as a human rights regime should be analyzed through an international regime approach using the theory of regime-interplay which will examine the ECHR process as one of the influential human rights regimes in the European Union.

Keywords: Human Rights, European Union, European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), regime inter-play

ABSTRAK

Isu Hak Asasi Manusia adalah masalah yang sangat diperhatikan di Uni Eropa. Aliansi negara-negara Eropa sebelumnya menghadapi masalah yang berkaitan dengan Hak Asasi Manusia yang dihubungkan dengan aspek geo-politik dan geo-ekonomi di kawasan tersebut. ECHR (Konvensi Eropa tentang Hak Asasi Manusia) hadir sebagai rezim yang menjalankan nilai-nilai HAM yang sebelumnya dipengaruhi oleh COE (Konvensi Eropa) di Uni Eropa. Perkembangan ECHR sebagai rezim hak asasi manusia di Uni Eropa sangat tergantung pada kondisi negara-negara anggota UE sendiri, yang sebelumnya terfragmentasi menjadi sistem fasisme dan komunisme, dan harus ditransformasikan menjadi sistem liberal. Data dalam penelitian ini akan dianalisa melalui metode literatur (studi pustaka). Proses pengembangan ECHR sebagai rezim Hak Asasi Manusia dianalisis melalui pendekatan rezim internasional menggunakan teori *regime-interplay* yang akan menelaah proses ECHR sebagai salah satu rezim HAM yang berpengaruh di Uni Eropa.

Kata Kunci: HAM, Uni Eropa, *European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)*, *regime inter-play*

Pendahuluan

Tulisan ini diawali dengan telaah dari fenomena penegakan HAM di Uni Eropa yang terjadi sejalan dengan pembentukan kawasan tersebut sebagai sebuah entitas *supra-state* bahkan bisa disebut sebagai

international-state yang muncul sebagai bagian dari nasionalisme etnis. Pembentukan tersebut diawali dengan perubahan yang membawa implikasi bersifat kompleks bagi negara-negara anggotanya, salah satunya pada perubahan identitas “warganegara” Uni Eropa dan

perlunya pembentukan *civil society* di Eropa (Wardhani, 2011). Masalah identitas semakin berkembang menjadi isu yang pelik dengan ide penambahan jumlah anggota yang mencakup wilayah Eropa Timur. Kondisi yang terjadi di Eropa berdampak pada masalah keamanan manusia (*human security*), sebuah isu non-tradisional di benua tersebut. Nasionalisme etnis telah menggeser isu tradisional, yaitu keamanan militer, yang mendominasi perpolitikan di Eropa. Nasionalisme dan etnisitas menjadi menarik karena berkaitan dengan masalah jati diri bangsa Eropa secara keseluruhan. Dua hal yang bertolak belakang dalam isu nasionalisme dan etnisitas di Eropa: terjadi pelemahan nasionalisme di Eropa Barat dan penguatan nasionalisme di Eropa Timur (Wardhani, 2011).

Proses perubahan tersebut juga terlebih dahulu menghadapi tantangan kedua bagi kawasan ini, tantangan tersebut ialah Persaingan ideologi antara Barat dan Timur membawa dampak yang dramatis bagi perkembangan Eropa. Eropa tidak saja secara sederhana terbagi dalam dua ideologi yang bertolak belakang namun berkembang menjadi dua kultur dengan kekuatan ekonomi dan kondisi sosial yang berbeda sama sekali. Sebaliknya, berakhirnya Perang Dingin juga menyebabkan perubahan signifikan bagi benua tersebut. Eropa Timur mengalami perkembangan spektakuler yang belum pernah terjadi di masa lalu. Kemunduran Uni Soviet dan disintegrasi Yugoslavia menghasilkan peta Eropa kontemporer dengan kemerdekaan sejumlah negara baru di satu pihak, dan di lain pihak terdapat tuntutan-tuntutan pemisahan diri dari beberapa wilayah di Eropa Timur.

Kedua tantangan yang telah dihadapi Uni Eropa ini tidak pernah terlepas dari masalah penegakan HAM. Proses penegakan HAM yang berbeda di setiap kawasan di Uni Eropa memunculkan kesulitan tersendiri

untuk menyatukan persekutuan kawasan ini dibawah payung hukum transnasional yang diakui. Polemik masalah HAM di Eropa Barat dan Eropa Timur menjadi tantangan tersendiri, mengingat masalah itu juga disokong oleh masalah perbedaan geopolitik dan geoekonomi. Namun tantangan tersebut berhasil diatasi oleh aktor-aktor yang berada di kawasan Eropa, baik itu aktor *interstate* maupun aktor *suprastate*, *non-state*, dan *substate*. Adalah *The European Court of Human Right* (ECtHR) yang bertransformasi menjadi ECHR (*European Convention of Human Rights*) yang merupakan sebuah rezim yang dikendalikan oleh aktor *interstate* maupun *non-state*. *The European Court of Human Right* didirikan pada tahun 1959 dibawah struktur dari *Council of Europe*, sekelompok negara-negara di Benua Eropa sepakat atas komitmen untuk memberikan proteksi terhadap HAM. Negara-negara yang awal nya tergabung di dalam *The European Court of Human Right* (ECtHR) ini pada awal nya hanya berjumlah 10 negara, yakni: Belgia, Denmark, Prancis, Irlandia, Italia, Luxembourg, Belanda, Norwegia, Swedia, dan Inggris.

Dalam prakteknya ECHR (dulunya ECtHR) berfungsi sebagai landasan untuk menginterpretasi *European Convention of Human Rights* (sekarang ECHR). Konvensi dari rezim ini dimulai pada tahapan pembentukan cikal-bakal penegakan hukum di kawasan Eropa. Beberapa peradilan yang ada di Eropa akan berfungsi lebih maksimal setelah setiap negara menerima sistem ECHR. *The Convention of Europe* (COE) telah memiliki peran dalam peningkatan peradilan sejak tahun 1990, namun dengan adanya ECtHR, dulu COE yang belum mampu menyinggung permasalahan hukum di tataran pemerintahan di Eropa hingga tahun 1970, namun semuanya berubah saat ECtHR hadir dan memasuki tatanan hukum di kawasan Eropa dengan menghasilkan

keputusan yang cepat berbeda dari pemerintahan (Ba, 2005).

Akibat dominasi nya ECtHR menjadi peradilan permanen diakhir tahun 1998 dan juga membawahi tentang undang-undang kekerasan bagi individu yang belum ada sejak tahun 1994, dan undang-undang ini merupakan sesuatu yang bersifat wajib (*mandatory*) bagi seluruh negara yang menandatangani COE (Ba, 2005). Secara sederhana ECtHR telah menjadi hal pendukung bagi lahir nya rezim ECHR yang bersifat resmi, dan berhubungan secara tidak resmi dengan *European Court of Justice* (ECJ) dan *The Court of European Union* hingga docktrin-doktrin dari konvensi ECHR relevan untuk diterapkan. Di kawasan Eropa sendiri, rezim yang bersifat transnasional mulai bermunculan sekitar tahun 1970 hingga 1990. Tahun 1970 ditandai dengan beberapa pergolakan yang terjadi di kawasan Selatan Eropa yang setidaknya merepresentasikan tiga kediktatoran di kawasan tersebut. Negara-negara yang dikuasai oleh diktator di kawasan tersebut ialah Yunani dan Spanyol (1939-1975) serta Portugal (1933-1974) (Ba, 2005). Konvensi ini lah yang membuat Fasis meredup di kawasan ini dan memakasakan tiga negara tersebut mengubah sistem pemerintahnya yang sebelumnya bersifat otoritarian menjadi demokrasi. Hal ini diperkuat dengan komitmen seluruh negara komunis termasuk Rusia ikut menandatangani COE. Setelah hampir 70 tahun menutup diri dari konvensi, akhirnya Rusia mengakui dan meratifikasi undang-undang dalam perlindungan HAM pada tahun 1989 (Ba, 2005). Secara teknis seluruh anggota Uni Eropa merupakan anggota dari COE dengan ECJ sebagai badan peradilannya, namun seluruh rezim itu juga terikat dengan hukum (*legal binding*) pada ECHR. ECHR juga merupakan aturan yang disepakati bersama sebagai ketentuan umum sebagai anggota Uni Eropa yakni

mengutamakan dan menjunjung tinggi nilai-nilai Hak Asasi Manusia (HAM) yang diatur di dalam Konvensi Eropa tentang Hak Asasi Manusia yang implementasinya hampir sama seperti rezim perjanjian internasional yang diatur oleh PBB (UN) (Hanifer-Burton, 2009).

Hal ini lah yang mendorong penulis untuk menelaah lebih lanjut pengaruh *European Convention of Human Rights* (ECHR) sebagai sebuah rezim yang bersifat *single trans-state, rule of law regime*, yang diimplementasikan oleh aktor politik dan beberapa institusi legal dari anggota Uni Eropa, berhasil membuat landasan hukum HAM di Uni Eropa bahkan masuk kedalam aspek berlakunya aktivitas perdagangan di regional Uni Eropa yang berbeda dengan perjanjian perdagangan di regional lainnya (Drezner, 2009).

Berdasarkan uraian dari latar belakang masalah, maka penulis merumuskan suatu permasalahan, yaitu: Bagaimana pengaruh *European Convention of Human Rights* (ECHR) di dalam Uni Eropa Sehingga berhasil menjadi salah satu rezim HAM di Eropa (*The European Human-Rights Regime*)?

Kerangka Konseptual

Secara politik internasional, kebangkitan ECHR sebagai rezim HAM di Eropa dapat ditelaah melalui aspek, seperti berikut:

1. Suasana dari kontestasi politik di kawasan tersebut sepanjang pertengahan hingga akhir 1980 yang memengaruhi gaya kepemimpinan politik dalam mendominasi Eropa.
2. Struktur dari Uni Eropa yang sudah kokoh, dengan anggota yang terpisah dari ECHR namun tumpang tindih (*overlapping*) dengan COE. Namun fenomena ini juga bisa dikaji melalui teori rezim internasional, yakni teori *regime interplay*. *regime interplay* sendiri merujuk pada situasi ketika konten

,operasi, konsekuensi, dari satu institusi (*recipient regime*) dipengaruhi oleh rezim lain (*tributary regime*). Dalam penjabarannya *regime interplay* terbagi atas tiga klasifikasi (*taxonomies*) dari *interplay* itu sendiri. Tiga klasifikasi tersebut ialah (Stoke, 2001):

1. *Embeddedness (relationship to overarching principles and practices)*. Pada klasifikasi *embededness*, suatu rezim terbentuk atas dua tingkatan, yakni: *meta-regime* dan *regime*. Seperti yang dikemukakan oleh Aggarwall, meta-regime dapat memengaruhi prinsip dan praktek keseluruhan rezim bergantung pada rezim yang paling besar atau berpengaruh.

2. *Nestedness (relationships to functionally or geographically broader regimes)*. Ini kebalikan dari *embededness*, jika *embededness* berbicara mengenai meta-regime memengaruhi regime, maka *nestedness* akan berbicara rezim yang paling besar atau berpengaruh akan memengaruhi rezim yang kecil. Keseluruhan fungsi dari rezim tersebut terpusat pada rezim yang paling besar dan berpengaruh.

3. *Clustering (deliberate combination of several regimes)*. Klasifikasi ini menjelaskan bahwa suatu rezim yang besar terbentuk atas rezim besar yang lain. Secara sederhana suatu rezim besar terbentuk atas rezim yang paling berpengaruh dan besar yang lebih dahulu hadir.

4. *Overlaps (unintentional influences)*. Klasifikasi rezim ditahapan ini merupakan yang paling banyak ditemui dalam menelaah fenomena rezim internasional. Beberapa rezim lahir karena ada proses tumpang tindih terhadap *concern* yang dipegangnya.

Regime interplay sendiri dalam penerapannya ditemui dalam tiga jenis bentuk *interplay*, seperti:

1. *Utilitarian interplay*. Berbicara bagaimana suatu rezim merubah struktur *pay-off* di rezim yang lain

2. *Normative interplay*. *Interplay* dalam jenis ini ditelaah melalui norma yang dianut oleh suatu rezim, harus dianut oleh rezim lain.

3. *Ideational interplay*. *Interplay* dalam jenis ini dipaparkan melalui tataran ide atau ilmu pengetahuan yang membentuk rezim tersebut.

Masing-masing jenis dari *interplay* ini memiliki ukuran efektifitas untuk ditelaah lebih lanjut. Ukuran efektifitas dari tiga jenis *Interplay* ini dapat dilihat sebagai berikut (Stoke, 2001):

1. *Utilitarian based*. Efektifitas dalam jenis *interplay* ini diukur berdasarkan cost efficiency, hal ini dikarenakan jenis *interplay* berusaha merubah struktur *pay-off* dari rezim lain. Selanjutnya *externalities* yang sangat erat kaitannya dengan *public goods* yang bisa memaparkan *concern* dari rezim itu sendiri. Dan yang terakhir yakni *competition* sejauh mana suatu rezim dapat berkompetisi dengan rezim lain sehingga ada suatu rezim yang harus ditinggalkan.

2. *Normative based*. Efektifitas dalam jenis *interplay* ini diukur apabila suatu rezim sudah melakukan inovasi dan memiliki *data based* mengenai suatu hal dan digunakan oleh rezim lain, hal ini terkait dengan aspek koherensi yang terdapat dalam jenis *interplay* ini. Selain itu aspek determinasi juga menjadi hal yang penting agar suatu rezim diikuti oleh rezim lain. Terakhir, aspek *procedural validation* yang menunjukkan bahwa suatu rezim memiliki validasi prosedural yang akan diikuti oleh rezim lain.

3. *Ideational based*. Suatu rezim bisa dikatakan efektif pada jenis ini apabila rezim tersebut telah melahirkan *knowledge* yang digunakan dalam menghadapi *prominence*. Hal ini akan erat hubungannya dengan agenda politik.


Jika ditelaah melalui pendekatan *regime interplay* maka fenomena dari ECHR sebagai rezim *Human-Rights* di Uni Eropa dapat ditelaah melalui klasifikasi *interplay*

(*taxonomies*) pada aspek *embeddedness*. Penulis menyematkan aspek *embeddedness* dalam fenomena ini karena ada proses yang menunjukkan suatu rezim memengaruhi keseluruhan prinsip dan praktek dari ECHR sebagai rezim yang bergantung kepada rezim besar lainnya, seperti: Uni Eropa yang keseluruhan anggotanya tergabung ke dalam COE dan ECJ sebagai badan peradilan.

ECHR seolah hadir sebagai *meta-regime* yang sebelum nya dirancang dalam ECtHR sebagai bagian dari hasil COE bagian utama dari terbentuknya Uni Eropa itu

sendiri. ECHR memang memiliki badan yang terpisah dari ECJ, namun di dalam COE, ECHR merupakan bagian yang penting. Hal ini lah yang membuat ECHR dan ECJ memiliki ikatan hukum yang kuat (*legal binding*) namun berbeda institusi. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa isu HAM yang dipertaruhkan dalam agenda rezim ini berhasil menjadi *institutional bargaining* dan bisa diterima oleh semua negara anggota. *Institutional bargaining* merupakan salah satu penentu untuk mengukur berhasil atau tidaknya suatu rezim (Pamuji, 2011)

Bagan I Menunjukkan Bahwa EHCR Merupakan Bagian Dari Lingkaran *Embeddedness*



Diolah dari Alice D. Ba and Matthew J. Hoffman.2005. *Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence, Contestation, and World Order*.


Bagan diatas menunjukkan bahwa Uni Eropa (EU) sebagai rezim besar dan paling berpengaruh berhasil menjadikan ECHR sebagai *meta-regime* (Aggarwal, 1998) yang bergerak dalam HAM dan meletakkan prinsip dan praktek keseluruhan rezim Uni Eropa yang sebelumnya telah disepakati dalam COE.

Dalam tataran jenis *regime interplay*, fenomena diatas dapat ditelaah melalui jenis *regime interplay* yang berdasarkan *normative based*. Fenomena HAM yang dibangun melalui COE memiliki determinasi yang jelas, sehingga dapat diikuti oleh negara-negara anggota Uni Eropa lainnya dan memiliki tingkat obligasi, presisi, dan delegasi yang tinggi

menjadikan rezim ini sebagai sumber hukum yang tegas (*hard law*) (Goldstein, 2001). Dari segi koherensi, ECHR memiliki koherensi yang sama dengan ECJ, karena kedua institusi ini sama-sama bergerak dalam aspek hukum. ECHR dan ECJ sama-sama bersifat *legal binding* satu dengan yang lainnya. Pertanyaan mengapa ECHR dapat diterima oleh negara-negara anggota Uni Eropa lainnya bisa dilihat

melalui aspek *procedural validation* yang menjelaskan bahwa ECHR merupakan kelanjutan ECtHR dan juga mengangkat isu yang sangat diperlukan untuk kepentingan bersama, seperti isu HAM sehingga membuat ECHR diikuti oleh rezim lain, terutama diikuti oleh rezim transnasional lainnya yang ada di kawasan Uni Eropa.

Bagan II Telaah Aspek *Normative Based* Terhadap ECHR Dalam *Regime Interplay*



Diolah dari Alice D. Ba and Matthew J. Hoffman.2005. *Contending Perspectives on Global Governance: Coherence, Contestation, and World Order*.

Kompleksitas rezim memberikan analisa bahwa rezim terbentuk tidak hanya berawal dari niat para aktor yang tergabung di dalam rezim tersebut, melainkan terbentuk dari perjanjian-perjanjian dalam proses pembentukan rezim atau setelahnya (Alter & Meunier, 2009). Dalam implementasi perjanjian-perjanjian tersebut aktor yang tergabung di dalam rezim sering menggunakan strategi yang membingungkan, hal ini wajar karena bias negara sebagai aktor terpusat masih mendominasi dalam fenomena

Hubungan Internasional, proses pengambilan kebijakan yang kompleks, termasuk strategi politik aktor. Perjanjian yang terbentuk di dalam rezim bisa gagal dan bisa saja menjadi luas aspeknya, kompleksitas rezim hadir sebagai teori dan konsep yang menjelaskan bagaimana hal-hal tersebut bisa terjadi, dari mana asal-usulnya, mengapa, dan bagaimana rezim tersebut saat ini (Alter & Meunier, 2009). Seperti hal nya ECHR yang juga mengalami proses yang panjang dan ideal

untuk dianalisa menggunakan teori dan konsep kompleksitas rezim.

Metode Penelitian

Metode yang digunakan dalam penulisan karya ilmiah ini ialah metode kualitatif dengan teknik pengumpulan data sekunder yang diperoleh melalui metode kepustakaan (*library research*). Data diperoleh dan dikumpulkan melalui beberapa studi kajian terdahulu dan analisis dokumen seperti: buku, artikel, jurnal, dan laporan yang terkait dengan penulisan karya ilmiah ini.

Hasil Penelitian


Pengaruh ECHR sebagai sebuah rezim yang bergerak dibidang HAM dapat juga dikaji melalui pendekatan normatif yang menjelaskan bagaimana suatu norma dapat diadopsi oleh bagian dari sistem internasional. Selanjutnya Finnemore dan Sikkink (Finnemore, 1998) menjelaskan bagaimana suatu norma dapat diadopsi dalam bagian dari sistem internasional. Penjelasan Finnemore dan Sikkink ini diawali dengan dinamika norma dan politik internasional disaat pra dan paska Perang Dingin yang banyak dipengaruhi oleh pemikiran-pemikiran akademisi yang mengkaji pergeseran norma dan tingkah laku politik. Norma ini memengaruhi ekspektasi, pemberian identitas (*given identity*), *appropriate habits* (patut atau tidak patut), serta *standard of behaviour* (standard dalam bertingkah laku).

Ada beberapa tahapan yang dijelaskan oleh kedua penulis ini, dan tahapan yang bersinggungan dengan proses dan

dinamika politik ialah tahapan yang dikenal dengan istilah “*tipping points*” dimana norma tersebut telah diambil dan diadopsi oleh pemimpin suatu negara serta memberikan tanggapan bahwa norma tersebut memang dirasa perlu untuk dikembangkan.

Dalam konteks ECHR, perkembangan HAM merupakan bagian dari norma yang sangat seksi untuk diperjuangkan. Karena konsep HAM itu sendiri berkembang dengan adanya peran *non state actors* atau *interstate actors* yang membuat dan menghadirkannya sebagai norma, bahkan setingkat *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (DUHAM) menurut Abboth memiliki legalitas yang rendah, kurang presisi, dan terinstitusionalisasi secara lemah, namun dalam perkembangan yang sulit itu lah yang membuat rezim HAM kuat dari waktu ke waktu (Abbott, 2000).

Finnemore dan Sikkink menjelaskan tahapan awal perkembangan nilai atau norma yang dibuat oleh aktor pada tahapan awal dari bangkitnya institusi atau rezim yang disebut sebagai *norm emergence* dengan akademisi, *epistemic community*, dan kelompok *think-tanks* yang menghadirkan pemikiran baru dalam merekonstruksikan bentuk ancaman yang menimpa HAM, hingga norma tersebut dianggap sebagai *common senses* sehingga patut untuk dibicarakan dalam konteks internasional secara bersama, pada tahapan ini lah norma masuk pada tahapan *norm cascade or acceptance*, hingga bersifat *taken for granted* pada tahapan *internalization*.



Diolah dari Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organization* Vol. 52 No.4. The MIT PRESS diakses melalui <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2601361>, Hal. 896.

Selain itu, proses ECHR diterima sebagai rezim HAM di Eropa juga dipengaruhi oleh *acceptance from transnational force* yang tidak lain adalah proses penerimaan dari sebagai besar negara-negara anggota Uni Eropa. Desakan transnasional ini juga dipengaruhi oleh tataran eksekutif dan legislatif dari beberapa negara-negara anggota Uni Eropa. Negara-negara yang mengalami hal seperti itu adalah sebagai berikut:

1. Perjalanan COE yang awalnya hanya ditandatangani oleh beberapa negara anggota Uni Eropa seperti: Prancis, Jerman, dan Belanda yang tidak lepas dari persoalan geopolitik seperti kehadiran fasis.
 2. Negara-negara Uni Eropa menjadi anggota COE pada tahun 1970 seperti Portugal, Yunani, dan Spanyol.
 3. Masuknya Rumania pada tahun 1990 yang menunjukkan akhir dari Perang Dingin dan dominasi komunis yang sarat akan pelanggaran hukum.
- Semua hal yang dihadapi oleh beberapa negara diatas tidak terlepas dari proses konstitusi formal dan hukum. Kedua proses ini juga mendukung terciptanya

ECHR sebagai rezim HAM di Eropa karena tiga hal, yakni:

1. ECHR cocok dengan konstitusi nasional setiap negara Uni Eropa yang sebagian berfokus pada hubungan transnasional.
2. ECHR disusun berdasarkan proses hukum dari setiap negara anggota Uni Eropa mencerminkan validasi prosedural dalam *normative interplay*.
3. Implementasi ECtHR yang terlebih dahulu telah dibuat diterima doktrinnya oleh tataran eksekutif dan legislatif negara-negara anggota Uni Eropa sehingga memudahkan jalan pembentukan ECHR sebagai interpretasi dari ECtHR.

Dari proses keseluruhan tersebut membuat ECHR sebagai rezim yang memiliki mekanisme penyelesaian sengketa internasional dengan tingkat independensi yang tinggi karena berada dalam pengawasan badan supranasional yang independen (Keohane, 2000) yakni Uni Eropa.

Kesimpulan

ECHR berhasil menjadi sebuah rezim melalui proses *embeddedness* dan *normative interplay*. Fenomena HAM yang dibangun melalui COE sebelumnya memiliki determinasi yang jelas, sehingga dapat diikuti oleh negara-negara anggota Uni Eropa lainnya. Dari segi koherensi, ECHR memiliki koherensi yang sama dengan ECJ, karena kedua institusi ini sama-sama bergerak dalam aspek hukum. ECHR dan ECJ sama-sama bersifat *legal binding* satu dengan yang lainnya.

Proses perubahan *meta-regime* menjadi sebuah *regime* juga bisa dilihat dalam fenomena ini. EHCR yang sebelumnya bernama ECtHR sekarang menjadi rezim yang banyak diikuti oleh rezim transnasional lainnya di Uni Eropa. Hal ini dikarenakan ECtHR sebelumnya memiliki validitas prosedural dalam hukum yang diterima oleh beberapa anggota Uni Eropa yang tergabung dalam COE. Dari segi koherensi, ECHR memiliki koherensi yang sama dengan ECJ, karena kedua institusi ini sama-sama bergerak dalam aspek hukum. ECHR dan ECJ sama-sama bersifat *legal binding* satu dengan yang lainnya walaupun tidak dalam sebuah institusi yang sama.

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**KEKUATAN LAUT AS DI YOKOSUKA JEPANG DALAM MENGHADAPI
KEKUATAN LAUT TIONGKOK DI CHINA'S NEAR-SEAS REGION (2013-2017)**

***THE US MARITIME POWER IN YOKOSUKA JAPAN FACING CHINA'S MARITIME
POWER IN THE CHINA'S NEAR-SEAS REGION (2013-2017)***

Muhammad Fauzan Malufti¹⁾, Arfin Sudirman^{*)}

1)Department of International Relations, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung

*) Department of International Relations, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung
arfin.sudirman@unpad.ac.id

ABSTRACT

This article aims to describe the function of the US sea power in Yokosuka Japan against Chinese sea power in China's Near-seas Region in 2013-2017. In the past two decades, the increasing of Chinese military power and coercive policy in the South, East, and Yellow China Sea, or the so-called China's Near-seas Region (CNR), have created regional security concern for the United States. The Chinese naval ability to carry out A2/AD operations in this area has eliminated the immunity of US warships that previously could operate freely without any significant threat. In order to confront the threat, the US government issued new policies, strategies and operational concepts where one of the most important elements of military force in charge of carrying it out was its sea power element in the form of surface warship stationed at the Yokosuka naval base. By using the concept of Sea Power and Maritime Warfare, this article concludes that in order to face the threats posed by China on CNR, US surface warships are expected to carry out strategies and operational concepts that are in line with two basic functions of sea power, sea control, and expedition operations albeit with a high risk in the event of war. This article uses a qualitative research method where data is collected through literature studies and interviews.

Keywords: CNR, A2 / AD, Sea Power, Yokosuka, Marine Control

ABSTRAK

Artikel ini bertujuan untuk mendeskripsikan fungsi kekuatan laut AS yang ditempatkan di Yokosuka Jepang dalam menghadapi kekuatan laut Tiongkok di China's Near-seas Region pada tahun 2013-2017. Dalam dua dekade terakhir, peningkatan kekuatan militer dan aktivitas koersif Tiongkok di LTS, LTT, dan Laut Kuning, dikenal juga dengan nama China's Near-seas Region (CNR), telah menciptakan kekhawatiran bagi Amerika Serikat. Kemampuan angkatan laut Tiongkok untuk melakukan operasi A2/AD di wilayah ini telah menghilangkan imunitas kapal-kapal perang AS yang sebelumnya dapat beroperasi secara bebas tanpa adanya ancaman berarti. Untuk menghadapi ancaman tersebut, militer AS mengeluarkan strategi maupun konsep operasional baru dimana salah satu unsur kekuatan militer paling utama yang bertugas menjalankannya adalah unsur kekuatan laut dalam wujud kapal-kapal perang permukaan yang ditempatkan di pangkalan angkatan laut Yokosuka, Jepang. Dengan menggunakan konsep Sea Power dan Maritime Warfare, artikel ini menyimpulkan bahwa guna menghadapi ancaman Tiongkok di CNR, kapal-kapal perang permukaan AS tersebut diharapkan dapat menjalankan strategi dan konsep operasional yang sesuai dengan fungsi dasar kekuatan laut yaitu pengendalian laut dan operasi ekspedisi meskipun dengan resiko yang tinggi jika terjadi perang. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode penelitian kualitatif dimana data dikumpulkan melalui studi literatur dan juga wawancara.

Kata Kunci: CNR, A2/AD, Kekuatan Laut, Yokosuka, Pengendalian Laut

Pendahuluan

Pada November 2011 Pemerintahan Barack Obama mengumumkan bahwa AS akan merubah fokus kebijakan luar negerinya dari sebelumnya Timur Tengah menjadi Asia-Pasifik, suatu kebijakan yang kemudian dikenal dengan nama *Rebalancing Towards Asia* dan terus menjadi fokus kebijakan luar negeri Obama hingga pemerintahannya berakhir di 2017. Tujuan dasar AS melalui kebijakan ini adalah untuk meningkatkan dan memperluas kerjasama antara AS dengan negara-negara dan institusi-institusi regional, memperkuat hubungan dengan negara sekutu, serta mengembangkan norma dan aturan regional yang sesuai dengan norma keamanan, ekonomi, dan politik internasional yang didukung AS, dalam dimensi keamanan, politik, ekonomi, dan diplomasi (Sutter, Brown, dan Adamson, 2013:1).

Salah satu hal yang melatarbelakangi munculnya kebijakan *rebalancing* adalah semakin kompleksnya isu keamanan di wilayah Asia-Pasifik khususnya dikawasan *China's near-seas region* (CNR). CNR merujuk pada wilayah laut yang terletak diantara daratan utama Tiongkok dan garis *first island chain* (FIC) yaitu Laut Tiongkok Selatan (LTS), Laut Tiongkok Timur (LTT), dan Laut Kuning (CRS, 2017:1). Sebagian besar isu keamanan di kawasan ini disebabkan oleh meningkatnya kekuatan militer dan aktivitas koersif Tiongkok di LTS dan LTT (CSIS, 2016:VI). Berkat pertumbuhan ekonominya yang pesat, dalam dua dekade terakhir Tiongkok terus melakukan modernisasi terhadap militernya mulai dari modernisasi alutsista, strategi tempur, struktur komando/kecabangan, hingga

melakukan perubahan doktrin. Modernisasi ini secara signifikan meningkatkan kapabilitas militer Tiongkok dari yang sebelumnya (hanya mampu) terfokus pada pertahanan daratan utama (*mainland*) hingga wilayah lepas pantai Tiongkok, kini meluas hingga ke arah selatan seperti Samudra Hindia hingga Afrika, dan juga ke arah Timur seperti Laut Filipina.



Gambar 1. Kawasan China' Near Seas Region

(Sumber: RAND, 2011: Anti-Access Measures in Chinese Defense Strategy)

Di CNR, fokus modernisasi militer Tiongkok adalah peningkatan kapabilitas dalam operasi *counter-intervention* atau *anti-access/area denial* (A2/AD) yang bertujuan untuk mencegah, membatasi, atau mengganggu pergerakan kekuatan laut musuh disuatu wilayah dengan cara mengembangkan dan mengoperasikan persenjataan jarak jauh seperti rudal balistik dan rudal jelajah yang saat ini mampu menjangkau seluruh basis militer dan kapal perang AS yang beroperasi di wilayah Barat Pasifik (CRS, 2017:7-8). Fokus lainnya

yaitu melakukan perubahan doktrin (yang juga diikuti oleh peningkatan kapabilitas) angkatan laut Tiongkok, *People Liberation Army Navy*

(PLAN), dari sebelumnya *green water navy* yang terbatas pada wilayah perairan nasional menjadi *blue water navy* yang memiliki kemampuan untuk menggelar kekuatan di laut lepas, samudra, dan perairan antar benua jauh diluar wilayah kedaulatan negaranya.

Kekuatan laut AS di CNR diwakili oleh Armada Pasifik-nya, *US Pacific Fleet* (PACFLT), yang merupakan armada terbesar AS dengan kekuatan 200 kapal, 1.200 pesawat, dan 130.000 personil baik sipil maupun militer (CPF, 2017). Dari 11

pangkalan utama PACFLT di Asia-Pasifik, salah satunya adalah Pangkalan Angkatan Laut Yokosuka di Jepang. Memiliki nama resmi *Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka*, pangkalan angkatan laut ini terletak di Teluk Tokyo, Yokosuka, Jepang. Peran sentral pangkalan Yokosuka bagi kekuatan laut AS di Asia-Pasifik diperlihatkan melalui kelengkapan fasilitas dan penempatan kekuatan disana yang menjadikannya sebagai pangkalan angkatan laut luar negeri terbesar AS di seluruh dunia (Naval Technology, 2017).

Yokosuka juga menjadi markas kekuatan utama Armada Pasifik AS, Armada Ke-7, yang memiliki kekuatan lengkap mulai dari kapal suplai dan logistik, kapal selam, kapal serbu amfibi, kapal perusak, kapal penjelajah, hingga kapal induk. Dari Yokosuka inilah kapal-kapal perang AS dan unsur kekuatan lainnya berpatroli di kawasan CNR guna melindungi kepentingan nasional AS dari ancaman yang ada, baik yang bersifat tradisional maupun non-tradisional.

Kerangka Teoritis

Dalam penelitian ini, peneliti menggunakan beberapa konsep. Pertama studi strategis untuk melihat bagaimana negara menggunakan aset militer untuk mencapai tujuan politik dalam sistem internasional serta bagaimana teknologi mempengaruhi strategi yang dapat diambil oleh negara. Kedua, konsep kekuatan laut (*seapower*) untuk melihat unsur dan fungsi kekuatan laut AS yang ada di Yokosuka. Unsur kekuatan laut yang diteliti terfokus pada unsur teknologi yaitu dalam bentuk kapal perang (termasuk peran dan sistem persenjataan yang melekat padanya). Sedangkan fungsi kekuatan laut yang akan

diteliti terdiri dari dua fungsi yaitu pengendalian laut dan operasi ekspedisi.

Terakhir adalah konsep peperangan laut yang digunakan untuk melihat aktivitas dan strategi kekuatan laut AS di Yokosuka serta kekuatan laut Tiongkok yang ada di CNR. Meskipun hingga saat ini tidak terjadi peperangan laut antara AS dengan Tiongkok, aktivitas dan strategi kekuatan laut kedua negara dibentuk atau diarahkan untuk menghadapi kemungkinan terburuk yaitu pecahnya peperangan laut. Nantinya aktivitas dan strategi kekuatan laut kedua negara akan membantu peneliti dalam mendeskripsikan fungsi kekuatan laut AS di Yokosuka.

Unsur Kekuatan Laut AS di Yokosuka

AS sudah menempatkan kekuatan lautnya di Yokosuka sejak 1945 ketika Jepang menyerahkan pangkalan laut tersebut kepada AS. Seiring berjalannya waktu, postur kekuatan laut AS di Yokosuka, yang utamanya hadir dalam bentuk kapal perang permukaan, mengalami perubahan termasuk pada rentang waktu 2013-2017. Sesuai dengan kebijakan *rebalancing*-nya, dalam rentang waktu ini AS memperkuat postur kekuatannya di Yokosuka.

Pertama, peningkatan kekuatan hadir dalam bentuk penambahan kapal dimana satu kapal penjelajah dan satu kapal perusak ditambahkan ke Yokosuka. Kedua, peningkatan kekuatan hadir dalam bentuk pertukaran kapal dimana beberapa kapal yang sebelum tahun 2013 sudah ditempatkan di Yokosuka ditukar dengan kapal-kapal baru yang memiliki sistem persenjataan lebih modern. Melalui peningkatan kekuatan tersebut, kekuatan laut AS di Yokosuka berjumlah 1 kapal

induk, 1 kapal komando amfibi, 3 kapal penjelajah, dan 8 kapal perusak dimana setiap jenis kapal ini memiliki karakteristik dan fungsinya masing-masing (U.S. 7th Fleet, 2017:1).

Strategi kekuatan Laut AS di CNR

Strategi kekuatan laut AS dalam menghadapi Tiongkok di CNR dapat dilihat dari beberapa dokumen. Dokumen pertama yaitu *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* yang dirilis pada tahun 2015. Dokumen ini menjelaskan lima fungsi kekuatan laut AS yaitu;

- I. Akses Semua Wilayah (*All Domain Access*)
- II. Pencegahan (*deterrence*)
- III. Pengendalian Laut (*Sea Control*)
- IV. Proyeksi Kekuatan (*Power Projection*)
- V. Keamanan Maritim (*Maritime Security*)

Dalam dokumen ini juga disebutkan bahwa pada tahun 2020 sekitar 60% dari total kapal dan pesawat AL AS akan berada kawasan Indo-Asia-Pasifik, dimana Yokosuka dan CNR berada. Peningkatan kekuatan ini bertujuan agar AL AS memiliki kapasitas regional yang cukup guna menghadapi berbagai tantangan keamanan di kawasan.

Dokumen lainnya adalah *The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy: Achieving U.S. National Security Objectives in a Changing Environment*. Dokumen ini menjelaskan strategi kekuatan laut AS secara lebih spesifik yaitu strategi di kawasan Asia-Pasifik. Dalam dokumen ini, disebutkan bahwa modernisasi yang dilakukan oleh Tiongkok terhadap kapabilitas militernya seperti kapal

permukaan, pesawat, radar, dsb., ditunjukkan untuk menangkai intervensi militer AS di LTS dan LTT. Adapun salah satu cara AS untuk menghadapi Tiongkok adalah dengan memastikan berjalannya '*third offset*'.

Third offset merupakan strategi AS untuk memastikan bahwa militernya, dalam hal ini angkatan lautnya, dapat mengimbangi dan tetap memiliki dominasi terhadap persenjataan musuh khususnya dengan memastikan bahwa dirinya sendiri unggul dalam hal teknologi persenjataan

Strategi lainnya adalah mengembangkan konsep operasional baru bernama *Air-Sea Battle* yang dirilis pada tahun 2010. Strategi ini dikembangkan secara khusus untuk menghadapi ancaman strategi maupun persenjataan *Anti-Access/Area-Denial* (A2/AD) yang salah satunya berasal dari Tiongkok dikawasan laut dekat. *Anti-Access* (A2) didefinisikan sebagai tindakan yang bertujuan untuk menghambat pergerakan pasukan AS ke suatu kawasan. Sementara *Area Denial* (AD) didefinisikan sebagai tindakan yang bertujuan untuk mengganggu operasi pasukan AS di suatu kawasan. Kapabilitas ini akan menghambat pergerakan, memberikan resiko operasi lebih tinggi, serta memaksa pasukan AS untuk beroperasi lebih jauh dari kawasan yang diinginkan (U.S. DoD, 2013;2).

Dalam dokumen ini, tiga hal yang harus dilakukan oleh armada AS dalam menghadapi ancaman A2/AD yang tercantum dalam *Air-Sea Battle* adalah; (1) *Disrupt* yaitu mengganggu kemampuan Komando, Kendali, Komunikasi, Komputer, Intelijen, Pengamatan, dan Pengintaian (**K4IPPP**) musuh; (2) *Destroy* yaitu

menghancurkan atau menetralsir wahana (*platform*) dan sistem persenjataan A2/AD musuh dan; (3) *Defeat* yaitu mengatasi senjata yang sudah diluncurkan musuh (U.S. DOD, 2013;7).

Unsur Kekuatan Laut Tiongkok di CNR

Angkatan laut Tiongkok *People Liberation Army Navy* (PLAN) merupakan angkatan laut terbesar di Asia dimana hingga awal tahun 2017 memiliki lebih dari 300 kapal yang terdiri dari kapal kombatan, kapal pendukung, dan kapal selam (U.S. DoD, 2017:24). PLAN memiliki tiga armada yaitu armada utara, armada timur, dan armada selatan, dimana semua armada ini berada di dalam kawasan CNR. Oleh sebab itu, kekuatan laut Tiongkok di CNR adalah seluruh kekuatan AL-nya.

Strategi kekuatan Laut Tiongkok di CNR

Melalui dokumen berupa buku putih pertahanan yang dirilis pada tahun 2015 dengan judul *China's Military Strategy*, Tiongkok menjelaskan bahwa secara keseluruhan doktrin angkatan bersenjataanya adalah pertahanan aktif (*active defense*). Tiongkok menyatakan bahwa negaranya tidak akan melakukan serangan militer kecuali jika mereka sudah diserang terlebih dahulu dan mereka pasti akan menyerang balik jika diserang (Tao, 2015). Khusus mengenai angkatan lautnya, dokumen ini menjelaskan empat fungsi utama PLAN:

- I. Mengembangkan struktur kekuatan militer maritim modern
- II. Menjaga kedaulatan, hak-hak, serta kepentingan maritim
- III. Melindungi sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
- IV. Berpartisipasi dalam kerjasama maritim internasional

Strategi utama kekuatan laut Tiongkok di FIC adalah pertahanan laut dekat (*Near Seas Defense/Jinhai Fangyu*) yang merujuk pada pertahanan dilautan dekat Tiongkok yaitu LTS, LTT, dan Laut Kuning. Strategi ini menggantikan strategi pertahanan dekat pantai (*near coast*) dimana modernisasi PLAN dua dekade kebelakang memungkinkannya untuk



beroperasi dalam wilayah yang lebih luas. Strategi ini menuntut kemampuan untuk melaksanakan pendendalian laut (*sea control*) agar PLAN dapat menjalankan keempat fungsinya dengan penekanan utama yaitu melaksanakan penyeberangan laut dan pendaratan amfibi secara efektif dan bebas ke Taiwan (Li, 2011:117-118).

(FarSeas Gambar 2. Strategi Kekuatan Laut Tiongkok di FIC (Sumber: U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security

Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010 (PDF)).

Pengendalian laut di laut dekat ini dilaksanakan dengan beberapa metode. Pertama, blokade dan isolasi (*blockade and isolation*) terhadap jalur pelayaran, pelabuhan, dan wilayah laut musuh guna mencegah kapal musuh beroperasi. Kedua, serangan gabungan (*joint strike*) terhadap sistem peringatan dini, pengawasan, pengendalian, hingga logistic musuh guna melumpuhkan musuh. Ketiga, penekanan pulau-pulau terpencil (*suppression of outlying islands*) untuk mencegah musuh menggunakan pulau-pulau tersebut. Keempat, pencarian dan pemusnahan (*search and annihilation*) guna menghancurkan kapal musuh yang berada diluar area blokade. Kelima, penghilangan rintangan secara menyeluruh (*comprehensive barrier removal*) guna menjamin kebebasan saat beroperasi (Li, 2011;119). Strategi Tiongkok di laut dekat ini juga dikenal dengan istilah *counter-intervention* atau yang dinamai AS sebagai strategi *anti-access/area denial* (A2/AD).

Strategi kedua adalah pertahanan laut jauh *defense/Yuanhai Fangwei*) yang merujuk pada pertahanan laut selain CNR atau pertahanan laut yang melewati FIC. Wilayah laut yang masuk dalam strategi ini adalah laut yang terletak diantara FIC dan *Second Island Chain* (SIC) seperti Laut Filipina. FIC sendiri merupakan gugus kepulauan yang menghubungkan Jepang Utara, Kepulauan Mariana Utara, Guam, terus ke selatan hingga Pulau Biak di utara Papua. Strategi ini menuntut kemampuan untuk melaksanakan operasi ekspedisi/proyeksi kekuatan (*expeditionary*

operations/power projection) secara berkelanjutan diluar CNR.

Nilai Strategis CNR

Bagi AS, nilai strategis kawasan CNR hadir sebagai konsekuensi dari berdirinya basis-basis militernya yang terletak atau bergantung pada kawasan ini. Sejak berakhirnya Perang Dunia II, AS secara dominan memiliki pengaruh dikawasan CNR dengan menciptakan sistem aliansi dengan membentuk perjanjian dan atau membangun basis militer dengan tiga negara utama dikawasan yaitu Korea Selatan, Jepang, dan Taiwan, yang kemudian beberapa tahun kebelakang terus memanjang ke arah selatan dengan dua negara yaitu Singapura dan Australia.

Semua basis militer diatas mengandalkan *Freedom of Navigation* dan SLOCs kawasan CNR untuk tetap terhubung satu sama lain, lebih jauh lagi untuk menghubungkan kekuatan militer AS di Pasifik, USPACOM, dengan kekuatan militer AS di Timur Tengah dan Afrika, USAFRICOM dan USCENTCOM. Hilangnya kendali AS sebagai akibat dari semakin kuatnya kendali Tiongkok terhadap CNR akan berakibat pada terpecahnya kekuatan AS di Asia-Pasifik menjadi dua yaitu antara utara dan selatan CNR, serta mempersulit pergerakan militer AS baik dari Pasifik menuju Timur Tengah dan Afrika ataupun sebaliknya.

Nilai strategis CNR bagi AS selanjutnya juga terikat pada basis militer yang dimilikinya dikawasan. Ada tiga keuntungan yang didapatkan AS dengan memiliki basis militer luar negeri (RAND, 2013:XX). Pertama, *contingency responsiveness* dimana menempatkan pasukan dikawasan CNR memungkinkan AS

dapat merespon secara cepat ancaman terhadap kepentingan nasionalnya dibandingkan harus menunggu datangnya pasukan dari daratan utama AS yang tentunya akan memakan waktu lebih lama. Kedua, *deterrence* dan *assurance* dinama penempatan pasukan AS dinegara sekutu dapat mencegah musuh menyerang dengan meyakinkan musuh bahwa ia akan mendapatkan balasan yang cepat dan lebih besar jika berani melakukan serangan. Penempatan pasukan AS dinegara sekutu juga berguna untuk menunjukkan komitmen negara pengirim kepada negara sekutu bahwa negara pengirim akan melindunginya. Ketiga, *security cooperation* dimana penempatan pasukan AS diluar negeri mampu meningkatkan kemampuan pasukan tersebut melalui proses adaptasi pasukan dengan lingkungan (asing) negara lain.

Bagi Tiongkok, kawasan CNR memiliki tiga nilai strategis yaitu sebagai *barriers*, *springboards*, dan *benchmarks* (Erickson dan Wuthnow, 2016:11). Sebagai *barriers*, CNR yang dibatasi oleh FIC dilihat sebagai penghalang yang dirancang oleh militer asing untuk menahan proyeksi kekuatan dan pertumbuhan angkatan laut Tiongkok. Hal ini dikarenakan adanya sistem berupa basis militer AS yang terbentang dari Jepang, Filipina, hingga Australia. Oleh sebab itu, jika Tiongkok, khususnya PLAN, ingin meningkatkan kapabilitasnya serta mendapatkan kebebasan dalam beroperasi dilaut, ia harus dapat menembus FIC.

Sebagai *springboards* atau batu loncatan, pulau-pulau di CNR yang didalamnya terdapat basis militer AS dilihat sebagai fasilitas untuk proyeksi kekuatan

militer asing terhadap daratan utama Tiongkok. Sebagai *benchmarks* atau tolak ukur, CNR dilihat sebagai tonggak untuk mendemonstrasikan perkembangan kemampuan proyeksi kekuatan Tiongkok sendiri. Kemampuan untuk beroperasi melewati FIC, utamanya dalam bentuk latihan militer, dilihat sebagai bukti meningkatnya kapabilitas proyeksi kekuatan PLAN. Pembangunan berbagai basis militer di Kepulauan Spratly dan Paracel seperti pangkalan udara, dermaga, hingga stasiun radar dan penempatan pesawat tempur, kapal, hingga rudal anti permukaan dan anti udara didalamnya juga ikut berkontribusi pada kemampuan proyeksi kekuatan PLAN. Basis militer ini memungkinkan kapal-kapal PLAN untuk berlabuh, mengisi ulang logistik, serta dengan radar dan persenjataan yang ada memungkinkan Tiongkok untuk melakukan pengawasan seluruh wilayah LTS.

Nilai Politis CNR

Kebijakan *rebalancing* penting bagi AS untuk meyakinkan kepada negara-negara dikawasan Asia-Pasifik bahwa AS tetap aktif secara global dan tidak kehabisan tenaga akibat Perang Afganistan dan Perang Irak serta AS tidak akan menarik diri dari suatu wilayah ketika berbagai isu keamanan meningkat. Khusus untuk negara-negara sekutu AS, strategi AS untuk menambah dan memodernisasi kekuatan militernya yang ditempatkan di CNR merupakan bentuk komitmen pemerintahan Obama terhadap sekutunya. Strategi ini juga menjawab kekhawatiran terhadap meningkatnya agresi Tiongkok dimata negara sekutu AS yang mengharapkan terus berlanjutnya kepemimpinan dan keterlibatan AS dalam menjaga perdamaian

dan kestabilan kawasan (U.S. DoD, 2015:19).

Di level domestik, kontrol terhadap CNR memainkan peran sentral dalam memastikan kelangsungan pertumbuhan ekonomi demi tercapainya kemakmuran bagi negara dan warga masyarakatnya. Untuk mencapai hal tersebut, Tiongkok perlu melindungi hal-hal yang membuat pertumbuhan ekonominya terus terjadi yaitu, SLOCs, akses terhadap pasar, dan sumberdaya alam. Sementara di level internasional, kawasan FIC akan memberikan panggung bagi Tiongkok untuk menunjukkan kebangkitan dirinya setidaknya sebagai *regional power* atau bahkan *superpower* kepada dunia internasional. Untuk memperlihatkan hal tersebut salah satu hal yang dilakukan Tiongkok adalah meningkatkan kapabilitas militernya, terutama PLAN, agar dapat menandingi negara lain, beroperasi jauh diluar wilayah nasional Tiongkok, serta menjalankan prinsip '*no compromise*' dalam urusan kedaulatan dan territorial (Heath, 2017:1-5).

Nilai Ekonomis Kawasan FIC

Bagi kedua negara, nilai ekonomis utama CNR terletak pada SLOCs. Saat ini 80% volume dan 70% nilai perdagangan global mengandalkan transportasi laut dimana 60%-nya melewati kawasan Indo-Pasifik. LTS sendiri dilewati 1/3 pelayaran global dengan nilai sekitar 3,4 Triliun Dollar AS pada tahun 2016 (chinapower.csis.org, 2017) dan 1/3 pengiriman minyak mentah global serta lebih dari setengah pengiriman gas alam cair (LNG) global juga melewati wilayah ini (EIA, 2013). Pada tahun 2016, 64% perdagangan maritim Tiongkok berlayar

melalui melewati wilayah ini dengan total nilai sebesar 1,470 triliun dolar AS. Sementara pada tahun yang sama, 14% perdagangan maritim AS berlayar melewati LTS dengan total nilai sebesar 208 miliar dolar AS. Sementara dalam sektor perikanan, tiap tahunnya wilayah ini menghasilkan 20 juta ton ikan yang merupakan 25% dari total tangkapan ikan dunia. Mengenai nilai sumber daya alam yang ada di LTS, diperkirakan terdapat 11 miliar barel minyak dan 190 triliun kaki kubik gas alam (EIA, 2013).

LTT memiliki potensi sumberdaya alam sebesar 200 juta barel minyak, 1 hingga 2 triliun kaki kubik gas alam. Dalam sektor perikanan, tiap tahunnya wilayah ini menghasilkan 3.8 juta ton ikan. LTT dan Laut Kuning memiliki nilai SLOCs yang penting khususnya bagi Tiongkok dimana enam dari sepuluh pelabuhan terbesarnya berada di wilayah ini dimana Laut Kuning sendiri mewakili sekitar 57% dari total volume perdagangan Tiongkok (CNA, 2012:4). Mengenai nilai sumber daya alam yang ada di Laut Kuning, diperkirakan terdapat 1.1 miliar barel minyak dan 2.2 triliun kaki kubik gas alam (U.S. GS, 2017: 1-2).

Sengketa Wilayah Di CNR

Sengketa wilayah yang terjadi dilatarbelakangi oleh nilai strategis, politis, dan ekonomis yang melekat pada CNR itu sendiri. Di LTS, terdapat tiga wilayah utama terjadinya sengketa wilayah yaitu Kepulauan Parasel, Karang Scarborough, dan Kepulauan Spratly. Di LTT, sengketa wilayah terjadi antara Tiongkok dan Jepang di Kepulauan Senkaku dimana meskipun AS bukan negara *claimant*, pakta pertahanan AS-Jepang memastikan bahwa

AS akan membantu Jepang menjaga kedaulatan wilayahnya.

Keagresifan pemerintah Tiongkok dalam melakukan klaim wilayah ini, yang terlihat dari beberapa insiden seperti tabrakan antar kapal penjaga laut, penangkapan nelayan, dan pengusiran kapal maupun pesawat oleh otoritas Tiongkok, meningkatkan rasa ketidakamanan bagi negara-negara di kawasan yang disisi lain juga meningkatkan keinginan negara-negara ini akan kehadiran AS yang kuat di kawasan (CSIS, 2016:14)

Militerisasi Di CNR

Di LTS, sejak tahun 2013 Tiongkok melakukan reklamasi di kepulauan Spratly dengan tujuan memperluas daratan pulau-pulau yang ada untuk pembangunan lebih lanjut. Reklamasi ini kemudian diikuti dengan militerisasi dimana Tiongkok membangun fasilitas militer seperti landasan udara, pelabuhan, hanggar pesawat tempur, perkubuan senjata, barak tentara, serta fasilitas komunikasi dan pengawasan seperti stasiun radio dan radar. Meskipun reklamasi dan pembangunan di kepulauan ini tidak akan memperkuat klaim wilayah Tiongkok di wilayah LTS, Tiongkok dapat menggunakan pulau-pulau ini untuk meningkatkan dan mempertahankan kontrol serta pengawasan militernya di wilayah ini (U.S. DoD, 2017:9).

Di LTT, pada tahun 2013 Tiongkok secara sepihak mendirikan *Air Defense Identification Zone* (ADIZ) yang hingga saat ini tidak diakui dan diprotes oleh AS dengan mengirim pesawat tempurnya untuk terbang di wilayah tersebut tanpa pemberitahuan kepada Tiongkok. Pendirian ADIZ ini dapat dilihat sebagai usaha

Tiongkok untuk meningkatkan klaim wilayahnya secara *de facto* di LTS yang pada akhirnya mengganggu *status quo* wilayah LTS karena ADIZ ini tumpang tindih dengan ADIZ milik Korea Selatan, Jepang, dan Taiwan yang sudah ada sebelumnya.

Dalam beberapa kesempatan, kapal perang AS yang berasal dari Yokosuka melakukan *freedom of navigation operations* (FONOPS) dengan berlayar didalam klaim 12 mil laut pulau-pulau buatan Tiongkok di kepulauan Spratly. FONOPS ini dilakukan sebagai bukti bahwa AS tidak mengakui klaim wilayah Tiongkok di LTS serta menegaskan bahwa kapal-kapal AS akan berlayar dan beroperasi dip perairan manapun yang diizinkan sesuai dengan hukum internasional yang berlaku (CSIS, 2015:17). FONOPS ini tentunya mendapatkan protes dari Tiongkok yang menyebutkan bahwa kapal perang AS telah melakukan tindakan yang tidak profesional dan merupakan bentuk provokasi militer yang mengancam keamanan Tiongkok.

Pengendalian Laut AS dan Ancaman PLAN

Dalam menjalankan fungsi pengendalian laut di CNR, kapal-kapal perang AS menghadapi ancaman dari PLAN yang memiliki strategi laut dekat dalam bentuk operasi A2/AD. Operasi ini tidak lain adalah bentuk pencegahan laut (*sea denial*) yang dilakukan PLAN khususnya terhadap AL AS di lautan sekitar Tiongkok dengan mengoperasikan sistem-sistem persenjataan tertentu.

Ancaman pertama datang dari rudal balistik dan jelajah yang dapat dibawa oleh kapal selam ataupun kapal permukaan

Tiongkok. Kedua jenis rudal dapat digunakan untuk menyerang Yokosuka dan menghancurkan fasilitas militer seperti dermaga, dok perawatan, stasiun radio, hingga gudang logistik, serta menghancurkan kapal-kapal AS dipelabuhan sebelum dapat berlayar ke CNR. Rusaknya fasilitas perawatan dan perbaikan serta logistik ini akan menghambat pergerakan dan tempo operasi armada AS di CNR mengingat dengan rusaknya Yokosuka mengharuskan AS untuk memperbaiki kapal dan mengirimkan logistik dari basis militer lain yang lebih jauh seperti Guam, Singapura, atau bahkan Hawaii.

Kemudian, kemampuan pertahanan udara PLAN juga telah meningkat dengan pengoperasian berbagai rudal pertahanan udara, yang dapat menangkis serangan dari pesawat, helikopter, ataupun rudal yang diluncurkan oleh kapal perang AS. Rudal-rudal ini memberikan kemampuan pertahanan udara mandiri dan berlapis bagi armada PLAN terlebih ketika ia harus beroperasi jauh diluar jangkauan pesawat udara yang berasal dari daratan utama.

Dalam dimensi bawah laut operasi A2/AD PLAN diwakili oleh kapal selam dan ranjau laut. Keunggulan utama kapal selam dibanding kapal permukaan adalah kemampuannya untuk beroperasi tanpa terdeteksi lawan berkat kemampuannya untuk bersembunyi hingga ke dasar lautan. Keunggulan ini akan digunakan oleh kapal selam PLAN untuk menerobos jaring patroli armada AS dan mendekat hingga jarak yang cukup untuk menyerang kapal perang AS dengan torpedo ataupun rudal jelajah yang dibawanya.

Tiongkok juga memiliki berbagai tipe ranjau laut modern yang dapat diletakkan diberbagai jalur laut untuk mencegah kapal-kapal AS mendekati CNR serta perairan sekitar Yokosuka untuk mencegah kapal-kapal AS dapat keluar dari pelabuhan. Peletakan ranjau cukuplah mudah dan dapat dilakukan secara rahasia dengan menggunakan kapal selam PLAN sementara operasi pembersihan ranjau yang harus dilakukan oleh AS akan menjadi operasi yang rumit dan memakan banyak waktu (Speller, 2015:99).

Ancaman lainnya juga datang dari kapal patroli berpeluru kendali Tiongkok seperti korvet. Memang kapal-kapal ini memiliki ukuran yang lebih kecil, minim pertahanan udara, serta tidak dapat beroperasi secara optimal di laut lepas. Namun puluhan kapal ini dapat melakukan serangan bersama (*swarms attack*) terhadap armada AS yang beroperasi didalam CNR dengan menggunakan taktik *hit and run*.

Terakhir, ancaman terhadap pengendalian laut AS berasal dari kapal perang permukaan PLAN. Untuk ancaman dari sistem persenjataan yang dibawa oleh kapal-kapal ini, seperti rudal, torpedo, dan ranjau, kurang lebih sudah dijelaskan dalam paragraf-paragraf sebelumnya. Sementara ancaman lain berasal dari sensor yang ada dalam kapal, seperti radar, sonar, dan perangkat sistem komunikasi, yang menjadi fondasi bagi kemampuan K4IPP. Kemampuan ini digunakan untuk mendeteksi dan apabila perlu melakukan penargetan senjata kepada kapal perang AS dari jarak jauh.

Pengendalian Laut AS di CNR

Dalam dokumen *Naval Operations Concept 2010* dan CS-21R, disebutkan

bahwa pengendalian laut merupakan faktor penting sebagai fondasi bagi kekuatan laut AS. Oleh karenanya, kekuatan laut AS diharuskan untuk dapat mengatasi segala hal yang mengancam kemampuannya untuk mengendalikan laut. Menghadapi ancaman yang diberikan oleh Tiongkok, fungsi pengendalian laut yang dijalankan oleh kapal-kapal perang AS di Yokosuka dijalankan dalam lima bentuk operasi yaitu *anti-surface warfare* (ASUW), *anti-submarine warfare* (ASW), *mine warfare* (MIW), *anti-air warfare* (AAW) dan serangan terhadap peluncur rudal pantai (*shore-based missile launchers*) atau disebut juga *Strike Warfare* (STW) (Clark, 2015:3).

Setiap kapal perang AS di Yokosuka dapat berkontribusi dalam lima operasi ini, berkat persenjataan maupun teknologi yang melekat padanya, baik secara independen ataupun berkelompok, dengan rincian sebagai berikut:

Tabel 1. Fungsi Pengendalian Laut AS di CNR

Fungsi Pengendalian Laut dalam Menghadapi Tiongkok	
<i>Anti-surface Warfare (ASUW)</i>	
Kapal Induk	- Memperluas area deteksi, penargetan, dan penyerangan terhadap target permukaan - Menyerang target permukaan dengan pesawat
Kapal Komando Amfibi	Melakukan fungsi K4IPP

Kapal Penjelajah & Perusak	Menyerang target permukaan dengan rudal dan meriam
<i>Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)</i>	
Kapal Induk	Melakukan pemburuan kapal selam secara terbatas.
Kapal Komando Amfibi	Melakukan fungsi K4IPP
Kapal Penjelajah & Perusak	- Kapal utama dalam pemburuan kapal selam. - Menciptakan jaring anti-kapal selam disekeliling Armada AS.
<i>Mine Warfare (MIW)</i>	
Kapal Induk	Melakukan pemburuan ranjau secara terbatas
Kapal Komando Amfibi	Melakukan fungsi K4IPP
Kapal Penjelajah & Perusak	- Kapal utama dalam pemburuan ranjau - Membersihkan jalur pelayaran Armada AS dari ancaman ranjau
<i>Anti-Air Warfare (AAW)</i>	
Kapal Induk	- Memperluas area deteksi, penargetan, dan penyerangan terhadap target di udara - Memberikan superioritas udara terhadap pesawat dan helikopter musuh

	▪ Memberikan peringatan dini terhadap ancaman di udara
Kapal Komando Amfibi	▪ Melakukan fungsi K4IPP
Kapal Penjelajah & Perusak	▪ Kapal utama dalam pertahanan udara berlapis terutama dalam menghadapi rudal balistik dan jelajah
Strike Warfare (STW)	
Kapal Induk	▪ Memperluas area deteksi, penargetan, dan penyerangan terhadap target di darat ▪ Menyerang target di darat dengan pesawat dan helikopter
Kapal Komando Amfibi	▪ Melakukan fungsi K4IPP
Kapal Penjelajah & Perusak	▪ Menyerang target di darat dengan rudal dan meriam

(Sumber: Olahan Peneliti, 2018)

Operasi Ekspedisi AS di CNR

Di CNR, pendaratan amfibi bukan menjadi tugas utama kapal-kapal AS di Yokosuka, melainkan menjadi tugas gugus tugas amfibi yaitu *Amphibious Ready Group* yang juga berkedudukan ditempat lain salah satunya di Sasesbo, Jepang. Gugus tugas amfibi ini memiliki tugas untuk mengangkut dan mendaratkan pasukan marinir AS. Sementara tugas kapal-kapal AS di Yokosuka dalam operasi ekspedisi adalah sebagai berikut

Tabel 2. Fungsi Operasi Ekspedisi AS di CNR

Fungsi Operasi Ekspedisi dalam Menghadapi Tiongkok	
Strike Warfare (STW)	
Kapal Induk	▪ Memperluas area deteksi, penargetan, dan penyerangan terhadap target di darat ▪ Menyerang target di darat dengan pesawat dan helikopter
Kapal Komando Amfibi	▪ Melakukan fungsi K4IPP
Kapal Penjelajah & Perusak	▪ Menyerang target di darat dengan rudal dan meriam
Pengawalan Gugus Tugas Amfibi	
Kapal Induk	▪ Menjalankan lima operasi yang sama dengan lima operasi dalam fungsi pengendalian laut
Kapal Komando Amfibi	▪ Menjalankan lima operasi yang sama dengan lima operasi dalam fungsi pengendalian laut
Kapal Penjelajah & Perusak	▪ Menjalankan lima operasi yang sama dengan lima operasi dalam fungsi pengendalian laut
Bantuan Tembakan dalam Pendaratan Amfibi	
Kapal Induk	▪ Memberikan bantuan tembakan dari udara dengan

	pesawat dan helikopter sesuai permintaan pasukan pendarat
Kapal Komando Amfibi	▪ Melakukan fungsi K4IPP
Kapal Penjelajah & Perusak	▪ Memberikan bantuan tembakan dari permukaan dengan rudal dan meriam sesuai permintaan pasukan pendarat

(Sumber: U.S. Navy: Our Ships, 2018)

Skenario Perang Laut AS-Tiongkok di CNR

Perlu di garis bawahi bahwa dalam bagian ini peneliti hanya bertujuan untuk mendeskripsikan secara singkat fungsi kekuatan laut AS yang ada di Yokosuka saat terjadi perang laut antara kedua negara.

Peperangan laut antara kedua negara dapat terjadi di dua wilayah yaitu Taiwan dan LTS. Dalam skenario Taiwan, Tiongkok dapat melakukan tindakan koersif terhadap Taiwan dalam beberapa bentuk seperti blokade laut, pengeboman, hingga invasi dengan cara melakukan operasi amfibi di Teluk Taiwan. Sementara dalam skenario LTS, perang bisa terjadi ketika Tiongkok

terus melakukan reklamasi dan pembangunan basis militer dipulau-pulau buatan, menempatkan secara permanen armada kapalnya, atau secara sepihak menutup jalur laut dan udara.

Dalam kedua skenario, PLAN akan berhadapan dengan AS yang akan melakukan intervensi dan memberikan bantuan misalnya kepada Taiwan. Seperti yang sudah dijelaskan di atas sebelumnya, PLAN akan melakukan operasi A2/AD di LTT untuk memblokir armada AS yang datang dari Utara dan Timur seperti Jepang dan Guam, serta di LTS untuk memblokir armada AS yang datang dari arah Asia Tenggara.

Dengan kecepatan penuh, Armada AS dapat mencapai Taiwan dan LCS dalam waktu kurang dari dua hari. Inilah keuntungan AS yang memiliki basis militer serta menempatkan kapal perangnya di Yokosuka bahwa secara cepat AS dapat merespon terjadinya eskalasi dengan Tiongkok dibandingkan harus menunggu armadanya tiba dari wilayah atau basis militer lain.

Perkembangan jangkauan persenjataan armada Tiongkok akan memaksa Armada AS untuk menjaga jarak dengan tidak masuk atau melewati Selat Taiwan namun tetap berada pada jarak yang

Port	Straight-line distance to Taiwan Strait areaa (nautical miles)	Minimum travel time in days, based on average speeds belowb		
		20 knots	25 knots	30 knots
Yokosuka, Japanc	1,076	2.2	1.8	1.5
Guam	1,336	2.8	2.2	1.9
Singapored	1,794	3.7	3.0	2.5
Pearl Harbore	4,283	8.9	7.1	5.9
Everett, WA	5,223	10.9	8.7	7.3
San Diego	5,933	12.3	9.9	8.2

Gambar 3. Waktu & Jarak Tempuh Kapal Perang AS dalam Mencapai Selat Taiwan

(Sumber: Jerald D, 2007: FinnChina-U.S. Economic and Geopolitical Relations)

cukup untuk meluncurkan senjata dan pesawat dalam jumlah besar (RAND 2015; 215). Hal ini juga berkaitan dengan keuntungan yang dimiliki oleh kapal induk dibandingkan dengan pangkalan udara yang ada di darat. Meskipun dilengkapi pertahanan udara, pangkalan udara AS yang ada di CNR tetap rentan terhadap serangan PLAN karena sifatnya yang tetap (*fixed*). Akan jauh lebih sulit bagi PLAN untuk menyerang kapal induk AS yang memiliki mobilitas tinggi dimana dengan kecepatan 25 knot dalam waktu 24 jam ia dapat berpindah-pindah tempat sejauh 600 mil laut (Beng, 2016:75).

Disisi lain, lebih amannya Armada AS untuk beroperasi diluar CNR juga disebabkan oleh adanya kecenderungan bahwa jika peperangan terjadi, PLAN akan memilih untuk hanya beroperasi di dalam CNR. Hal ini dikarenakan masih belum sepenuhnya kemampuan *blue-water* PLAN. Di Pasifik Tiongkok tidak memiliki basis militer diluar CNR sehingga jika armadanya beroperasi diluar CNR, kapal-kapalnya harus mengandalkan kapal logistik, yang tidak memiliki kemampuan pertahanan sehingga sangat rentan terhadap serangan AS, ataupun harus kembali ke daratan utama jika ingin melakukan perbaikan atau pengisian ulang senjata. Dari sisi strategi, operasi diluar CNR bukanlah prioritas Tiongkok, setidaknya untuk saat ini. Strategi laut dekat memiliki prioritas lebih tinggi sehingga kapal-kapal PLAN dikerahkan untuk operasi lokal dan ada

dalam posisi bertahan didalam CNR (CNAS, 2017;20).

Sementara bagi AS, meskipun PLAN memiliki keuntungan di dalam CNR, Armada AS dapat menggunakan strategi A2/AD yang sama terhadap armada Tiongkok. Armada AS dapat menutup semua jalur laut menuju CNR, mengurung dan memberikan ancaman serupa bagi armada Tiongkok yang berusaha untuk keluar dari CNR, dan pada akhirnya menutup kekuatan laut Tiongkok dari dunia. Jika PLAN menghalangi AS masuk ke laut dekat, AS akan menghalangi PLAN keluar dari laut dekat, sebuah situasi yang bernama *mutual assured access denial* (Malufti, Wawancara 1).

Dampak Strategis Perang Laut AS-Tiongkok di CNR

Dalam situasi perang keputusan AS untuk mengirimkan atau tidak Armada AS kedalam CNR akan bergantung pada pertimbangan seberapa besar kerugian yang rela ditanggung oleh AS demi melakukan pengendalian laut dan operasi ekspedisi terhadap Tiongkok. Kekuatan laut yang dimiliki Tiongkok pada tahun 2013-2017 secara nyata dapat menyebabkan kerusakan besar terhadap Armada AS di dalam CNR. Namun pada akhirnya ketika masih ada perdamaian kerugian-kerugian ini hanya diprediksi terlebih ketika kedua negara terus mengembangkan dan memodernisasi kekuatan lautnya masing-masing (Malufti, Wawancara 1).

Salah satu dampak strategis yaitu kerugian angkatan laut kedua negara baik dalam hal materil maupun personil. Bagi Armada AS, jika ia beroperasi semakin dekat dengan daratan utama Tiongkok, semakin tinggi pula potensi kerusakan yang

dapat diterimanya. Sebaliknya bagi PLAN semakin jauh armadanya beroperasi dari daratan utama atau melewati CNR, semakin tinggi potensi kerusakan yang dapat diberikan Armada AS kepadanya.

Dampak strategis lainnya adalah AS terpaksa menarik mundur pasukan dan merelokasi basis militernya, yang sebelumnya ada di CNR seperti Filipina, Jepang, dan Korea Selatan, menjauh dari FIC kearah SIC seperti Guam. Hal ini dapat terjadi ketika AS gagal mengimbangi perkembangan militer Tiongkok dan atau tidak berhasil menahan laju armada PLAN, dalam skenario Taiwan, LTS, ataupun skenario peperangan lainnya, akibat AS lebih memilih untuk menahan diri dihadapan potensi kerusakan tinggi yang dapat diterima oleh Armada AS jika mengintervensi Tiongkok. Jika hal ini terjadi, kredibilitas kehadiran militer AS di CNR akan turun drastis dan dapat menyebabkan negara-negara yang sebelumnya menyetujui berdirinya basis militer AS di wilayah nasionalnya mencabut izin tersebut untuk mengurangi ketegangan negaranya sendiri dengan Tiongkok (Holmes, 2010:125).

Kesimpulan

Peningkatan kekuatan militer dan aktivitas koersif Tiongkok di CNR selama

dua dekade terakhir telah menghilangkan imunitas kapal-kapal perang AS di Yokosuka yang sebelumnya dapat beroperasi secara bebas di kawasan tersebut tanpa adanya ancaman berarti. Seperti skenario perang yang sudah dijelaskan sebelumnya, kini kapabilitas dan strategi A2/AD PLAN membuatnya mampu beroperasi dan menjangkau seluruh wilayah CNR sehingga, jika terjadi perang, armada AS akan menghadapi risiko yang tinggi jika 'nekat' beroperasi di dalam CNR.

Kondisi inilah yang kemudian menjadi dasar bagi AS untuk menyusun kebijakan, strategi, dan konsep operasional baru yang disusun berdasarkan bentuk ancaman yang diberikan oleh PLAN dan skenario peperangan yang mungkin terjadi antara kedua negara di CNR.

Sesuai dengan konsep studi strategis, kecanggihan dan kapabilitas kapal-kapal perang permukaan AS di Yokosuka memungkinkan AS untuk menjalankan kebijakan, strategi, dan konsep operasional barunya sesuai dengan dua fungsi dasar kekuatan laut yaitu pengendalian laut dan operasi ekspedisi.

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BIODATA KONTRIBUTOR

Bustanul Arifin

Bustanul Arifin is a political researcher focusing on international studies. Arifin got undergraduate degree from President University majoring in International Relations and holds master degree from Leeds Beckett University, United Kingdom in International Relations. Right now, Arifin becomes the Director of Supernova Education Center and actives as researcher in some consultants in Indonesia. Experienced as political and social analyst in some consultants as well as lecturer. His research interest includes diplomacy studies, peace and conflict studies, technology and diplomacy, domestic politics, and communication.

Nur Afni Damanik

Nur Afni Damanik is a graduate of International Relations Study of President University, Indonesia. Upon obtaining her degree in 2018, she joined Foreign Policy Community of Indonesia in pursuant of her interest in foreign policy issues. Her research interest includes multilateralism, trade and international business as well as international political economy. During her study, she conducted an internship at ASEAN Centre for Energy.

Rachel Kumendong serves as the admission and administration staff for International Teachers College (ITC) UPH. Before coming to ITC, she has been actively involved student organizations particularly with Campus Ministry, and Leadership Development. She earned a bachelor's degree in International Relations, majoring in ASEAN studies, from Universitas Pelita Harapan Karawaci, Indonesia. During her study, Rachel has been exposed to international community by joining several Model United Nations (MUN) Conferences, National Assembly of International Relations Students, and having experience of conducting internship abroad at Indonesian Embassy in Manila, Philippines.

Her area of interests is related with international politics and security, study of terrorism and counter terrorism, and international development.

Jerry Indrawan, S.IP, M.Si (Han) menyelesaikan program sarjana di Prodi Ilmu Politik Institut Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Jakarta tahun 2010 dan program magister Ilmu Pertahanan di Universitas Pertahanan Indonesia tahun 2014. Saat ini mengabdikan sebagai dosen tetap di Program Studi Ilmu Politik UPN "Veteran" Jakarta. Juga mengajar Ilmu Politik dan Hubungan Internasional di UPN "Veteran" Jakarta, Universitas Paramadina, dan Universitas Satya Negara Indonesia. Fokus kajiannya adalah Cyberpolitics, Studi Keamanan dan Strategi, dan Studi Perdamaian. Menulis beberapa buku di bidang politik, keamanan internasional. Saat ini juga menjabat sebagai Head of Research and Development Yayasan Peneliti Muda Indonesia.

Sigit has joined as a Research Fellow at the Center for Japanese Studies, University of Indonesia since August 2019. In addition, he is also a Visiting Lecturer at University of Indonesia, Christian University of Indonesia, Pelita Harapan University, and Prof. Dr. Moestopo University in the field of International Relations. His research focus is on International Relations in East and Southeast Asia. His thesis discusses "Indonesia's Non-Traditional Security (Piracy and Armed Robbery)

Policy and ReCAAP”, written under the supervision of Professors Yamakage Susumu, Murashima Eiji, and Ueki Chikako Kawakatsu at the Department of International Relations, Graduate School of Asia Pacific Studies, WASEDA University, Japan. Prior to joining the Master’s program at Waseda University, he graduated from the University of Indonesia for the undergraduate program and Non-Degree Program in the Department of East and Southeast Asia Studies, Faculty of Arts and Social Science, University of Malaya, Malaysia.

Herry Wahyudi, lahir di Ujung Batu (Riau) tahun 1990 dan menyelesaikan pendidikan sarjana strata I pada tahun 2013 di jurusan Hubungan Internasional Universitas Riau dengan mengambil konsentrasi strategi, diplomasi dan keamanan, serta menyelesaikan pendidikan strata II pada tahun 2016 di jurusan Hubungan Internasional Universitas Gadjah Mada dengan minat dan konsentrasi Politik Internasional. Saat ini aktif sebagai dosen tetap di Program Studi Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, Universitas Abdurrahman Pekanbaru. Selain itu, kesibukan lainnya yakni sebagai peneliti di lembaga kajian Pusat Studi ASEAN Universitas Riau sejak tahun 2016 pada bidang kesekretariatan, riset, dan publikasi. Beliau juga tercatat sebagai peneliti di Indonesia Strategic & Sustainable Community (Issco.asia) dan Forum for Academician of International Relationship Riau (FAIR RIAU). Minat kajian dan riset penulis yang ditekuni saat ini adalah Politik Luar Negeri, Politik Internasional, Keamanan Internasional, kajian kawasan Indo-Pasifik & ASEAN, serta kajian-kajian kontemporer (Teori-teori HI, HAM, isu-isu keberlanjutan, asap lintas-batas, norma dan kosmopolitanisme).

Muhammad Fauzan Malufti is a Research Assistant in Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia. He has main interest in Indonesia’s defense-security related issues including strategic studies and traditional security issues. He’s been working for an Indonesian think tank, online media, and currently working as a freelance writer.

Arfin Sudirman is a lecturer, researcher and currently positioned as Head of Department of International Relations, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Padjadjaran, Bandung, Indonesia. Earned his doctoral degree of International Relations, Universitas Padjadjaran and Master of International Relations, Curtin University of Technology, Perth, Western Australia. He has published numerous articles in various journals in Indonesia such as Center Strategic for International Studies (CSIS), Central European Journal of International Security Studies (CEJISS), Jurnal Ketahanan Nasional Universitas Gadjah Mada, Jurnal Ilmu Hubungan Internasional Universitas Parahyangan, Jurnal Global Strategis Universitas Airlangga and Jurnal Wacana Politik, Universitas Padjadjaran. He has also been supervising students from undergraduate to post graduate level in the topic of International Security Studies. He has been actively teaching in other universities such as Universitas Parahyangan, Indonesia Defense University, UPN “Veteran”, Army Command Staff School (SESKOAD), Air Forces Command Staff School (SESKOAU), and Indonesian Armed Forces Command Staff School (SESKO TNI)