

## RUSSIA SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL SECURITY: THE ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT OF RUSSIAN FEDERATION MILITARY OPERATION IN UKRAINE (2014)

Hendra Manurung  
President University  
[h\\_manurung2002@president.ac.id](mailto:h_manurung2002@president.ac.id)

### ABSTRAK

Federasi Rusia merupakan aktor global yang menerapkan kebijakan tegas terhadap Ukraina. Guna mencapai tujuan politik nasional Rusia yang dikendalikan dari Moskwa, melalui operasi militer di tahun 2014, didefinisikan bagaimana negara tersebut berperilaku. Melalui kombinasi operasi militer dan non-militer, Rusia secara perlahan memperoleh kekuasaan melalui aneksasi Krimea. Efektivitas metoda ini dipergunakan untuk menentukan strategi perang Rusia saat ini. Dengan demikian menjelaskan bagaimana kebijakan luar negeri dan kebijakan pertahanan Rusia dari tahun 2000 hingga 2013 yang memiliki ketergantungan pada lingkungan strategis Ukraina terhadap Rusia, dan kepentingan nasional Rusia pada Ukraina. Fokus utama penelitian ini adalah pencapaian tujuan politik Rusia dalam operasi militer yang dilaksanakan di Ukraina dan menganalisa komponen keamanan nasional Rusia yang signifikan mempengaruhi interaksi konflik asimetrik.

**Keywords:** keamanan nasional, tujuan politik, operasi militer, perilaku negara.

### 1. Introduction

Major states often exercise their military operation as the strategy to pursuit their objectives. Russian acts systematically identified as the behavior of states during war time. The outcome of such action encourages the international system to formulate an institution that could maintain the world order, where it known as the United Nations (UN). In January 1946, the four major states (Britain, France, Russia, and the United States) who were often exercising military operation met for the first time as the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Despite as the immediate effects from World War II, these states power have tendency to implies victory in war, they need to maintain their existence in the international system cooperatively and competitively. Although the promotion of the ideas of the UN has been introduce, the military activities are still continuously conducted by those major states in the next decades. Their ability in the conduct of military operations is adequate quantity in achieving the

objectives (Volth, 2001, p.42). Thus, the operations are often found as strategic tools of a state in pursuing their interests because it remains as the capability of states' power in pursuing its objectives on certain condition.

The competition between two great powers, which are the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States (U.S.), in the second half of the 20th century, dramatically changed the world's atmosphere. During this period, the establishment of mutual assistance was prominent in international security architecture. The willingness of states to be a dominant actor in the international system is also important. As the result, one of the major states (the Soviet Union) during this period established a security alliance known as the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact was a formed of political and military alliance under Soviet Union direction in affirming its control over military forces in the region as well as to counterbalance to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on the European contingent (Curtis, 1992). After inking the treaty, with the support of Soviet

foreign policy, Brezhnev Doctrine, “doctrine of limited sovereignty”, declared that when forces that are hostile to socialism try to revert the development of some socialist country towards the restoration of the capitalist order, it becomes not only a problem of the country concerned, but also a common problem and concern of all socialist countries (Curtis, 1992). Under this security paradigm, as a strong actor (the Soviet Union) often did military operations towards weak actors (post-Soviet space) in order to keep their influence towards the opposing states. As such, the strategic interaction is classified as the study of asymmetric conflict in international relations where the strong actor should almost always win in every conflict based on its victory (Curtis, 1992).

However, such condition is not always going in its path. The security structure of the Soviet Union as major state slowly changes. After the expulsion of Albania in 1962, the organizational structure of this alliance had been modified. The reunification of Germany in 1990, the rise of non-communist government, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1990 and 1991, confirmed the demise of the Warsaw Pact and also marked the end of the Cold War as well. Hence, with the emergence of independence states of former Soviet Union, it has shown the decline of state capability to control. At the moment of Soviet state dissolution, Russia consistently preserving its national security and showing its capability as a major state throughout various formulation of her domestic and foreign policies.

After the dismissal of the Soviet Union in 1990, the relations between Russia and former Soviet states remain unstable. Russia keeps maintaining its dominance within these countries through various economic, political, and even military activities until today. Along with her foreign

policy priority, the aims to establish a Eurasian integration along with the Commonwealth of Independence States) CIS (Russia Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013), space has restored Russia’s proactive approach towards these countries. The basis of Russia priority in the region is not only based on sharing generic historical background, but also to build integration in various spheres along with the CIS Member States through bilateral and multilateral cooperation (Russia Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).

Furthermore, on the concept of foreign policy of the Russian Federation, especially on paragraph 48(e), it stated that: build up relations with Ukraine as a priority partner within the CIS, contribute to its participation in extended integration processes (Russia Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). Based on this degree, the importance of Ukraine on Russia’s border is undeniable. The aforementioned situation is in line with a statement from Henry Kissinger statement in an open editorial in the Washington Post that “to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country (Kissinger, 2014).”

Early 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s seizure of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine was the most consequential decision of his 16 years in power (1990-2016). By annexing a neighboring country’s territory by force, Putin overturned in a single stroke which the post-Cold War European orders had rested (Russia Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Putin decision is of more than historical interest. Understanding his motives for occupying and annexing Crimea is crucial to assessing whether he will make similar choices in the future for example, sending troops to liberate ethnic Russians in the Baltic States. It is reasonable argument to determining what measures the West might take to deter such actions. The

conflict occurring between Russia and Ukraine within Ukraine's territory in 2014 is reflecting the importance of Ukraine for Russia domination in the region.

It highlights the descriptive analysis of the current Russian political discourse monitored by Moscow which focuses on one aspect of its normative dimension, namely the ideal of national sovereignty and anti-colonial resistance.

There are four points of view to understand Putin actions. First, Putin as defender. The Russia Crimean operation was a response to the threat of NATO's further expansion along Russia's western border. By this state behavior, Putin seized the peninsula to prevent two dangerous possibilities: first, that Ukraine's new government might join NATO, and second, that Kiev might evict Russia's Black Sea Fleet from its long-standing base in Sevastopol; Second, Putin as imperialist. It identified the annexation of Crimea as part of a Russian project to gradually recapture the former territories of the Soviet Union. Putin never accepted the loss of Russian prestige that followed the end of the Cold War, and he is determined to restore it, in part by expanding Russia's borders; Third, Putin as improviser. Kremlin decision rejects such broader designs and presents the annexation as a hastily conceived response to the unforeseen fall of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich. The occupation and annexation of Crimea was an impulsive decision that Putin stumbled into rather than the careful move of a strategist with geopolitical ambitions; Fourth, Putin Leadership. It inspired nations-building for the future of the Great Russian arise in the Eastern Europe region.

Based on Russia's movement towards the country, it has illustrated a new generation of war from Russia's approach today. This pattern of interactions has demonstrated the concept of asymmetric

warfare which has been exist long time ago. For instance, as the sage of warfare theory, Sun Tzu, on his work *The Art of War* determined that all warfare is based on deception. When confronted with an enemy, one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepare against him; where he is strong, avoid him (Sun Tzu, 1971, p.66-67). It identified the wisest strategy or tactic in facing the adversaries' strength and advocates it into indirect approach.

## **2. Result and Discussion**

### **2.1. Russia Foreign Policy: Combination National Interests and Regional Security**

The loss of Ukraine in 1991 has also ultimately marked the decline of Russia control over this state. With the changing of security structure after the Cold War, it also adjusts both states interaction. The political instability in Ukraine on the year of 2014 has sent a significant challenge for Russia's national security, especially towards Crimea as its naval base.

That matter has jeopardized the vital interest of Russia near Black Sea, so it influences the formulation of strategy towards Ukraine where Russia needs to use its military operation for its protection of interests. As a major state, Russia needs to maintain its national security from possible external hazards to maintain its control over Ukraine.

It is very often the case that political scientists deliver their analysis based on the assumption that politics is a praxis that has very little to do with moral values. The writer does not share this view on domestic politics and believe that in order to suggest a transparent and reasonable analysis of the political. It needs to take into consideration on normative dimension of political discourse. This dimension can be explicit or implicit, well-recognized or hidden but

according to the writer's or author understands it is almost always present.

Kremlin decision makers' resistance can be shaped and is actually shaped in many different ways. As any other vision of liberation, it is used both by the oppressed and the oppressors. Furthermore, there are a sufficient number of different qualitative theoretical approaches that can be used in order to analyze the complexity of the anti-colonial resistance of our time. The writer attempts to elaborate some features of the current Russian political discourse that according to the writer's understanding fits into the more general paradigm of the resistance against colonial trends of the globalized world post 911.

Russia is very concerned by the developments of the United States and the European Union Foreign Policies that seem to believe that they have the right to interfere in other states' internal affairs. Lavrov (2017) also indicates that this self-proclaimed right is often justified by the Western leaders in terms of political and ideological superiority of the West. Russia Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stresses that the Russian position, for example, in relation to the so called "Arab Spring", is based on the fundamental Principles of International Law based on national sovereignty and non-interference (Russia Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). Commenting on the situation in Syria during the spring 2013, Lavrov further confirms that in most of the cases military solutions "could only mean radicalization of the country" (Glasser, 2013). It is easy to demonstrate how Lavrov's view on International Politics presented in the interview fits very well into the tradition of just war ethics, and it includes an articulated normative vision of how the international system of human rights should be sustained (Glasser, 2013). The Russian concept of foreign policy points out some additional normative concerns in

promoting Russia's approach to Human Rights issues transparently and pragmatically. It leads to Russia global competition on a civilizational level, whereby various values and models of development based on the universal principles of democracy and market economy start to clash and compete against each other in Eastern Europe.

Therefore, with the condition as an independent state, during Yanukovich presidency (2010-2014), several tensions have taken place in the relations between Moskwa and Kyiv. One of the cases is where Kyiv has built a close relationship with European Union (EU). The Ukraine and EU work on an association agreement aiming at political association which adhering European values and principles and economic integration for last few years. It challenges the national security of Russia as a major state in the region. As the result, before it was due to signed, Yanukovich rejected the agreement on November 2013. After several identifications conducted, one of the reasons behind this agenda is that Russia successfully implemented its political and economic leverage over Ukraine in order to cancel its agreement with EU. There has been an economic instability between Kyiv and Moscow trade relations. Russia has putted a sanction over Ukraine in mid-August. Cutting energy supply to Ukraine and blocking the flow of imports from the country have affecting the economic condition of Ukraine. In accordance to the Wall Street Journal, "Ukrainian officials say the Russian sanctions cost them US\$15 billion in lost trade and it could run up to half a trillion by signing the EU deal."<sup>1</sup> As the result of rejection of agreement, it

---

<sup>1</sup> [Online] The Wall Street Journal. (2013, November 27). *The Battle for Ukraine*. Retrieved September 28, 2015, from The Wall Street: <http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303653004579213664244095466>

caused big street protests from pro-Western protesters in Kyiv's Independence Square continuously. On 22 February 2014, a peak demonstration occurred when protesters took control over government building in Kyiv. This situation resulted in Yanukovich fled from Kyiv to eastern part city of Ukraine, Kharkiv, in asking for support.

Furthermore, with the security instability in Ukraine, on February 27, 2014, a penetration over Crimea was executed in the capital of Simferopol, with approximate number of 120 armed Russian insurgents armed with automatic weapons seized the Crimean parliament.<sup>2</sup> The signification of occupation then marked with Russian flag flies over Crimea's parliament.<sup>3</sup> This condition has put a high tension on the violation of Ukraine territory in regards to Russian invasion which absolutely occurring. Moreover, it was also followed by a statement from the Ukrainian Acting President, Turchynov, which stated that:

"Russia has begun wanton aggression against Ukraine under the guise of training exercise. The Russian Federation has sent troops into Crimea, and has not only captured the Crimean parliament and Council of Ministers, but also has taken control of communication facilities [...] We're sure that Ukraine will preserve its territory, Ukraine will defend its independence and any attempts of annexation or intrusion will have very serious consequences."<sup>4</sup>

On May 2014, a new president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko is being elected where at the same time the conflict occurred is still continuously. This president known has long supported the country's pro-

European movement.<sup>5</sup> Due to this political challenge, Russia once again is exercising its military operation into Crimea in order to "protect" the Black Sea Fleet on the ground.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, as the strategic interest of Russia, such military operations are conducted in Crimea. This operation has established a strategic interaction between Russia and Ukraine in achieving their political objectives. The interaction is being identified as the asymmetric warfare between strong actor (Russia) and weak actor (Ukraine) in winning their survival.

A strategic interaction between the two countries in Ukraine is reflecting on how a strong state (Russia) is trying to defeat a weak state (Ukraine) through military operations which conducted periodically. It is in line with how Carl von Clausewitz understanding the fact about warfare that it must waged the political objective:

"We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. War in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course is no small demand, but however much it will affect political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them. The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose." (Clausewitz, 1827: 87)

---

<sup>2</sup> [Online] Ukraine Policy. (2014, February 27). *Russian Seize Simferopol*. Retrieved October 8, 2015, from Ukraine Policy: <http://ukrainianpolicy.com/russians-seize-simferopol>.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

---

<sup>5</sup> [Online] BBC News. (2014, June 7). *Profile: Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko*. Retrieved October 4, 2015, from BBC News: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26822741>.

<sup>6</sup> [Online] Ukraine Policy. (2014, February 27). *Sevastopol & Simferopol Airports Under Russian Military Occupation*. Retrieved October 8, 2015, from Ukraine Policy: <http://ukrainianpolicy.com/sevastopol-airport-under-military-occupation/>.

The Cold War remains echoing in the case of Ukraine as a formerly part of Soviet Union. In order to protect its national security and achieving the political objective, Russia implies its victory as a strong actor by conducting military operations in Ukraine. As the response, Ukraine is also conducting several operations and tactics based to overcome the challenge. Therefore, the relative power occurred within this pattern is explaining the logic of the asymmetric war between Russia and Ukraine. With various operations and tactics executed from both sides, the relative power owned will later explains the relative interests of the state on how they should response. As such, the strategic interactions that happened during conflict could determine the outcome of relative power.

## 2.2. Russia Strategy in Regional Security: Ukraine

The writer used realism approach of International Relations theory define power implies victory in each interaction during the conflict. The writer also sees the military operations in Crimean conflict as the strategic interaction of strong actor to defeat weak actor to increase their relative power. Also bring strategic interaction theory in this case to identify the ideal-types of strategies taken by states in pursuing their national interest. This strategy distinguishes the approaches direct and indirect actors in implementing their operations and tactics on terrain which beneficial for the position. The approaches will later expect to determine the outcome analysis of the asymmetric conflict between actors.

It establishes theories which apply in the framework, determining the level of analysis is very essential in this research as analytical tools. In international conflict, according to Waltz (1959), there are three levels of analysis: individual level, state

level, and state system level. In association with this research, the writer uses the state level and state system analysis in explaining the strategic interaction between Russia and Ukraine. This is to accommodate the Realist approach which reflecting the actions taken due to the clash of interests among states in protecting their national security.

The strategic interaction theory explains why some asymmetric conflict could end quickly and how weak actors can lead to asymmetric war over strong actors. In this theory, strategy refers to an actor's plan for using armed forces to achieve military or political objectives.<sup>7</sup> Within this definition, the term 'strategy' should be differentiated into two affiliated terms: grand strategy and tactics. Grand strategy is defined as the consolidation of diplomatic, economic, military, and political factors used by leaders to defend their respective nation-states.<sup>8</sup> While tactics defines as to the art of fight and along with the use of various arms of the military-for example, armor, artillery, and infantry-on terrain and favorable position.<sup>9</sup> In order to acknowledge the ideal-type strategies, the typology is explained as follows (Toft, 2001: 100):

Attack (strong actor) strategies:

- (1) direct attack
- (2) barbarism

Defense (weak actor) strategies:

- (3) direct defense
- (4) guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS)

---

<sup>7</sup> For further reading, see Mearsheimer, J.J. (1983). *Conventional Deterrence*. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press. p. 28-29.

<sup>8</sup> This definition of grand strategy is cited from the *Center for International Relations and Politics*, Carnegie Mellon University as quoted by Skinner, K.K. Retrieved October 13, 2015, from CIRP Research: <http://www.cmu.edu/ir/cirp-research/grand-strategy.html>.

<sup>9</sup> This definition of tactics is a paraphrase of one from the *Littre Dictionary* as quoted by Charnay, "Strategy," p. 770.

Based on the two distinct strategies, the approaches that are suitable in the strategic interaction classified into: direct and indirect. In direct approach, the focus is on targeting an adversary's armed forces in order to demolish the adversary's capacity to fight. While indirect approach seeks to demolish the adversary's will to fight: a guerilla warfare strategy target enemy soldiers, and barbarism targets enemy noncombatants.<sup>10</sup> If the same approach (direct-direct or indirect-indirect) occurs in the conflict, the weak actor will be defeated because there is no deflection of strong actor's power advantage. While in contrast, if opposite approach apply in the interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-direct), the victory for weak will indicate because the strong actor's power advantage is diverted or avoided (Toft, 2001: 105). For that reason, in order to outline the expected strategic interaction and conflict outcomes in asymmetric conflict, several premises will be explain based on four distinct approaches, see Figure 1.1.

		Weak-Actor Strategic Approach	
		Direct	Indirect
Strong-Actor Strategic Approach	Direct	Strong actor	Weak actor
	Indirect	Weak actor	Strong actor

Figure 1.1. Expected Effects of Strategic Interaction on Conflict Outcomes (expected winners in cells)

There are 4 (four) premises are as follows:

First, in the context of direct attack versus direct defense, when strong actors attack using a direct strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should win quickly and decisively;

Second, in the context of direct attack versus indirect defense, when strong actors attack with a direct strategy and weak actors defend using an indirect strategy, all other things being equal, weak actors should win;

Third, in the context of indirect attack versus direct defense, when strong actors attack with an indirect strategy and weak actors defend using a direct strategy, all other things being equal, strong actors should lose;

Fourth, in the context of indirect attack versus indirect defense, when strong actors employ barbarism to attack weak actors defending with a guerilla warfare strategy (GWS), all other things being equal, strong actor should win.

It concludes there premises describe an interaction based on the same-approach or opposite-approach. With strong actors are more likely to win same-approach interactions and lose opposite-approach interactions.



Figure 1.2. Russia-Ukraine Strategic Interaction

Russia is a regional strong actor versus Ukraine which perceived as a weak actor which conflicting interests in the protection of their national security. The clash of interest is affecting them to use its military

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. p. 105.

power to pursue their national interest. The writer identified that throughout strategic interaction occurring within the asymmetric conflict could be utilized in analyzing conditions of war that generate an outcome of states' actions in achieving their objectives (Russia Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). It is an established fact that a Russia substantiated policy is impossible without reliance on history (Lavrov, 2016). This reference to history is absolutely justified, especially considering recent celebrations. In 2015, Russia celebrated the 70th anniversary of Victory in WWII, in 2014 marked a century since the start of WWI. In 2012, Russia marked 200 years of the Battle of Borodino and 400 years of Moscow's liberation from the Polish invaders. Russia has special role in European and global history.

Russia reformulates country's foreign and defense policy in order to maintain its survival in Global Politics. Particularly under the timeframe on 2000 until 2013, the revitalization process was becoming clearer on the stage. The willingness of Russia in return to change the structure of world polarity could never be ignored. Russia renewed its foreign policy concept in maximizing power on international system. Due to contemporary development, network diplomacy seems to be one of an effective solutions under these circumstances, including humanitarian and information technology. In addition, the reconstruction of Russian defense policy has strengthened state's capacity and capability in achieving the objectives. Additional consideration on Russia's military capability, the recognition of the advancement of cyber power, which begun since 2001 has signed a new characteristic of Russia's military operation. In the sense of combination between military and non-military forces, this new element is ready to be measured.

In the interaction between the two countries, Russia confirms its status as strong actor. Russia determines its national security components based on national goals, national balance of power, and degree of national security. On national goals, Ukraine perceived as a zone of Russian interest. Ukraine is not allowed to have a direct align with the EU because geopolitically it might hamper Russia's Eurasianism; Protection of Russian compatriots in Ukraine has become a legitimate instrument for Russia in expanding its influence; Russia's energy transfer to Europe must be secured; and the existence of Russia Black Sea Fleet have to be maintained. While on the existential challenges, NATO remains as a potential primary threat of national security. At the same time, the spread of terrorism and radicalism also add additional challenge towards the state that might trigger the conduct of military operation. On the national balance of power, Russia's staying and assault power emphasize the military superiority of the state in any occasion of warfare. Especially in the involvement of other forces, such as airborne forces, aerospace defense forces, strategic missile forces, and nuclear forces; these forces provide sizable differences between Russia and Ukraine. As the result, these nexuses have position Russia on mutual deterrence and a balance of terror against adversaries. The national security formulation causes Russia to conduct its military operation towards Ukraine.

In military operation, Russia adopted a new method on contemporary warfare. Defense policy orientation influences the behavior of Russia on the rule of war. The implementation of inter-dependency between military and non-military measures on the conflict in Ukraine had shown it's effectively in achieving political objectives. In addition to the conduct of information



operations, Russia could easily protect its national security from any potential hazards through three phases of operation: (1) the preparatory phase, (2) the attack phase, and (3) the stabilization phase. Russia was able to mislead the perception of Ukraine in particular and Western in general in the context of responding Russia's action.

### 3. Conclusion

The relative power of Russia as a strong actor in international system has determined its position to act assertively towards Ukraine. In regards to the behavior of the state that have had play a significance role in international system which reflection of Soviet Union era, Russia is trying to regain its sphere of influence over Ukraine- as part of post-Soviet space. This is how a state implies power in victory. The behavior of Russia on this asymmetric warfare has demonstrated the Realist logic towards the protection of national security of the state. Realist logic has become an integral part on Russia's military operation in Ukraine.

Considering Ukraine strategic environment, it remains as center of gravity for Russia in building a Eurasian integration. EU enlargement policy on Ukraine illustrates a small shift taken by Ukraine to increase its power from Western part of the contingent. Political and economic provisions are recognized to be the elements of both entities' relations. However, Russia also still has several political measures to maintain. The importance of economic flow of energy transfer and natural resources, historic and symbolic (Crimea and Black Sea), military (defense industry and infrastructure of Russia Black Sea Fleet, and strategic geopolitical location are classified as the national interests of Russia over Ukraine.

This type of warfare might become a strategic movement of Russia's future

orientation towards post-Soviet space. As a strong actor, along with its reflection as a superpower (Soviet Union) that ever been established in the past, Russia will keep reconstructing its power on current structure of international system. However, the existence of Ukraine in protecting its sovereignty will remain crucial under the perspective of Russia. This is a challenge for Russia to move strategically in achieving its objectives anytime in the future. Less confrontation will be considered as priority since Russia is still on the process of transforming its military capacity and capability at the current status.

## REFERENCES

- Arreguin-Toft, I. (2001). How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict. *International Security*, 26(1), 93-128. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753212868>
- Bennet, A. (2014). Case study methods: Design, use, and comparative advantages. In D. F. Sprinz & Y. Wolinsky-Nahmias (Eds.), *Models, numbers, and cases: Methods for studying international relations* (pp. 19-55). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Brezhnev, L. (1968). *Brezhnev doctrine: Speech by First Secretary of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev*. Retrieved from <https://www.ethz.ch/content/specialinterest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/125400>
- Bukkvoll, T. (2001). Ukraine and the Black Sea region. In T. Aybak (Ed.), *Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of cooperation and conflict* (pp. 85-114). London: I. B. Tauris.
- Brzezinski, Z. (1997). *The grand chessboard*. New York: Basic Books.
- Byt silnymi: Garantii natsionalnoi bezopasnosti dlia Rossii. (2012). *Rossiiskaia gazeta*.
- Clausewitz, C. V. (1827). *On war: Book one*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Connell, M. E., & Evans, R. (2015). Russia's "ambiguous warfare" and implications for the the U. S. Marine Corps. *CNA*. Retrieved from [https://www.cna.org/cna\\_files/pdf/dop-2015-u-010447-final.pdf](https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/dop-2015-u-010447-final.pdf)
- Davydov, I. (2008). *The Crimean Tatars and their influence on the 'triangle of conflict' Russia-Crimea-Ukraine*. Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/4255>
- Evans, G., & Newnham J. (1998). *The Penguin dictionary of international relations*. London, UK: Penguin Books.
- Fisher, A. W. (1970). *Introduction to the Russian annexation of the Crimea, 1772-1783*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Freeman, S. M., & Solmirano, C. (2014). *Trends in world military expenditure, 2013*. Retrieved from <http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1404.pdf>
- Garnett, S. W. (1997). *Keystone in the arch: Ukraine in the emerging security environment of central and eastern Europe*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Giles, K. (2015). Russia's toolkit. In K. Giles, P. Hanson, R. Lyne, J. Nixey, J. Sherr, & A. Wood, *The Russian challenge* (pp. 40-49). London: Chatham House.
- Giusti, S., & Penkova, T. (2010). EU policy toward Ukraine and Belarus: Diverging paths? In F. Bindi & I. Angelescu (Eds.), *The foreign policy of the European Union* (pp. 133-147). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Granholm, N., Malminen, J., & Persson, G. (Eds.). (2014). *A rude awakening: Ramifications of Russian aggression towards Ukraine*. Retrieved from [http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir\\_3892.pdf](http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3892.pdf)
- Herz, J. (1950). Idealist internationalism and the security dilemma. *World Politics*, 2(2), 157-180. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2009187>
- Hodenskog, J., & Pallin, C. V. (2013) *Russian capability in a ten-year perspective – 2013*. Retrieved from <https://www.foi.se/reportssummary?reportNo=FOI-R--3734--SE>
- Hodiichuk, L. C. I. (2009). Challenges in relations between Russia and Ukraine over the next 10 years. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U. S. Army War College.
- International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2012). Russia and Eurasia. In *The military balance 2012*. Abingdon, England: Routledge.

- International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2013). Russia and Eurasia. In *The military balance 2013*. Abingdon, England: Routledge.
- Institute of Politics. (2014). The Ukrainian crisis. Retrieved from [http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files\\_new/research-policy-papers/NatsecUkraine2014.pdf](http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/default/files_new/research-policy-papers/NatsecUkraine2014.pdf)
- Jaworsky, J. I. (1995). Crimea's importance to Ukraine and its future security. In M. Drohobycky (Ed.), *Crimea: Dynamics, challenges, and prospect*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Jeffries, W. W. (1967). *Geography and national power*. Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute.
- Kahn, T., & Beese, E. (2014, September 18). *FPI fact sheet: Timeline of Russian aggression in Ukraine and the western response*. Retrieved from <http://www.foreignpolicy.org/content/fpi-fact-sheet-timeline-russian-aggression-ukraine-and-western-response>
- Kiilo, T., & Vladimirova, Y. (2011). Compatriots. In K. Tuur (Ed.), *Russian Federation 2011: Short-term prognosis* (pp. 179-183). Tartu, Estonia: Tartu University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.ut.ee/ABVKeskus/sisu/proгноosisid/2011/en/pdf/RF2011.pdf>
- Kivirahk, J. (2009). *The "humanitarian dimensions" of Russian foreign policy toward Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic States*. Retrieved from <http://www.apec.md/2009/11/the-humanitarian-dimension-of-russian-foreign-policy-toward-georgia-moldova-ukraine-and-the-baltic-states/>
- Kofman, M., & Rojansky, M. (2015, April). A closer look at Russia's "hybrid war." *Kennan Cable*. Retrieved from <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190090/5-KENNAN%20CABLE-ROJANSKY%20KOFMAN.pdf>
- Kovalsky, N. (2001). Russia and the Black Sea realities. In T. Aybak (Ed.), *Politics of the Black Sea: Dynamics of cooperation and conflict* (pp. 163-180). London: I. B. Tauris.
- Larrabee, S. F., Wilson, W. A., & Gordon IV, J. (2015). *The Ukrainian crisis and European security*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- Leschenko, S. (2014). *Ukraina: mizh vyboramy ta voennym stanom [Ukraine: Between elections and a state of war]*. *Ukrayinska Pravda*.
- Maksymiuk, J. (2006). Ukraine: Crimea lighthouse becomes another bump in Ukrainian-Russian relations. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newslines*. Retrieved from <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/01/743bc216-3768-4ac1-a948-e6542d31b37b.html>
- Mankoff, J. (2009). *Russian foreign policy: The return of great power politics*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publisher, Inc.
- Maritime doctrine of the Russian Federation 2020*. (2001). Retrieved from [http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Russian\\_Maritime\\_Policy\\_2020.pdf](http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Russian_Maritime_Policy_2020.pdf)
- McLean, I. (1996). *Oxford concise dictionary of politics*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- McLess, A., & Rumer, E. (2014). *Saving Ukraine's defense industry*. Retrieved from <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/07/30/saving-ukraine-s-defense-industry-pub-56282>
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1983). *Conventional deterrence*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.

- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2013). Structural realism. In T. Dunne, M. Kurki, & S. Smith (Eds.), *International relations theories: Discipline and diversity* (3rd ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Medvedev, D. (2009). *Speech at third Russian World Congress of Compatriots abroad*. Retrieved from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/48523>
- Morgenthau, H. (1948). *Politics among nations*. New York: Knopf.
- National security of Ukraine: The past and the present. (1993). Institute of World Economy and International Affairs Research Paper, Kiev, Ukraine.
- Nichol, J. (2011). Russian military reform and defense policy. *Congressional Research Service*. Retrieved from <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42006.pdf>
- Niklas Granholm, Johannes Malminen, and Gudrun Persson (eds.). (2014). *A Rude Awakening – Ramifications of Russian Aggression Towards Ukraine*. Retrieved 15 December 2015, from Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm. p. 33: [http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir\\_3892.pdf](http://www.foi.se/ReportFiles/foir_3892.pdf)
- Oliker, O., Crane, K., Schwartz, L. H., & Yusupov, C. (2009). *Russian foreign policy: Sources and Implications*. Retrieved from [https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND\\_MG768.pdf](https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG768.pdf)
- Oswald, M. J. (2002). *Ukraine's relations with Russia: Competition or cooperation?* Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. Retrieved from <http://hdl.handle.net/10945/9757>
- Pamir, N. A. (2003). Energy and pipeline security in the Black Sea and Caspian Sea regions: Challenges and solutions. In O. Pavluik & I. Klympush-Tsintsadze (Eds.), *The Black Sea region: Cooperation and security building*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp
- Plokhly, S. (2000). The city of glory: Sevastopol in Russian historical mythology. *Journal of Contemporary History*, (35)3: 369-383. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002200940003500303>
- Putin, V. (2006). *Poslanie Federal'nomu Sobraniyu Rossiiskoi Federatsii*. Retrieved from <http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2006/05/105546.shtml>
- Putin, V. (2007). *Speech at the Balkan Energy Cooperation Summit*. Retrieved from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24368>
- Putin, V. (2012). Rossiia i meniaiuchshiisia mir. *Moskovskie Novosti*. Retrieved from <http://www.mn.ru/politics/20120227/312306749>
- Putin, V. (2014). *Vladimir Putin addressed state Duma deputies, Federation Council members, Heads of Russian regions and Civil Society representatives in The Kremlin*. Retrieved from <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603>
- Racz, A. (2015, June 16). *Russia's hybrid war in Ukraine: Breaking the enemy's ability to resist*. Retrieved from <https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/russias-hybrid-war-in-ukraine>
- Robert, A., & Guelff, R. (2000). *Documents on the laws of war*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Rompuy, H. V. (2014). Statement by President of the European Council at the occasion of the signing ceremony of the political provisions of the Association Agreement between the European Union and Ukraine. Brussels, Belgium: Press of the European Council.
- Rousseau, J. J. (1980). Social contract. *Rossiiskaiagazeta*. Retrieved from <http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html>
- Russian Federation military doctrine*. (2010). Retrieved December 22, 2015, from [http://www.sras.org/military\\_doctrine\\_russian\\_federation\\_2010](http://www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010)

- Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. (2013a). *Sukhoputnye voiska*. Retrieved from <http://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/ground/structure.htm>
- Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. (2013b). *Vozdushno-desantnye voiska*. Retrieved from <http://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/airborne.htm>
- Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. (2013c). *Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznachenii*. Retrieved from [http://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/rd/strategic\\_rocket.htm](http://structure.mil.ru/structure/forces/rd/strategic_rocket.htm)
- Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2000). *Kontsepsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii*. Retrieved from <http://www.in.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/fd86620b371b0cf7432569fb004872a7?OpenDocument>
- Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). *Kontsepsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/d48737161a0bc944c32574870048d8f7?OpenDocument>
- Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2008). *Information security doctrine of the Russian Federation*. Retrieved from <http://archive.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/2deaa9ee15ddd24bc32575d9002c442b!OpenDocument>
- Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2013). *Concept of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation*. Retrieved from [http://archive.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D](http://archive.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D)
- Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014). *Article of the Russian Federation Minister Sergey Lavrov "It's not Russia that is destabilising Ukraine."* Retrieved from [http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign\\_policy/news/-/asset\\_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/66734](http://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/66734)
- Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2014). *Statement by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the events in Ukraine*. Retrieved from [http://archive.mid.ru/bdomp/brp\\_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/660ea8ecf9378e3a44257d430060c61f!OpenDocument](http://archive.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/660ea8ecf9378e3a44257d430060c61f!OpenDocument)
- Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2015). *Comment by the Information and Press Department on NATO military exercise in Ukraine*. Retrieved from [http://www.mid.ru/en/kommentarii/-/asset\\_publisher/2MrVt3CzL5sw/content/id/1611205](http://www.mid.ru/en/kommentarii/-/asset_publisher/2MrVt3CzL5sw/content/id/1611205)
- Saunders, S. (2010). *Jane's fighting ships 2010–2011*. Coulsdon, England: IHS.
- Schelling, T. (1966). *Arms and influence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Sherr, J. (2004). Democracy: The missing link. In O. Pavluik & I. Klympush-Tsintsadze (Eds.), *The Black Sea region: Cooperation and security building*. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2013). *SIPRI arms transfers database*. Retrieved from <http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers>
- Subtelny, O. (1994). *Ukraine: A history*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Sutyagin, I., & Clarke, M. (2014). *Ukraine military dispositions: The military ticks up while the clock ticks down*. Retrieved from [https://rusi.org/system/files/UKRANIANMILITARYDISPOSITIONS\\_RUSIBRIEFING.pdf](https://rusi.org/system/files/UKRANIANMILITARYDISPOSITIONS_RUSIBRIEFING.pdf)
- Sutyagin, I. (2015). *Russian forces in Ukraine*. Retrieved from [https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201503\\_bp\\_russian\\_forces\\_in\\_ukraine.pdf](https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201503_bp_russian_forces_in_ukraine.pdf)

- Tal, I. (2000). *National security: The Israeli experience*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Thomas, T. L. (2010). Russian information warfare theory: The consequences of August 2008. In S. J. Blank & R. Weitz (Eds.), *The Russian military today and tomorrow: Essays in memory of Mary Fitzgerald*. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute. Retrieved from <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub997.pdf>
- Tzu, S. (1971). *The art war*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Volth, M. R. (2001). Military readiness. *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, 4(2) 42-48. Retrieved from <http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/D12-9-4-2E.pdf>
- Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics*. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Zaborsky, V. (1995). *Crimea and the Black Sea fleet in Russian-Ukrainian relations*. Retrieved from <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/crimea-and-black-sea-fleet-russian-ukrainian-relations>
- Zinovyeva, E. (2013) U.S. digital diplomacy: Impact on international security and opportunities for Russia. *Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security*, (19)2: 33-43. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19934270.2013.779430>