

INDONESIA'S 2020 NEW PARADIGM OF COLLABORATIVE STRATEGIC OUTLOOK IN THE SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION (SSC) AS THE BRIDGE-BUILDER FOR THE POST-PANDEMIC DEVELOPMENT

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ABSTRACT

The role of middle-income countries and the LDCs have been empowered through the South-South Cooperation (SSC) since 1955 when the Asia-African Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia. The SSC itself uses the frame of triangular cooperation to achieve sustainable development goals and technical collaboration with its member states. At the beginning of 2020, the annual press statement of Indonesia's Foreign Minister speech emphasized Indonesia's principle on diplomacy that mutual benefit within international cooperation needs to be done by reinforcing the new paradigm of multilateralism – a collaborative strategic outlook. This article linked the new paradigm with the current context of the world's economic polarisation and its unprecedented impacts that has made shifts towards middle-income and least-developing countries to be more resilient and cooperative amid the pandemic. With the new landscape of the global economy, Indonesia is now challenged to move forward and reinforce its partnerships in multilateralism amidst the fading global altruism and protectionism, hence this was contested during the G-20 Sherpas meeting. The document-based and internet-based research with qualitative analysis in this article also considers the recent development of conferences and meetings with the stakeholders in SSC within the period of Mrs. Retno Marsudi's term as Indonesia's foreign minister from 2014 until 2020. The article concludes the trajectories of Indonesia's post-pandemic public diplomacy in SSC, the new role of Indonesia as the bridgebuilder in the post-pandemic cooperation norms to achieve the SDGs

through cooperation in the G-20, and public diplomacy for the political influence and economic interdependence.

Keywords: Cooperation, South-south, Diplomacy, Multilateral, Bridge-builder

ABSTRAK

Peran negara menengah dan terbelakang semakin diperkuat dengan adanya Kerjasama Selatan-Selatan (KSS) sejak 1955 ketika Konferensi Asia Afrika (KAA) diadakan di Bandung, Indonesia. KSS sendiri menggunakan kerangka kerjasama segitiga untuk mencapai agenda pembangunan berkelanjutan dan kolaborasi teknis bersama dengan negara anggotanya. Pada tahun 2020, Pernyataan Pers Tahunan Menteri Luar Negeri RI mempertegas prinsip diplomasi Indonesia bahwa keuntungan bersama perlu dicapai dengan memperkuat paradigma baru dalam multilateralisme yaitu pandangan strategis untuk berkolaborasi. Artikel ini menghubungkan paradigma baru tersebut dengan konteks polarisasi ekonomi dunia saat ini serta dampak yang sangat berpengaruh pada perubahan kepada negara menengah dan terbelakang untuk lebih tahan dan kooperatif ditengah pandemi. Dengan lanskap perekonomian dunia yang baru, Indonesia saat ini ditantang untuk maju dan memperkuat kemitraan dalam multilateralisme di tengah mudarnya altruisme global dan proteksionisme seperti yang telah diutarakan Indonesia pada pertemuan Sherpa G20. Penelitian di artikel ini menggunakan metode riset berbasis dokumen dan internet dengan analisa kualitatif yang mempertimbangkan rekam jejak mengenai perkembangan terbaru dari konferensi dan pertemuan dengan para pemangku kepentingan dalam kerangka kerja KSS selama masa jabatan Menteri Luar Negeri RI Ibu Retno Marsudi dari 2014 hingga 2020. Artikel ini menyimpulkan trayektori dari diplomasi publik post-pandemi Indonesia dalam KSS, peran baru dari Indonesia sebagai pembangun jembatan dalam norma kerjasama post-pandemi untuk mencapai agenda pembangunan berkelanjutan melalui kerjasama di G-20 dan diplomasi publik untuk pengaruh politik dan interdependensi ekonomi.

Kata kunci: Kerjasama, Selatan-selatan, Diplomasi, Multilateral, Pembangun Jembatan

Introduction

The studies of international relations are related to the terms of international cooperation' where liberalist views perceive this as the key point to maintain international peace and security through interdependence within the international system. Since its establishment in 1955 from the stipulations of the Asia-African Conference, SSC has become a tangible benchmark where the partnership between developing countries is not merely based on mutual assistance from more developed countries but also it can be done by a whole- approach of stakeholders on its engagement to multilateral framework like the SSC. The existence of the triangular cooperation within the SSC framework itself draws the line between the articulation of member states' position as the beneficiary, engagement of donors and organizations as the facilitators, and the international organizations' governance as the pivotal actors in mobilizing the cooperation to achieve the goal-setting of the set interdependence. SSC itself is the only comprehensive cooperation spectrum that caters to the developing countries' role through the inter-regional cooperation partnerships such as MIKTA, ASEAN, African Union, and MERCOSUR. This contention answers the question of why developing countries' regional groups favor more this kind of cooperation and it into their national foreign and domestic policy conceptualization when achieving global economic sustainable development.

Indonesia as one of the emerging key players in world politics is now utilizing the momentum to build back better and to advance the role of developing countries to achieve the SDGs and their post-pandemic economic recovery. Indonesia upholds that by maintaining the collaborative strategic outlook to increase multilateral confidence in global altruism. Indeed it is coherent with the status quo where the waves of protectionism, populism, and nationalism have been existing during the Covid-19

pandemic. The unprecedented challenges brought by the crisis have been prolonging the barriers to remedy itself from the Covid-19 pandemic particularly to some extent related to the development agenda. The issue of the development agenda in the past is based on the traditional definition that 'cooperation is mainly done by the state actors'. But now it seems to be redefined by a new concept of 'human security' which focuses on the notion that SDGs were adopted to address the vast non-traditional threat to the human race. Therefore, from that changing nature and the redefinition of international affairs, Indonesia shifts its cooperation architecture into more people- centered diplomacy and cooperation. To prove the above notion, we can see that it is supported by the fact that the current Covid- 19 pandemic is not merely about the state's affairs but also the people. Matter of fact, the transnational character of the Covid-19 pandemic affects the mobility of the people which will be concerning either in economic, tourism, health, political, and humanitarian sectors.

Indonesia prioritizes SSC as a way to not only forging the global partnership with more increased connectivity and resilience but also to boost the one-date policy that has led Indonesia to acquire more than 32 development partners since 1999 – 2015 within the triangular cooperation. It was manifested through more than 400 capacity building and technical programs with Indonesia's SSC partners to engage the civil society and small-medium holders to effectively internalize the SSC schemes into their business (KBRI Havana, 2015). To conclude, these ideas can potentially realize more agile and stronger development cooperation if corroborated through the maximization of norm-setting at the multilateral level. One of which is from Indonesia's case on their engagement in G20 informal cooperation as part of the multilateral efforts to address the particular matters intertwined with the said concern.

Indonesia's multilateral engagement in G-20 also draws a new value-added economic diplomacy that could act as the bridge builder. It is integrated into Indonesia's diplomacy to not only increasing economic productivity but also by maintaining a healthy flow of investments and cooperation. This is being substantiated with the realization of efforts to remove all administrative and non-administrative from its policies, to increase the capacity of middle-income countries like Indonesia and other Least Developing Countries (LDCs) to create a positive climate for their development agenda to grow. It empowers that bridge-builder role to traverse the challenges.

If this is practiced in Indonesia's public policy, these best practices of development cooperation can eventually lure more positive and diverse economic prospects. On the other hand, this will commercialize not only mere ideas or substances that seem to be experimental but also a more positive shape of diplomatic efforts to gain outreach to the global networks either in or outside the G-20. This will bring SSC to another level of triangular cooperation itself where it can be impactful and reflecting a more tangible output. To contextualize better, Astuti and Fathun (2020) argued that economic diplomacy is pretty much a game where countries determine their bargaining values and capability. In the context of G-20, Indonesia should be able to position itself as a country that could be a supplement and can be supplemented by the other countries on their games at the multilateral level (Astuti & Fathun, 2020). This 'game' concept meant that each country inside the international cooperation landscape will have to resolve its fragmented puzzle of their strategy to achieve economic interdependence and financial cooperation (Zartman, 2007).

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

International cooperation according to Keohane (1984) argued that international

cooperation can occur if the particular actors within the framework are starting to behave themselves accordingly. What the argument means is to achieve mutual benefits by synchronizing perceptions and motivations to institutionalize their preset agreements and norms from the cooperation (Leeds, 1999). The limits and parameters of the cooperation itself are determined by the actors involved itself, because it is adjacent to their behavior when implementing the set rules during the gameplay of the cooperation (Leeds, 1999). Furthermore, the norm-sharing process of the particular cooperation should target the achievement of mutual interest through trust and policy coordination among the actors. This is the foundational concept of international economic cooperation to substantially explain the behavior and norms brought by the actors (member states in this case) in their diplomacy at the bilateral, regional, multilateral, and global levels within the international system.

In the context of the SSC, we commonly understand that the SSC was established for the member states to contextualize the innovative set of international economic and development cooperation in which will be discussed in the four following points. First, SSC member states implement their development cooperation within the same structure under the roof of the UN system, which means coherent norms and principles with the UN architecture. Second, the rules of the SSC where it stipulated collective action and technical assistance among member states, can be seen as the 'glue' of SSC member states. And this is proven to be one of the main factors on why SSC is preserved even during the endless crises. Third, the commonalities of challenges and problems faced by these SSC member states became their mutual objectives of international interaction the SSC's governance. Fourth, the common principles and norms vis-à-vis the adjacent demand from the domestic developments to achieve prosperity and peace for their people as part

of the sustainable development goal, has united these member states to leverage and contribute towards each other. Textually, this is discussed by Greico (1999) which he argued that the interaction of states in one particular international cooperation framework exists if there are any commonalities among actors regarding any specific objectives. Not only that, if the states are facing the same common challenges, cooperation can exist for them to traverse the common challenges together (Greico, 1999). However, the cooperation will end if their common objectives are shifting, and it will be counterproductive to the cooperation's real essence. We can perceive that states will interact mutually if they are under the same intention in one particular international organization with the sets of the needed regime that can offer those commonalities.

ASEAN Outlook on Indo Pacific as the Precedence of the “Collaborative Strategic Outlook”

Although the principle of “collaborative strategic outlook” was introduced back in January 2020 when Indonesia's Foreign Minister Mrs. Retno Marsudi gave a speech at the Annual Foreign Minister Press Statement 2020, ASEAN Outlook on Indo Pacific can be seen as early as 2016 (AOIP). Back then, Indonesia hasn't stated the collaborative principle explicitly to the public, but the assumptions of this paper and the characteristic of AOIP seems to match the notion discussed here. AOIP has become tangible proof that Indonesia realized its challenges and limitations hence trying more innovative efforts to be leveraged fully to advance Indonesia's foreign policy and domestic interests.

Indonesia managed to become a trendsetter in ASEAN and its external partners by showcasing collaborative diplomacy to address sensitive issues by spearheading ASEAN principles while at the same time allowing the region to spearhead a firm diplomatic approach that builds confidence

and trust. Although many perceived AOIP as a normative declaration of political stance, it's not wrong neither true to the question. AOIP denotes that scalable partnership and collaborative actions can project a strategic movement of ASEAN. This means that ASEAN can sail its ship with China to maintain healthy interdependence with its external partners while also sailing the South China Sea issue. This is proven by the fact that Indonesia alongside other countries managed to sign the RCEP in November 2020.

This reflects that the principle of collaborative partnership in the case of ASEAN can be incorporated into the hierarchy of ASEAN's regime that will stand as the enabling environment to maintain confidence, and also to somehow projects implicit preventive actions against the middle-income trap as the solution to absorb and resolves the shocks and preconditions existed in the status quo (Arase, 2019). And we can see here that is intertwined with the norms of SSC. To understand the interlinkages of the new Indonesia's paradigm of cooperation for sustainable development, we should relate it with a sentiment called ‘increasing global interconnectivity’ that should be embedded in the dynamics of G-20 itself. This is aimed to explain how Indonesia could bridge the global south with the global north while also synchronizing their priorities in G-20 cooperation to advance their agenda in SSC through its representation in the G-20 Sherpa track representing MIKTA and SSC key player.

A New International Setting in Global Landscape of Development Cooperation

The international setting of cooperation itself has always been drawn with the traditional concept that more developed countries always support and assist the middle income and LDCs' needs to alleviate poverty, increasing economic capability, technical assistance, and maintaining their partnerships as part of strategic

interdependence. However, the current world's dynamics changed the way the UN and other emerging countries embrace their cooperation in the international-setting of multilateralism to achieve global prosperity and security. The world has undergone two major world wars and also one cold war in which it has drawn a new picture in the international landscape. The multipolar world has lured the newly independent countries to unite together and drives their actions forward to be the new positive force amidst the post-cold war tension. This was proven with the establishment of the Non- Aligned Movement (NAM) adopted in the Asian African Conference in Bandung. This can be seen as a new benchmark for new shiftings to the global landscape as the countries at that time were motivated to rebuild their country in the post-colonial era. Pertaining to it, the term 'shiftings' that we should understand is the dynamics that are pertinent with the changing concept of interdependence from the notion of 'OECD and the major powers as the donors to global development' to the advancement of southern hemisphere countries to catalyze development'. Certain SSC kinds of literature like (Engel, 2019) depicted SSC as a 'messy concept' of developing countries' united action in the southern hemisphere against the northern hemisphere where the developed countries are located. However, with this so-called 'messy concept' it can be perceived in another way where the middle income and LDCs were wanting to develop more sophisticated cooperation from the previous norms as counter-hegemony norms into a preventive action against fragmented inter-regional cooperation. Then the question now would be why does it matter? In the current Covid-19 pandemic we can perceive that global altruism is fading, the trade war between the US and China for example has driven the world into another pit of proxy competition and politicized economic cooperation. These events are not sustainable especially amid the Covid-19 pandemic. The emergence of protectionism

and populism became another external factor on why Indonesia has the urgency to move forward in a strong partnership to be resilient and prepared in the post-pandemic recovery. It eventually proves that the essence of international cooperation is no longer based on traditional views that the developed countries are the only major source of assistance for developing countries and LDCs. But instead, now the developing countries are transforming themselves and moving forward to enhance their solidarity to achieve sustainable development by providing newer constructive engagement and contributions to support their fellow LDCs and middle-income countries to develop for SDGs, and this is embraced in the SSC outlook itself.

The above notion can be understood and supported in several arguments that will be discussed in the following. First, we need to comprehend the concept of the international development cooperation itself as the medium to convey the mutual interests of countries to provide new hope for their people and to move forward in a scalable manner. Second, to achieve scalable progress of development, a correct set of policy outlook and guidance should be applied. Historically, all of the SSC member states were experiencing colonialism in the past before they gain independence, hence dependencies towards major donor countries should be prevented. Member states should scrutinize their interdependencies and cooperation to although it will require more negotiations and technicalities that might be even more complex. This is evident enough if we are discussing a third-world country without any strong governance. Third, in order to achieve the so-called 'best practices' of a new paradigm of international development cooperation, the global south needs to envision that the poorer member states can still achieve development assistance by being solid and reflects it to their cooperation with each other in the new international setting of cooperation (Gray & Gills, 2016). Fourth, the diverse and

enormous natural resources located in the middle-income and LDCs at the global south hemisphere have increased the value of SSC cooperation. This does imply that countries in the SSC if they manage to gain control and power over all inter/intraregional cooperation policy dimensions constructively will bring new benefits. One of which is it can be maximized to overarching their foreign policies and economic needs. This is done to depicts that as the bridgebuilder amid the global competition among major powers, countries need to ensure that the challenges can be addressed in such a timely manner to prevent further liabilities and collateral damages. This is quite relevant to the current status quo where the middle-income countries and LDCs started to examine their aptitude on how they could endure their game on the global landscape in between the shadow of two giant furies. This is correlated when (Steinbock, 2018) argued that the global momentum to achieve economic integration in globalization can be harmed with a tangible 20% decrease in Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) – With most of the developed countries were investing, logically the middle-income countries and LDCs should be worried because of the adverse tariffs battle that might allow FDIs to be withdrawn (with most of them in US dollars) and again it's proven when WTO agreed that this could lead into another recession. That will be the case if they are not innovating themselves (the developing countries) in the “hot peace” of the world. SSC allows developing countries to grasp the momentum when the traditional notion doesn't allow it when there is a global economic uncertainty. And fifth, the international regime characteristic of the SSC allows the member states to do norm-shaping, norm-setting, and norm-sharing in the international development cooperation to increase their penetration against the great wall caused the major power polarisation. It is tangible enough to perceive this as the effort to

achieve collective actions through the provisions that are not incorporating any so-called “dependent variable” from the major powers' grasp. To clarify, these arguments and narratives are not invalidating that developing countries shouldn't cooperate with the major donors but to show that mere traditional views of cooperation can't increase the resilience of the middle-income countries and the LDCs to maintain an innovative interdependence and to advance the new paradigm called the global collaborative outlook to demonstrate the global south as new potential cooperation.

Contesting the Role of SSC as the Prime Solutions to Achieve Sustainable Development

OECD defined SSC as a new strategic cost-efficient and trusted collaboration among the involved countries to innovate and rejuvenate their partnerships in a changing world to address both systemic and structural challenges in achieving sustainable development (OECD, 2011). This is a signal that SSC can take the role not only as a new way of middle income and LDCs promotes their solidarity amidst the world's polarisation (as the nature of SSC cooperation itself was established during the proliferation of cold war competition) but also enshrine the value that exchanges and sharing of knowledge between the developing countries are also able to cater the devotion of the member states in resolving their intertwined challenges to attain the non-conditionality and best practices of interdependence. The mentioned narrative itself was tangibly stipulated in the adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution 33/134 in 1978 to cater the qualified technical cooperation and multidimensional resolutions with not only mere governmental actors but also the subnational and regional actors under the innovative approach to assimilate technology and effective governance (United Nations, 1978).

With the role of middle-income countries and LDCs are being empowered to cater to the new demand of multilateral and inter-regional cooperation, it's safe to say that this is one of the adaptation to the new changing statecraft from state-centered diplomacy to people-centered diplomacy, which will bring the scope of human security agenda as one of the strategic outlooks to achieve the best practices of the sustainable development goals. To conclude, SSC is the answer for the member states in the global south to diversify their engagement in the multilateral architecture. This was affirmed by the United Nations in the Report of the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, the document summarized that the post-2015 agenda to achieve the SDGs should profoundly be more inclusive to cater all actors like the high-income, middle-income, and low-income players (United Nations, 2013). Those players are encouraged to forge a more inclusive atmosphere for the governance to institutionalize the cooperation that can engage all actors from the public to private stakeholders (United Nations, 2013).

SSC and the G20: A View From Within in the Case of Financial Assistance for Development Agenda

G20 is composed of member states associated with several regional groups like G77, OECD, MIKTA, and BRICS. These regional groups, particularly in this matter the G77 or Group of 77 holds a key role in the G20 itself. As part of the sherpas groupings, G77 acquire the chance to engage and negotiate in the political directives especially in the spectrum of economic cooperation. The collaboration between these countries can be contested with the notion of how they can advance the developing countries' agenda to alleviate challenges like poverty from their domestic situation. This status quo itself is also exacerbated by the deprived financial policies derailing from the best practices.

With the status of most G-77 and Indonesia included as the beneficiary of FDIs – we can see that foreign loans and debts become a major concern, especially it is intertwined with their GDP performance. These countries also to add, are the key beneficiary parties in the post-Bretton woods financial cooperation. Deeper to the trench, the existence of G77 is considered crucial to the OECD itself, especially when it comes to SSC and G20 relations. G-77 players are crucial to the OECD countries in terms of debt and loan sustainability. It is not because of the governmental lenders but since the G77 countries are the ones that will determine the fate of G20 informal cooperation in terms of its lending and financial assistance program. It will determine how does the private lenders will continue to inject the funds to assist the G20 financial empowerment solutions (like debts and development loans). In the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, taking an example from the past G-20 session presided by Saudi Arabia has previously agreed upon the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) in October 2020. The DSSI initiative was introduced as part of post-pandemic recovery flexibility for LDCs and middle-income countries to repay their foreign debts. The case is, if in the case those G-77 countries are not prudent when they are adopting macroeconomic policies to recover, it can eventually reverse from benefits to liabilities & setbacks for the private lenders. This will make the private lenders being reluctant to comply further especially with the agreed DSSI that was adopted to ease the burden in post-covid economic recovery. Indeed the prudential policy is needed to ensure that countries would adopt a flawless economic policy that could eventually support their diplomacy and maintain the confidence of the multilateral community in the economic assistance that are accounted to support the middle-income countries and the LDCs (Hermawan, 2017).


To conclude, a balance between the inward-looking and outward-looking perspectives

when formulating the economic policy is needed to refrain from any counterproductive setbacks that may occur if member states couldn't offer an innovative way out from their prolonged economic crisis. Hence, the application and incorporation of the new development cooperation should be able to satisfy the demand to accumulate the growth either through series of best practices application and judicial review. Member states also need to spearhead sets of norms that can be manifested in a comprehensive and flawless policy to achieve national development agenda and to keep their healthy linkage to the global economic governance and supply chain.

Contesting Indonesia's Engagement to Economic Development Cooperation as a Bridgebuilder

In the case of Indonesia, as one of the major power in ASEAN and the key actors in SSC, Indonesia can exploit this opportunity through maintaining a solid proponent engagement in the north-south concept as part of the triangular cooperation, acting as the bridge builder, and tailoring the promotion of SSC through their regional arrangements and provisions. Therefore, contesting these assumptions will bring the question of how the bridgebuilders in SSC particularly Indonesia as the current focus in this article can foster strategic actions and synergies among the stakeholders and actors to institutionalize the governance following the best practices? This question is the correct proposition to better examine the notion since according to them that for countries to achieve a mature development, they have to develop the grassroots and traditional actors, reaching the mature age that eventually will bring the country to the level of mass consumption because of the increased GDP and economic stability adjacent with the economic integration either at the regional and or the multilateral level (Rostow, 1959).

These phases that were elaborated by Rostow suited the character of development in the middle-income countries and LDCs wherein the present time the middle-income countries and LDCs strived for a better economic endeavor. Technically speaking, these states are actually adhering to the Buenos Aires Conference on TCDC that emphasized the following points: (1) horizontal sharing of best practices and to collaboration with the UN Development Group (enforcing just partnership and inclusive governance); and (2) Implementing policies with the target to reach the phase of mass consumption in their national development. To reach the said vision, one of the innovative solutions to be considered is by enhancing the whole-society approach (civil society engagement) and increasing the labor productivity as the powerhouse and main driver of productivity and competitive growth (OECD & UNDP, 2019).



Picture 1: The G-20 African Partnership in the Framework of the G-20 Action Plan on the 2030 SDGs Agenda
(Source: G20 contribution to the 2030 Agenda: PROGRESS AND WAY FORWARD)

SSC and the New Statecraft of Diplomacy in the World: A New Indonesia's Economic Diplomacy and Development Cooperation Paradigm

As elaborated on the previous parts within this article, the existence of G-20 has brought a new way forward especially for Indonesia's economic diplomacy that maintains the principle of "free and active"

– which emphasized the principle of not aligning with any polar and actively engaging to the maintenance of international peace and security as the soul of Indonesia's foreign policy. In the context of economic cooperation and diplomacy, Indonesia advocates the importance of mutual benefit, collaborative strategic outlook, increasing strategic trust, preventing the zero-sum approach, increasing multilateralism, and prioritizing the key concepts of Diplomacy 4+1 that were introduced by Indonesia's Foreign Minister Mrs. Retno Marsudi at her Annual Foreign Minister Press Statement (PPTM) 2020 this January (Ministry of Foreign Affairs RI, 2020). As it was elaborated before on the theoretical framework within this article, the new paradigm called the 'collaborative strategic outlook' was conveyed this year as the game-changer in catalyzing the development and economic cooperation and push forward in the multipolar world (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2020). With this notion being pushed forward and incorporated into the concept of Diplomacy 4+1 that was introduced, we can see that this new paradigm will also encompass Indonesia's navigation to expand its inter-regional partnerships. This is assumed from several symptoms that Indonesia did in its multilateral cooperation. For instance, we can see it from informal cooperation similar to the concept of SSC named MIKTA (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia) that was adopted as informal cooperation to the G-20 Sherpas track. Indonesia is driving their emerging role in MIKTA to increase the sentiment of 'global interconnectivity' where macroeconomic

policy coordination and the technical cooperation norms were synchronized with Haung (2017) that the new emerging players in the global development landscape has innovated the way the international community enhances their development cooperation through blended involvement of the public and private stakeholders. And this is affirmed as the evolution that denotes G-7 decreasing proposition in the traditional perspective of global development (Haung, 2017). We can see that Indonesia is putting tremendous confidence in this SSC cooperation as under the administration of President Joko Widodo, rapid infrastructure establishments and national development policies were oriented with the joint funding windows between the public and private sector both nationally and internationally. This agenda was directed by President Joko Widodo to his Foreign Minister where Indonesia should prioritize a new set of collaborative economic diplomacy outlook to showcase Indonesia's economic prospectus and luring investments to build interdependence and confidence with Indonesia's economic partner specifically here, the SSC. Also to add, with the recent adoption of Omnibus Law on Job Creation in 2020, it becomes more imperative for the government to push forward and settle the decision and policymaking promptly.

We can see that Indonesia does take profits from the SSC not only as the beneficiary of the triangular cooperation but also as the scaling-up process for Indonesia's influence over the inter-regional cooperation spectrum. Two events push this narrative into logic, first is the recent adoption and roundtable intensive negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and several adoptions of the bilateral Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). Both of these events are coherent with the aforementioned elaboration, and it can be seen from the domestic status quo and the global contest itself. The changing global constellation in terms of economic and

political competition gave the momentum to countries like Brazil, Indonesia, China, and India the opportunity to advance their economic growth when the major powers like the United States are contracted. This certainly becomes a driving force for Indonesia to remedy its asymmetrical foreign economic policy to cope with the domestic agenda that will eventually bring Indonesia to decide the most feasible rationale. This rationale then is used to attain Indonesia's capability to be the bridge the gap between economic uncertainty and exploration of new innovative cooperation even in the middle of global uncertainty (Pujayanti, 2015). Thus it will bring us into the next notion – the localization of the international development norms into the national governance, which not only engages the central government as the sole monopoly actor of this field but also the involvement of sub-national and provincial actors to develop the main contention of the SSC. Textually speaking, it's relevant to Kaiser (2003) that to attain the best practices of an optimized role between each sub- national actor in cooperation. This is done by ensuring that the engagement should be mainstreamed and channeled to the scope of human resources empowerment and the industrial contact exchanges to generalize the concept to be friendly for the sub- national actors as the new role in the cooperation (Kaiser, 2003). Or so to say in IR this concept was called 'paradiplomacy' which extends the role of sub-national government to international exposure. Indonesia stipulated this whole 'all-out' engagement in the legislation of UU. No. 25 in 2004 about the National Development System Plan as it aspired from the SSC Grand Design and Blueprint document that emphasized:

“The whole nation of South-South Cooperation is geared towards the strengthening of mutually beneficial economic relationship through technical, economic, political, social & cultural and science & technology cooperation”.

The post-colonial nature of the SSC since its establishment also brought Indonesia to practiced that sovereignty and solidarity should be mainstreamed, to scale up the combined “positive force” brought by the SSC to the global governance for a more extensive bilateral, regional, and multilateral interdependence (P2K-OI BPPK Kemlu RI, 2016). The SSC theme of “*Better Partnership for Prosperity*” has been envisioned and enshrined by Indonesia's foreign policy to be phased into periodical segmentation with precise and scalable planned innovations to not only approach the partners and stakeholders but also to combine the concept of ‘full-cycle project’ to the SSC implementation. Indonesia historically adopted this principle in Presidential Decree No. 60 in 2011 regarding the masterplan of economic expansion and development of Indonesia (MP3EI) that was adopted for the phase of 2011-2015 and now 2016-2020 (P2K-OI BPPK Kemlu RI, 2016).

G-20 and the Collaborative Strategic Outlook in the SSC: Indonesia's Gameplay

The new paradigm of Indonesia's diplomacy in SSC can also be perceived as the main policy tool of Indonesia's soft diplomacy to lure the other member states to favor Indonesia's shaped and set norms in the multilateral forum such as G-20. What are the specific so-called set and shaped norms? It's the priority from Indonesia that any technical cooperation should be committed by each country, thus these member states shall oblige to the inclusive and non- discriminatory practices on their policies. So that every beneficiary country will not only receive mere fundings and technical guidance but also its tangible implementation. Indonesia pushes this norm to anticipate the regression that might occurs due to the national mismanagement of international funding. The national mismanagement in this context isn't limited

only to Indonesia but also other countries particularly the developing countries and LDCs. Developing countries tend to be convoluted by corruption and incapacities, therefore Indonesia asserts this as part of the norms to encourage a more positive force to the group in SSC and G20. This is proven by Indonesia's encouragement in the G20 meeting back in October 2020 when they urged developed countries to prevent their funding withdrawal to the development financial assistance.

Indonesia has contributed more than USD 49,8 million during 2000-2013 for the SSC to alleviate poverty and to fund cooperation into strategic priority areas (Pujayanti, 2015). To continue, Indonesia always reviews and rejuvenate their commitments and priorities in the G-20 vis-à-vis the legitimacy of G-20 as the global accountability for progressive development. For instance, the Indonesian government agreed that the IMF needs to be reformed as the current setting of the post-Bretton woods system in the multipolar world seems to be more outdated. Indonesia has conveyed its views regarding this and has always pushed for more outreaching actors' acquisition to legitimate the mandate of the G-20 as the demand-driver to the member states and to refresh the member states' governance for broader global participation (Ministry of Finance RI, 2013). In 2020, when the Sherpas Indonesia represented themselves in the G-20 Emergency Summit on the Question of Covid-19 Global Pandemic, Indonesia stressed the importance of MSMEs empowerment, technical health cooperation for the affordability of vaccine and easing the essential public goods, incorporating social safety net to reverse the collateral damage of the Covid-19 to the global development, and ensuring that G-20 member states are not going to retain the economic stimulus packages for the post-pandemic era (Akhlas, 2020). From this narrative, we can attain from these norms that Indonesia is trying to strengthen the G-20 member states' adherence to their post-

pandemic commitment and the UN Covid-19 strategic framework. To relate it better, in the context of SSC, the set norms and priorities that were affirmed by Indonesia in G-20 has the goal to ensure stable and healthy economic and monetary forecast that tend to be fragile in the crisis like the case of the Covid-19 pandemic. This implies that domestic control should be part of the obligation to preserve the set of mutual benefits from the SSC without having to be driven into inflation and monetary crisis. This context can be clarified further with the assumption that was written when perceiving the common systemic challenges in international economic and financial cooperation that consisted of broad and extensive stakeholders' engagement (Kenen, Shafer, Wicks, & Wyplosz, 2004).

Indonesia's navigation in the multilateral cooperation particularly G-20 is also reaching a new scale right now as with the current role and engagement from Indonesia that kept being increased to the SSC, Indonesia can be perceived as not only beneficiary countries in the triangular cooperation framework but also as the facilitator for the cooperation. And this was proven with the establishment of the single agency mandated for the SSC affairs following Indonesia's Foreign Policy Act stipulated in UU. No. 37 in 1999 about the SSC instrument's stipulations under the MoFA RI and the Middle Term National Development Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional/ RPJMN*) 2015-2019 that emphasized Indonesia's strategic segmentation of the SSC. Indonesia is now putting strategic collaborative efforts to map out the maximum policy objective although they are acquiring a limited national budget plan annually. This is a step for Indonesia to be active but resilient in multilateralism through the persistent approach of efficient and mutually beneficial cooperation – while also maintaining collaboration among the disputed and fragmented major powers in the international setting. This is useful for Indonesia to overcome its economic barrier

and policy challenges when it comes to development programs and utilizing its alliances with other states in or outside the Asia Pacific.

Moving Forward as an Emerging Power through Collaborative Efforts

We can comprehend that Indonesia is now moving forward as a collaborator to remedy the asymmetrical cooperation that was criticized by several kinds of literature in the past. To advance the notion of collaborative strategic outlook to resolve the critics and improve, Indonesia also improved in several sideline agendas of G-20 such as by participating in various G-20 side agenda for instance by becoming the co-chair of South-south Technical Cooperation (SSTC), executing policy mapping of the SSC technical assistance priority list, and topping up various bilateral, regional, and multilateral FTAs, CEPAs, and PTAs to diversify the efforts. Starting from the first one, Indonesia as the co-chair of SSTC proven that Indonesia wasn't only engaging with the other member states in multilateral but also improving the feasibility of inter- agency cooperation in Indonesia to advance the new paradigm by establishing bilateral and or trilateral working groups in which Indonesia participated within it as the Co- Chair. One of the examples was the bilateral meeting between Indonesia and Myanmar co-chaired by Indonesia in 2013 to discuss the thematic technical agenda item regarding three working groups establishment about climate change, inclusive growth, and good governance of decentralization between Indonesia and Myanmar in ASEAN under the SSTC (Bappenas, 2013). Second, in regards, the soft-diplomacy is basically when Indonesia advances their agenda to approach the countries like Vanuatu, Fiji, Tonga, Solomon Island, and Marshal Islands to implement a more collaborative way to resolve the political dispute between Indonesia and these countries in the context of Papua. The aforementioned countries are the top supporters and have usually engaged

against Indonesia in the United Nations General Assembly since 2015. To counter the negative collateral impact from those member states, Indonesia started to restructure their policy mapping in the SSC by putting Vanuatu in the 5th highest and Fiji in the 8th highest, the Solomon Islands in the 10th highest, and Tonga in 23rd highest priority which was labeled as the scale A that is equal to the representation of the head of state political commitment (BPPK Kemlu RI, 2015).

This re-structurization was aimed to ensure that Indonesia could obtain not only political influence over the governance of SSC to those countries but also to increase the interdependence. And from the review that the author has observed from the social media and news, now only Vanuatu themselves are still engaging with the question of Papua as they were repeatedly slandered in Indonesia in the 75th Session of the UN General Assembly in October 2020. Third, Indonesia is also expanding the SSC to expand its international comprehensive economic cooperation into another dimension, which is the Indonesian people itself as part of the people-oriented diplomacy. It is aimed to increase the prosperity and protection of the Indonesian workers under the Indonesian Citizen Protection (PWNI) program, hence extending it to the technical cooperation with the SSC member states. It is implemented by approaching SSC member states where the Indonesian workers are the most concentrated as a collaborative approach to protect the Indonesian nationals and to settle barriers between the Indonesian government and the partner countries to resolve any legal cases and or the labor provisions of the Indonesian people working overseas. This is even being prioritized until currently it is incorporated into the "Diplomacy 4+1" concept to preserve the income and maintaining comprehensive interdependence between Indonesia and its partners particularly with Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, China, and other countries in the

SSC. Indonesia took the comprehensive approach from scalable efforts until the political and bilateral commitment with other partners in the SSC to resolves IDPs and issues that are involving the Indonesian people on other countries' soil (BBPK Kemlu RI, 2015).

Indonesia's Public Diplomacy to Achieve the New Paradigm of Collaborative of Strategic Outlook in the SSC and G-20 Cooperation

Public diplomacy is one of the effective contemporary efforts to be channeled to commercialize the strategic collaborative outlook of new Indonesia's paradigm of cooperation. This is since diplomacy in this era is not only about interstate relations but also the people themselves. In which this is pretty much endorsed by those IR scholars who are specializing in transnational society research. Public diplomacy to promote the collaborative strategic outlook isn't only to raise awareness among the civil society but also to influence other people to the norms set by Indonesia – at the norm-sharing process, as the multilateral cooperation is based on norms. This will allows Indonesia to harmonize its policies in the SSC and G-20 furthermore it can also support Indonesia's goal to become a 'diplomatic' trendsetter from the norms that Indonesia proposed either regionally or multilaterally. MoFA RI shows their commitment to the process of public diplomacy that it is important for a better institutionalization and also to be resilient in traversing both horizontal and vertical challenges of diplomacy (MoFA RI, 2019).

The main theory that explains public diplomacy itself was from Nicholas J. Cull where he wrote in his book *Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories* that the spectrum of public diplomacy ranging from listening, advocating, and cultural exchange diplomacy can advance the engagement even to the foreign societies to the domestic political agenda (Cull, 2008). In the context of Indonesia, specifically

about the SSC, during the Annual Foreign Minister Press Statement in January 2020, this year Indonesia represented by MoFA RI Director General of Information and Public Diplomacy and the Exim Bank signed two MoU that stipulated the commitment from the government of Indonesia and Exim Bank to accelerate the economic diplomacy in the SSC. The first MoU between MoFA RI, University of Indonesia, and Indonesia Exim Bank to support the funding of economic diplomacy operation, the second MoU between MoFA RI and Indonesia Exim Bank to empower the capacity building of exporters and the importers through technical capacity building for the SSC framework (Indonesia Exim Bank, 2020). From these adoptions of MoU, it is evident that Indonesia is navigating themselves with the civil society's engagement to foster their contribution to the exporters' and importers' empowerment to support the best practices of the SSC trade spectrum. It is tangibly in line with the G-20 Leaders' Declaration that the member states should leverage from the G-20 menu of Policy Option in which the civil society engagement is part of the provisions. So to say, the adoption of blended financing and innovative capacity building like the aforementioned events are needed also to support the agreed G-20 DSSI initiative that was aimed to accelerate recovery and giving rooms for the beneficiary of debts to improve better and engage their economic stimulus packages. The deteriorating GDP and health crisis in the LDCs and middle-income countries has led the G-20 under Saudi's presidency to adopt the Common Framework to redefine the halted interactions and global supply chain and to benefit better, as of the fact that 46 countries have applied for DSSI which valued for more than 5,7 billion USD (G20, 2020). The efforts of public diplomacy and civil society engagement that were done for the economic recovery in SSC give a new fresh impression to the new paradigm of collaborative strategic outlook. The goal is to let the public and the foreign community

to better understand the successful journey of Indonesia's new paradigm in driving the strategic role as the bridge builder to be active and engage in the international system for the endeavor of Indonesia in playing their game as the emerging power.

Conclusion

Advancing the role of middle-income countries and LDCs requires a fond commitment of member states to be collaborative for the betterment of global altruism. The new pathway for the developing countries to play a new role has proven that development studies have the urgency to be redefined with the alternate views of the 'bridgebuilding' concept to renew the understanding and dynamics of international relations. Multilateral cooperation should be based on mutual benefits and not just merely commitment, but also has to be enshrined within the policy development to ensure inclusive growth and strong partnerships among stakeholders to achieve their cooperation objective. SSC as part of the global governance in development cooperation is utilized by Indonesia to advance the foreign policy from mere beneficiary into another new emerging facilitator in the SSTC. Indonesia has the potential also to advance their principle and norms in cooperation to be shared among the contracting parties within the SSC. Hence, policy coordination, negotiation, technical assistance, monitoring and evaluation, and the reciprocity between the beneficiary, facilitator, and pivotal stakeholders can be preserved to guarantee mutual benefits. Indeed by taking this outlook as a collaborative player needs to be corroborated by substantial and more hardworking diplomacy to resonate the Indonesian way of diplomacy better to the global community and to showcase Indonesia as the spear of the Asia Pacific emerging powers alongside with Japan

during the transition from Industry 4.0 to the Society 5.0.

Three correlated medium that can be used by Indonesia such as SSC as the facilitator and beneficiary, G-20 Sherpas as part of the MIKTA strategic informal cooperation, and public diplomacy are the key contenders in explaining the contention of the diplomacy 4+1 that is currently being examined by the global Covid-19 crisis to defend the collaborative strategic outlook in the fading multilateralism and increased protectionism that may harm the global governance. Economic diplomacy and interdependence done by Indonesia are the key steps to also influence the countries who are engaging against Indonesia vis-a-vis the Papuan is a strategic solution that prioritizes more into the collaborative approach to leverage from Indonesia's position within the structure and or the system.

The changing landscape of international development cooperation from state-centric into people-centric dynamics also brought the urgency for Indonesia to engage as a whole community both public and private cooperation to overcome the systemic challenges that were also brought by the unprecedented impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. And not to forget, the protection, prosperity, and priority of the Indonesian people to build back better, be more resilient, and increasing the global interconnectivity owing to the status quo and the characteristic of setbacks and challenges brought by the pandemic into the unprepared multilateral governance before. And once again, G-20 is now still striving, SSC is still running, and Indonesia is still participating in the post-pandemic development that could support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in less than 9 years. All of them, as part of Indonesia's contribution to the maintenance of international peace, prosperity, and security thus localizing the globalization for the people and the future endeavor of Indonesia.

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