WHY ARE INDONESIANS PRONE TO SUPPORT THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA?

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ABSTRACT

Keywords: Radicalization, extremism, ISIS, Indonesia

1. Introduction
Since the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) became independent from al-Qaeda in early 2014, Indonesia has been witnessing many ISIS homegrown attacks over the years. The Thamrin attack in 2016, Kampung Melayu attack in 2017, and dozens of small lone-wolf style attacks that can be traced back to ISIS. Recently, a family of six detonated themselves in front of Santa Maria Catholic church, Surabaya Centre Pentecostal Church, and Diponegoro Indonesian Christian Church in Surabaya, killing church goers and four of their own children as young as nine years old in the process, in total 18 lives, including the suicide bombers, on May 13, 2018. The church attack was perpetrated by a family whose father linked to Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), a local ISIS-supporter terrorist organization led by Aman Abdurrahman who was sentenced to death just days after the attacks.1

Indonesians, including women and children, have travelled to and from Syria where they lived under the ISIS-claimed “caliphate” territories.2 They are recruited as Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF) or those who travelled to fight alongside ISIS against the U.S.-led coalition army, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s armed forces, and other parties who oppose the group capturing territories to build a caliphate, even the al-Qaeda that ultimately cut ISIS off its jihadist franchise.

These facts show that Indonesians are susceptible to ISIS’s radical ideology, even though they fully know the loss it has brought to the victims of Islamic Extremism. Looking throughout the Indonesian history, the socio-political circumstances in contemporary Indonesia, the spread of Islamic school of Wahhabism & Salafism,

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the youth generation, and ISIS’s attempts to take over Southeast Asia, may shed a light on the susceptibility of Indonesians to adopt ISIS’s radical ideology that pushes them to carry out actions that cause the loss of life and damage to infrastructure.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Radicalism and Extremism

The term Islamic “radicalism” and “extremism” are often used interchangeably in journal studies or news articles, but seldom given deeper understanding as to how an individual or group qualify as either of those. According to Dr. Prinsloo in his study “The Etymology of ‘Islamic extremism’: A misunderstood term?” radical actors are those who seek fundamental change because they are dissatisfied with their place in the society within the context of contemporary political status, condition or value system. He pointed out that merely being radical or looking for political change does not automatically regard individual or group as being extreme. There is difference between being radical and adopting radicalism as a worldview as stated by KH. Hasyim Muzadi’s speech in a seminar in 2015, both agreed in the line between “being radical” and “taking it to extreme measures”. Dr. Prinsloo, emphasizing on the depth, immediacy, and method of change of radical actors, concluded what constitutes as extremism does not only based on radicals carrying out violent action because the boundary that categorizes violence rests in the social law. Thus, it is up to the state to determine what classified as radicalism or extremism. According to Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) or National Agency for Combating Terrorism, radicalism is a political stance that seeks revolutionary overall change by flipping existing values drastically through extreme violent means. Radicalism becomes terrorism when it involves violence, target (the civilians), and purpose (spread fear and threats for socio-political change). These are the basis of the definition of terrorism according to Indonesia as stated in Law No. 15 Year 2003 Eradication of Terrorism Criminal Act (Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme) which reads “Anyone who deliberately use violence or threat of violence inciting terror or fear towards

Khilafah Islamiyah or a Sharia-based government and the extreme measures are violent in nature. Radicalism is no longer being radical as an opposing thought or disgruntled by current social and political situation, but an understanding, a life virtue or principle, that needs to be violently acted upon. Therefore, the term “radicalism” and “extremism” are used interchangeably because it refers to a stage where a thought becomes violent action.

Dr. Prinsloo and KH. Hasyim Muzadi’s speech in a seminar in 2015, both agreed in the line between “being radical” and “taking it to extreme measures”. Dr. Prinsloo, emphasizing on the depth, immediacy, and method of change of radical actors, concluded what constitutes as extremism does not only based on radicals carrying out violent action because the boundary that categorizes violence rests in the social law. Thus, it is up to the state to determine what classified as radicalism or extremism. According to Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) or National Agency for Combating Terrorism, radicalism is a political stance that seeks revolutionary overall change by flipping existing values drastically through extreme violent means. Radicalism becomes terrorism when it involves violence, target (the civilians), and purpose (spread fear and threats for socio-political change). These are the basis of the definition of terrorism according to Indonesia as stated in Law No. 15 Year 2003 Eradication of Terrorism Criminal Act (Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana Terorisme) which reads “Anyone who deliberately use violence or threat of violence inciting terror or fear towards

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people or cause mass casualty, by depriving independence or loss of life and other’s possession, or bring about the damage or destruction towards vital strategic objects or environment or public facility or international facility.”

Dr. Prinsloo’s study “The Etymology of ‘Islamic extremism’: A misunderstood term?” is an easy-to-digest researcher’s view of the definition of Islamic extremism by assessing the context for which the word is used the most; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Dr. Prinsloo’s study and KH. Hasyim Muzadi’s speech in a seminar in 2015 as recorded in a study by Abu Rokhmad, both gives new perspective about the stages from radical to radicalism or extremism which is useful to define the meaning of those terms for this study. The paper by BNPT also helps researcher to study the meaning of terrorism according to Indonesia that is used as the basis of the counterterrorism law.

2.2. Radicalism in Indonesia

Indonesia, as home to the largest Muslim population in the world, surely holds a history of terrorism in the name of Islam. The earliest form of Islamic extremism in the archipelago is coined within the Darul Islam rebellion, also known as DI/TII in West Java at the beginning of 1949 until it was banned in 1962. Using chronological method to explain historical events, Chiara Formichi’s book Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in Twentieth-Century Indonesia focuses on explaining Kartosuryo’s acts, including his Islamic beliefs and ideals, that motivated him to lead the Darul Islam and proclaimed caliphate in West Java. Formichi’s study provides the historical background for this article to unveil the nation’s struggle with Islamic extremism.

In modern day Indonesia, religious political parties still hold the belief that Indonesia should and must uphold Sharia as its foundational law. Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) is an Islamic political party who supports the implementation of Sharia in Indonesia. In his Islamising Indonesia chapter “A Vision of Shariah–Led Prosperity: PKS Attitudes to the Implementation of Islamic Law”, Machmudi reveals PKS’ aim to turn Indonesia as an Islamic state, ruled under Sharia law. First, Machmudi classifies the nature of Indonesians regarding implementation of Sharia law. He divides those for and opposed to Sharia, then gives examples of political and/or social organization in each classification. His study is important for this research to strengthen evidence that although Indonesia is a nation of six religions, many Muslims are eager to be dominant and override their majority status to rule above others.

2.3. Ideology of the Islamic State

Salafism is the core ideology of ISIS. It refers to a Sunni fundamentalist movement of returning to pure ways of Islam. Emphasizing the importance of “purity and oneness of God”, Salafists seek to live solely based on God’s absolute authority; meaning willing to live under strict religious practice to maintain one’s moral integrity. Currently, many Indonesians are following the Muslim ideology that is potentially radical since it promotes exclusivity, even within the Muslim community. Indonesians have witnessed growing radicalism in big and small cities alike. The role of understanding

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8 BNPT. (2016).

Salafism in Indonesia through Noorhaidi Hasan’s study *Salafism in Indonesia: Transnational Islam, Violent Activism, and Cultural Resistance* is useful to shed light on how and why Salafism is sweeping the country and its influence in Indonesia.

Georges, using discourse method in her study *ISIS Rhetoric for the Creation of the Ummah*, interpreted the meaning behind the speech and the diction in Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi’s sermon on July 4th, 2014 when he proclaimed a caliph of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. She analyzed the moral and ethical values of the ISIS leader and his method of convincing the ummah to share his cause. Georges’ study gives clarity to ISIS ideology for both Arabic and non-Arabic speakers as it dives deep into the role of linguistics on public speaking.

### 2.4. Constructivism

According to Christian Reus-Smit, Burchill, and acquaintances, constructivist believe that “ideas, beliefs, and identities of individuals and groups are key to understanding the nature and course of International Relations.” It is important to bear the fact that the actor in the social world of International Relations according to constructivism theory does not only comprise of sovereign states, but rather the “world society” or a broader web of social relations that enmesh states, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), and other global social actors. Constructivism put much emphasis on ideas, constructivists view “normative” or “ideational” structures as important as material structure. For example, Marxist theory highlights the material structure of global capitalist system, and neo-realist stress the material structure of balance of military power, but constructivist does not see all those as highly important issue, whether that “systems of shared ideas, beliefs, and values (inter subjectivity) also have structural characteristics, and that they exert a powerful influence on social and political action.”

Christian Reus-Smit mentions, “Instead of treating actors’ interests as exogenously determined, as given prior to social interaction, constructivists treat interests as endogenous to such interaction, as a consequence of identity acquisition, as learned through processes of communication, reflection on experience (history), and role enactment.” Therefore, communication, experience or history, and role enactment are the means to construct identity. Identities form interests, which turns into action. Christian Reus-Smit, Burchill, and acquaintances give very insightful origin and definition of constructivism as an International Relations theory. Their definition of constructivism is used analyze the push and pull factors of why Indonesians support ISIS in this study.

### 3. Research Method

The research approach or method that the researcher used is qualitative. Qualitative method is the most suitable method as the researcher aims to explore a social context or phenomenon rather than confirming hypotheses. The researcher gathered data through field research and literature studies, in which the researcher collected primary data in the forms of direct interviews, or discussion, and secondary to tertiary data from books, journals, and articles. Interviews are conducted with International Crime Division staff member of NCB-INTERPOL Indonesia, a member of Indonesia Police Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Keamanan Polri, Baintelkam), and Al-Chaidar writer of

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The research analyzes data using historical-comparative method by referencing the history of Indonesia and similar past cases local or elsewhere to explain recent phenomenon. The researcher also used interviews and online resources to find out the motives of ISIS’s activity in Southeast Asia, and narrow down to Indonesia. The researcher classified ideologies of ISIS and examined the reason these ideologies are rooted in Indonesia and find ease to widespread in the Muslim community of Indonesia. The conclusion are the classification of whether any of these factors are push or pull factors for Indonesians to support ISIS. The analysis is correlated to constructivism theory, specifically on historical construction of ideas.

4. Background Analysis on Why Indonesians are Prone to Support ISIS
4.1. Indonesian Ummah and the Khilafah

Caliphate, also known as daulah or khilafah, is an Islamic state under a caliph. A caliph is a ‘successor’ who is elected by the ummah (Islamic community) or direct ancestor of Prophet Muhammad. Caliphate originally constitutes as Islamic leadership. Prophet Muhammad and his followers used to be in clash with other clans who do not accept the Islamic religion, therefore Muhammad fulfilled civil and religious duty along with his advisers.12 The caliphate’s basic function was to inherit the political and administrative function of Islamic community, in order to protect Islam and maintain jurisdiction based on Sharia.

Since the beginning of Islamic religion in the 7th century, there were four major caliphates after Prophet Muhammad. The four major caliphates are the Rashidun Caliphate, Ummayad Dynasty, Abbasid Dynasty, and Ottoman Empire. Other caliphates such as Fatimids and Caliphate of Cordoba lasted very shortly due to internal issues and wars.13

Unfortunately, after the Prophet Muhammad died in 632, there were no available guidelines as to how the succession is maintained, rather than prophecy.14 Two branches of Islam, Shia and Sunni, emerged during the Rashidun Caliphate. “Rashidun” is the collective name to address the first four caliphs. Some ummah who were later known as the ‘Shia’ insisted that only people from the Prophet’s lineage should be a caliph. They insisted that Ali, the prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, is the only legitimate successor of the prophet, whereas the ‘Sunni’ claims that the caliph can be anyone that has been unanimously elected by the ummah, therefore the prophet’s friend, Abu Bakr, was to be the first caliph to lead the ummah after the prophet.15

The last known caliphate in the world is the Ottoman Empire, abolished in 1924.16 During its golden era, Ottoman Empire territory reached as far as Greece, Hungary, Ukraine, and most present day Middle East countries; Iraq, Israel, Syria, Egypt, and North Africa. After its

16 Blanchard, C. M. (2010).
abolishment, the Turkish Republic replaced the authority of Ottoman Empire. Until present day, there is no recognized caliphate established after Ottoman Empire.

Caliphate can be in the form of nation-state, dynasty, or empire, as long as it reigns over a territory, implements Sharia law, and led by a caliph. A caliph is not the same with a king or dictator, caliph does not extend its power through coercive medium. A caliph must undergo bai’at or a political contract as a sign of its nomination as the head of a caliphate, the one who holds authority over all Muslim.\(^\text{17}\)

Caliphate operates under Sharia law (or Islamic law based on the Islamic holy book, Quran or Koran, Sunnah, and the hadith). Therefore, it differs with republican form of government whose highest authority is given to the people that can elect their own representatives, either head of the state or the legislator, those who make and amend the law. The only law that exists in caliphate is Sharia law and no one, event its caliph, may be able to formulate or add to the law.\(^\text{18}\)

Caliphate has an expansionist tendency. However, although it expands its territory, it does not behave so in order to take over resources and riches. A caliphate does that as a part of its foreign policy; to spread Islamic religion. Although a caliphate spreads Islam, it does not disregard and force minorities who refuse to convert to Islam. Minorities’ activities and private possessions are protected under the Islamic state.\(^\text{19}\)

A caliphate does not disregard minorities and force them to convert, however ISIS follows the concept of takfiri. Takfiri is Arabic for ‘those who accuse others of apostasy’. In other words, pointing fingers to individuals who do not follow a certain school in Sunni as unbeliever or kafir and treating them as rightful enemies.\(^\text{20}\)

Therefore, fellow Muslims that do not follow ISIS’s ideology are treated as kafir. Therefore, fellow Muslims that do not follow ISIS’s ideology are treated as kafir.

ISIS believes itself a true legit caliphate to fill the seat of the present caliphate status quo. ISIS captures cities in Iraq and Syria because of its expansionist tendency, making Mosul, Iraq and Raqqa, Syria its headquarters. ISIS territories also operate under strict Sharia law, where cutting off hands for punishment to stealing and public whipping happens daily.\(^\text{21}\) ISIS’s caliph is currently Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. He is considered the leader of all Muslim in the world by the citizens of the ISIS caliphate, and those who pledge allegiance to ISIS, regards his sovereignty as the Head of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and leader of all Muslims.

This is the major reason al-Qaeda broke its relationship with ISIS. Back in 2013 and early 2014 before ISIS was disavowed by al-Qaeda, ISIS ignited infighting with fellow Islamist rebels in Syria. ISIS kidnapped fellow rebels, assassinating their leaders, detonated suicide bombs that killed members of Tawhid Brigade and Suqour al-Sham both groups whose motive is to topple Assad regime and replace it with an Islamic state, later cooperate with Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Qaeda franchise in Syria) whom ISIS also fought for their unwillingness to merge with them.\(^\text{22}\)

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\(^{19}\) Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia. (2010).

\(^{20}\) Blanchard, C. M. (2010).


In Indonesia, there are several theories regarding the spread of Islam in Indonesia, it is difficult to determine which one is the truth because of the lack of historical evidence. At least two theories claimed that the existence of caliphate in the Middle East directly affected the Indonesian history since the period of ancient kingdoms. One theory claimed that Islam was first spread in the era of the third Rashidun caliph, Uthman, in the 6th century. Evidence found many Muslim traders in China in that era, thus Muslim merchants from Yemen and Persian Gulf passed through Indian Ocean and landed in Sumatra and Java on their way to China.23

Another theory claimed that the spread of Islam in Indonesia is a consequence of a conflict within Abbasid Dynasty in the 11th century. When Abbasid Dynasty was attacked, its Muslim practitioners collaborate with traders to fund their journey of introducing Islam to rural areas. They rode far enough to reach Indonesia as one of its destination. Thus, people in the archipelago, especially in Sumatra and Java, whether the common folk or the ruler, has some sort of connection with the caliphate in the Middle East throughout the caliphate.24

In Sumatra, these merchants spread Islamic teachings and married the locals. During the next few centuries, they spread the teachings further into Nusantara, reaching further Java, Borneo, and Sulawesi. Until the 13th century when the North Sumatran city of Pasai become the center of Islamic teachings in Malacca, a local ruler Meurah Silu, later known as Sultan Malik al-Saleh, established the first Islamic Kingdom in Nusantara, the Sultanate of Samudera Pasai.25

In Java, the pattern of Islamisation followed the bottom-top model of conversion whereas the people converted first and later the ruler, following the popular religion of the masses. The characters of Wali Songo (nine saints) were prominent in the process of Islamisation in the Java Island. The Wali Songo succeeded its missionary role by peaceful means, even accommodating local culture with religion without losing its identity.26

In the end of the 15th century, the Ottoman Empire deliberately sent its fleet to the Indian Ocean to secure the pathways of hijrah. The Ottoman Empire was the legitimate guardian of Mecca and Medina. It was also their responsibility to secure the pathways to and from the holy cities. The presence of Ottoman Empire’s fleet at the far west of Sumatra since 1498 did not only secure the hijrah process of ummah in Nusantara, but also strengthened the trading activities that had been since centuries before.27

During the era where Muslim Kingdoms ruled the islands of Nusantara, many sultans sought to earn their legitimate title as a Muslim King or Sultan from the caliphate in Middle East. Sultan Agung of Mataram (1593-1645), for example, attained his ‘Sultan’ title directly from the Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn or Sharif of Mecca (custodian of the two holy cities, Mecca and Medina). Likewise, the Sultanate in Aceh, Palembang, and Makassar, all

retained relations with the Sharif of Mecca, whom act on behalf of Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the connection between Muslims in Nusantara with the caliphate in Middle East was vigorous and solid.

Over time, the caliphate began to lose its power. Little by little, the empire was shrinking until there was no more. What was left out of the empire once great and prosperous was only the idea of “pan-Islamism” for the sole purpose of unity of the ummah. Pan-Islamism is a political movement aiming for Muslim unity through Muslim civilization in a territory or nation-state (caliphate), using Islam as glue regardless of the ummah’s ethnicity, to set them apart from the rest of the world so they may live in adherent to Muslim traditions. The impetus of pan-Islamism was ignited by the 34th Ottoman caliph, Sultan Abdul Hamid II, whom in the midst of the empire’s steep decline in the beginning of 20th century, claimed that Muslims all over the world must unite, lest there would be no hope in the future for unity of the ummah. Severe debts, and the influx of Western ideologies such as nationalism and liberalism causing the great empire to lose support from its European territories, all these factors put the empire on the line. The message swept the entire Muslim community, touching the Muslims in the archipelago or Dutch East Indies, as the colonials would call it.29

The end offered by this political movement is a Muslim utopia of transnational Islamic state, noting the fact that Middle East is no longer the only region of Islamic center (Formichi, 2010).30 In early 20th century East Indies, in order to promote pan-Islamism, the Ottoman Caliph sent his subordinates to give out copies of the Koran and Islamic theological books in Bahasa Melayu. One of those books discusses about Sultan of Turkey as Ruler of all Muslims. This action shows that the Ottoman Caliphate wanted the involvement of ummah in East Indies for his ambition to accomplish pan-Islamism.31

Meanwhile, Islamic scholars from Dutch East Indies who studied in Mecca and Cairo introduced Islamic reform at home. They sought to reform the local culture infused Islamic teaching with the pure ways of Islam with the spirit of Wahhabism. These modernist Muslims gave birth to some of the earliest Islamic organizations in Dutch East Indies. Modernist Muslims established organizations such as Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, al-Irsyad, and Persatuan Islam based in Java and Sumatra. In 1922, Sarekat Islam hosted al-Islam Congress to discuss about Islamic unity and caliphate question. Al-Islam Congress comprised of Islamic organizations and individuals from both the traditionalist and modernist Muslims, despite the ongoing differences and disputes. It is worth noting that the traditionalist and modernist Muslims in Indonesia follow Sunni, thus their difference is not profound in nature, but still within the scope of Sunni. As quoted from Faisal Ismail, “The religious disputes between the modernists and the traditionalists dealt in fact with furu (detail, branch) questions and not with usul (root, principle) questions”.

Leading up to the Ottoman Empire’s total collapse in 1924, there were Islamic movements in Egypt, India, and Saudi Arabia that strived for pan-Islamism. These

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movements manifested in several congresses to discuss the caliphate question. The al-Islam Congress established Komite Khilafat (Caliphate Committee) to coordinate the delegations to attend global Khilafat congress. The chairman of this committee was from Sarekat Islam, and the vice-chairman was K. H. Abdul Wahab who also served as the traditionalist’s representative. Global Khilafat congresses took place in Cairo and Mecca. Besides these, Komite Khilafat also held several local congresses in Bandung and Yogyakarta for indie Muslims to discuss the caliphate question in 1926s. Delegations were also sent to connect with Khilafat organization in India in 1927.33

In 1926, Abdul Wahab resigned from the chair because he felt unequally treated as a traditionalist. In the following years, he and several traditionalist Muslims established Komite Hijaz (Hijaz Committee) and an organization called the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The committee’s task was to call on Ibn Saud, the future King of Arabia, to consider the traditional Islamic schools of the four madhhab in his ruling, despite Ibn Saud being a modernist by following the teachings of Wahhabism. This new committee was a compensation of the actions Abdul Wahab did not get the chance to do at the old committee because the predominantly modernist Muslim committee limited his aspirations and choices. Same goes for the NU organization, it serves as a platform for traditionalist Muslims. Therefore, the NU’s founding father, Abdul Wahab, was ousted from the caliphate committee, but agreeing to be the vice-chairman in the first place shows his support to the caliphate and pan-Islamism through traditionalist way.34

None of the global Khilafat congresses bore any fruit to solve the caliphate question, evident by the fact that there is no caliphate established until today. The global Khilafat movement deteriorated following the Ottoman caliphate’s abolition in 1924. Despite the enthusiasm, Khilafat movements in East Indies and abroad lack political power and thus it ceased on its own by the end of 1920s. Differences and disputes between traditionalist and modernist Muslims, even among fellow modernist organizations bring about disunity among Indonesian Muslims. Sarekat Islam prohibited its members to affiliate with Muhammadiyah members and vice versa. Dispute also occurred between Sarekat Islam and Persatuan Islam, whilst the former avoided discussing religious controversies for the sake of unity, the latter insisted that those discussions are vital for Islamic reformation.35

In the end, some mainstream Islamic organizations, Muhammadiyah, al-Irsyad, and Persatuan Islam then shifted their attention from pan-Islamism to nationalism. When the former aimed for independence to form Islamic country based of Sharia law that can join the transnational caliphate project, the latter aimed for just independence from the colonials. Although brief, but the act of supporting caliphate and global pan-Islamism movement are deeply rooted within the Indonesian Muslim leaders’ deed in the history. Despite, in the past and present, major Islamic organizations in Indonesia still oppose each other in many different aspects, but once in the 1920s they decided to join global pan-Islamism movement to revive the caliphate that they joined in al-Islam congress, and ultimately Komite Khilafat.

4.2. The “Darul Islam”

Sarekat Islam, formerly Sarekat Dagang Islam, is a political party established in 1912 under H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto and his second-in-command Haji Agus Salim. First established to be a bridge between

34 Ismail, F. (2011).
Islam and socialism, but in early 1920s, Sarekat Islam ousted its hard line communist from its body and membership because of ongoing conflict of interest between the Islamic and communist members of the organization. Later in 1924, the party hosted al-Islam congress to rally support from East Indies’ Muslims and balance its political influence against the secular communist and nationalist parties.

After Komite Khilafat brief fiasco, Haji Agus Salim maintained the party’s core and purpose as religion and pan-Islamism. He did not seek to abandon the pan-Islamic cause (like other Islamic organizations). In 1927, Kartosuwiryo joined Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII). In several years after he arrived, he became the vice-president of the central board, journalist of the party’s newspaper Fadjar Asia, chairman of West Java counterpart, and secretary of the party’s executive board. Kartosuwiryo was dedicated to raising the issue on ‘political non-cooperation with the Dutch and the establishment of a state based on Islamic principles and jurisprudence’. He argued in pages of Fadjar Asia that Indonesian Muslims had to “wake up” and join PSII, because “our movement dedicates each and every bone of its body to pan-Islamisme.”

By 1930, the party has purged any remnants of socialism element and fully committed to pan-Islam. It added to its manifesto an article about “Unity in the Islamic Community” that Indonesian Muslims’ unity was a step towards national independence for unification of Islamic community across the world. Therefore, the party used pan-Islamism to ignite Islamic nationalism “as a step towards worldwide unification of the ummah.”

After the major split of its communist and Islamist wing in the 1920, the party split again shortly after Tjokroaminoto’s death in 1934. Confrontation between two prominent central board members, Agus Salim and Kartosuwiryo, over non-cooperation policy further divided the party. Kartosuwiryo had published writing about hijrah policy that mainly expressed his view on anti-colonialism infused with Islamic teachings. Agus Salim did not agree with Kartosuwiryo’s hijrah policy, stating that he wanted to avoid any confrontation with the colonial government. Agus Salim then left Sarekat Islam in 1936. The rest of the central board expelled Kartosuwiryo in 1937 because some of Islamic teachings in his writings were controversial.

Kartosuwiryo and his followers, typically Sarekat Islam’s West Java counterpart, split and became Komite Pertahanan Kebenaran-PSII (Committee for the Defense of the Truth, KPK-PSII). For the most part, Kartosuwiryo’s writing content had been persistent about pan-Islamism and implementing Sharia law. He added some points about PSII ultimate goal being darul Islam, meaning ‘abode of Islam’.

This goal further strengthened when the Japanese landed in the archipelago in 1942. The Japanese propaganda of building the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere through Hakko Ichiu (the world one house) and doenia baroe (new world) seen as a step closer to create Islamic state in East Asia. Kartosuwiryo interpreted these propaganda with his pan-Islam lens and encouraged all Muslims to support and cooperate with the Japanese because “the establishment of a Keloearga Asia Timoer-Ray (Greater East Asia Family) was to be pursued as the final step of the gradual Islamization of the whole

of society, a process that began with the family, and reached up to the neighborhood, the village, and the world.” He seemed uninterested with the fact that the Japanese and most of East Asian population did not follow Islamic religion per se. On June 22, 1945, just a couple of months leading up to Japan’s surrender to the Allies, the Panitia Sembilan (preparatory committee) drafted and signed the Jakarta Charter to be the basis of Indonesian constitution or Pancasila. After Sukarno forcefully declared independence on August 17, 1945, the Panitia Sembilan met up again to discuss about seven words “dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariah Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya” (with the obligation for its Muslim adherents to carry out Sharia) in the first principle of Jakarta Charter that may stir controversy between the diverse communities in Indonesia. Muhammad Hatta decided that only if the Charter did not show immoderate favor to one specific group that Indonesia would have the chance to truly unite and be independent.

The Jakarta Charter version, the one that included the seven words, did not make it to Indonesian constitution’s preamble. Sukarno appeased the Islamic nationalists by claiming that the constitution was “temporary”, “quick”, and only for the sake of the revolution (sementara, kilat, revolutiegroundwet). He also promised, “Later in the future [...] if we live in a safe and orderly state, we will gather once again the elected representatives of the people, who will enable us to make a more complete and perfect constitution.” Sukarno failed to follow-up to the “temporary” and “quick” element of the constitution. This would later grow to become one of the motives Kartosuwiryo to lead Darul Islam that declared Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia, NII) four years later, in 1949.

After the independence proclamation, still leading KPK-PSII in West Java, Kartosuwiryo was elected the executive committee of Masyumi in November 1945. Masyumi was a political party consisted of the union between major Islamic parties; NU, Muhammadiyah, and PSII were among all. The party sought the more dominant role of Muslim in the Republican administration in national level.

During the Independence War starting from 1945 against the Dutch, Islamic parties in Masyumi decided to release a decree of Resolusi Jihad (Holy War Resolution). Many Muslim youth joined Islamic paramilitary, the Hizbullah and Sabilillah, to take arms and fight against foreign presence. Hizbullah and Sabilillah were military training bodies for Muslim youths formed during the Japanese occupation as a subsidiary to Pembela Tanah Air (PETA). Finally, with the U.S. as mediator, the Dutch and Indonesian Republic reached consensus to sign Renville Agreement in 1948, thus the Republican administration along with Tentara Negara Indonesia (Indonesian Military, TNI) must remove itself from Dutch occupied territories.

Series of events over the course of 1948-1949; the Renville Agreement, the Dutch Aggression to Jogjakarta that led to Sukarno’s exile to Bangka, and the formation of Republik Indonesia Serikat (United States of Indonesia, RIS) as a result of Round Table Conference in Den Haag, became momentum for Kartosuwiryo and his followers in West Java to proclaim

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Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia, NII) in August 7, 1949. After several meetings in Cirebon and Tasikmalaya, Kartosuwiyo disbanded Masyumi’s West Java branch, merged Hizbullah and Sabilillah fighters in the area and made Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic Army of Indonesia, TII), and then declared some areas of West Java a territory of NII through jihad. This historical tragedy is known as the DI/TII (Darul Islam/ Tentara Islam Indonesia) rebellion.

In his manifesto, it was revealed that his vision of NII was not synonymous with a caliphate per se. If caliphate was a nation-state or kingdom that ruled over all ummah around the globe, Kartosuwiryo expected NII would be a Muslim nation-state based on Sharia law. Then as the next step, together with other Muslim nation-states, they would unite under an administrative body called Dewan Khalifatullah Fil’ardi (Council of the Representatives of God on Earth) which would be the caliphate central office. The form of the end-goal shifted from trans-nationalism to internationalism, from a single pan-Islamic borderless Islamic state to federation of Islamic nation-states. Therefore, when Indonesia and other Islamic nation-states have completed their independence, nation-states whom pledged allegiance with Dewan Khalifatullah Fil’ardi would be united with all ummah under the caliphate government.

Kartosuwiryo insisted that God had provided the means of DI/TII as a mandate for him to implement “God’s will on Earth”. He perceived himself the Khalifatullah dan Khalifatun Nabi (Representative of God and Representative of the Prophet). His leadership title was not synonymous with the Muslim caliph title. Rather his follower and he believed that he was given Wahyu Cakraningrat Sadar or a godly revelation that he was to bear a privilege to be the chosen caliph of Indonesia. Darul Islam continued its rebellion with its military wing TII in Java, Aceh, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan throughout 1950s. President Sukarno banned it for conducting rebellious and separatism activities in 1962.

Although ISIS seeks to take over Syrian President Assad’s rule and make the country a caliphate, they start by taking over cities and implement Sharia law in the domain. However, ISIS ideal caliphate does not need to undergo steps like Darul Islam, in which the Islamic nation-state must first be independent to be able to unite under a caliphate governmental body. ISIS’s idea of caliphate is realized by forming cells or get as many as Islamic organizations to pledge allegiance with it, and then the next step is to declare a territory, usually a city, as part of ISIS’s caliphate. Its nature is transnational, extending beyond borders with its headquarters in Iraq and Syria. So far, ISIS has declared territories of Iraqi’s Mosul, Ramadi, and Fallujah, and Raqqa, Syria, and the most recently Marawi, Southern Philippines.

Darul Islam spirit of jihadism and Islamic state of Indonesia still lives on until today. It embodied in Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) and JI, both groups are the new Darul Islam with slightly different priorities and strategies. Both are listed in the U.S.’ Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). As a former Darul Islam member say, “The Darul Islam is a house with many rooms, enough for all the factions.” For the government, Kartosuwiryo’s DI/TII movement is labeled as terrorism, but for some, Kartosuwiryo’s struggle made him hailed as a martyr.

who was brave enough and chosen by Allah to be the first to fight for change of the secular nature of Indonesia to be based on Islamic law.\textsuperscript{51}

4.3. The Resurgence of Islamist Right

There are currently two types of ummah in Indonesia. After the fall of Suharto’s dictatorial New Order era, in which any discussion about the country’s being and decision-making may cost the lives of those involved, the repressed Islamist movements and activism came back stronger and bolder than ever before. Presently, Indonesian ummah are split in two general categories: those who oppose the implementation of Sharia and those who are in favor for the implementation of Sharia. The first group views sharia as an instrument of division, between not only the Muslim and non-Muslim or kafir, but also between the various Muslim communities or ummah that holds various teachings and practices. A Muslim figure stands up as the pioneer of con-sharia implementation, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, the founder of Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islamic Network, JIL). He argues that not all Islamic law is made by Allah, “so that when it comes to human matters, religion is to be understood and formulated by human nature.”\textsuperscript{52}

Secular ummah opt Sharia law must only be implemented within the private sphere of family rule. In the society, every citizen and authority must respect all recognized religion and treat them equally. There are two types of con-Sharia ummah: first are those who are for total separation of religion and the state, and second are those moderate Muslims who only reject the legal implementation of Sharia in Indonesian constitution. The former appreciates religious diversity, so Islamic religious ego must be set aside for the good of the broader community, while the latter attempt to spread the universal value found in Islam to the ummah and create a positive image of tolerant Islam to the society. The biggest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, if not in the world, the NU and Muhammadiyah are examples of moderate Muslim in Indonesia.\textsuperscript{53}

The second category of ummah encompasses the pro-Sharia Islamist right, the ultimate version of this category is the Islamic extremists. These ummah strive for Sharia implementation at the fundamental governmental level. Pro-Sharia have the need to be treated special as the dominant population. Two types also divide this category, difference between the two is the immediacy. The “immediate” type are usually manifested in non-political Islamist organizations such as Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, FPI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), and government-listed ISIS-supporting groups such as; Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), Forum Aktivis Syariat Islam, Awhid wal Jihad, Forum Pendukung Daulah, Asybal Tauhid Indonesia, Mimbar Tauhid wal Jihad, Kongres Umat Islam Bekasi.\textsuperscript{54} These “immediate” pro-Sharia groups view Sharia as solution to Indonesian crisis. Without Sharia, crisis prevails without any effective solution. Usually they act violently towards the minorities and liberal Muslims. “They see Sharia as a kind of ‘generic medicine’ to cure all social, economic and political ills in the country.”\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{51} Formichi, C. (2010).

\textsuperscript{53} Machmudi, Y. (2008).
\textsuperscript{54} BNPT. (2016).
\textsuperscript{55} Machmudi, Y. (2008).
At least two of these organizations, HTI and FPI are openly supporting the establishment of *Khilafah Islamiyah* (Islamic caliphate) by casually teaching about it, spreading pamphlets in mosques all over Indonesia, holding monthly seminars and public forums. For those who want to know more may even find their websites or sermons posted in social media. They also organize student’s wing, usually famous within college students. HTI followers usually put up signs that say, “Caliphate and *jihad* is the answer” or “we need caliphate, not democracy and liberal capitalism” when holding a rally. While Hizbut Tahrir has been banned by the Indonesian government for not being in adherent with Pancasila and threatening the unity, FPI still enjoys its freedom to operate although ironically its *imam* (leader) Rizieq Shibab, has been accused for violating multiple clauses of Law No. 44 Year 2008 regarding Pornography.¹⁵⁶

Hizbut Tahrir, MMI, and Salafi groups aim to implement Sharia law through undemocratic means since they reject democracy. Judging from its website content, the Darul Islam-linked group, MMI, likely to spread xenophobic views about the growing Chinese communist ideology and U.S. incoming influence, especially when they just had been put in U.S.’ global terrorist list for alleged connection with al-Qaeda.¹⁵⁷ For FPI, HTI, and MMI, their goal is to establish caliphate through pan-Islamism ideology. In Detik News interview with FPI, their statement’s translation is the closest to: “Our goal is to unite. Then we will establish a caliphate, or OKI (*Organisasi Kerjasama Islam* or The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) we will turn into caliphate. Once the *ummah* unite, there will be no boundaries like Indonesia or Malaysia, we will all unite as one,” Said Awit Masyhuri, FPI central office’s Chief of Caliphate Establishment (*Ketua Bidang Penegakan Khilafah DPP FPI*).¹⁵⁸

The “non-immediate” pro-Sharia groups are those who engage themselves in political parties. They adjust themselves in politics, following Indonesian current constitution and do not reject democracy. They aim to implement Sharia through benign and legal ways, by democratic means in harmony with the constitution. Rather than antagonizing Pancasila as a *kafir* ideology, they seek to bring back the Pancasila in the Jakarta Charter signed draft, the one containing seven words about *ummah*’s privilege to implement Sharia. Islamic political parties, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP), *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* (PKS), *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB) are included in this category.¹⁵⁹

These local Islamist rightist strive and fight for their idealism to be realized in Indonesia. They attract the grassroots as well as the city people with global facts regarding the situation of *ummah* and why reaching the Caliphate state is important for all Muslims in Indonesia. These statements resonance well with Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi’s sermon when he proclaimed himself as caliph of the ISIS on July 2014, through a translation and discourse by Amaryllis Georges, and further categorized by Al-Chaidar.

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¹⁵⁶ Taylor, G. S. (2017, October 5).
Al-Chaidar stated that ISIS’s propaganda tool is by propagandizing people with three factors: theological, political, and global injustice.\(^6\) The first factor, ISIS radicalizes a subject with its own theological interpretation of Koran. For example (translation by Georges, part in bold taken directly from Koran)

[21] *By Allah, we will never be truthful as long as we do not sacrifice our lives and wealth in order to raise high the word of Allah and bring victory to the religion of Allah.*

[22] *Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed. [It is] a true promise [binding] upon Him in the Torah and the Gospel and the Qur’an. And who is truer to his covenant than Allah? So, rejoice in your transaction which you have contracted. And it is that which is the great triumph* [Al-Tawbah: 111].

[23] *So, take up arms, take up arms, O soldiers of the Islamic State! And fight, fight! Beware of being deluded and losing strength.*

[24] *Beware, for the dunyā (world) has come to you reluctantly, so kick it down, trample it, and leave it behind you. Indeed, what is with Allah is better and more lasting.*

Excerpt [21] is an introduction to the next excerpt. In excerpt [22], Al-Baghdadi quoted Surah Al-Tawbah 9 verse 111, which also mentions Torah and Gospel along with Qur’an. The citing of other Holy Books adds to Al-Baghdadi’s theological confidence in justifying his actions.\(^6\) Al-Baghdadi connects this verse with persuasion to “take up arms”, “fight”, “kick it down” in excerpt [23] and [24], however, according to Qur’an interpretation by local ulema (Islamic religious leader) Ahmad Hatta in his book *Tafsir Qur’an Per Kata* or “Qur’an interpretation word-by-word”.

Surah Al-Tawbah 9 verse 111 does not have any violent elements at all. In the interpretation, Ahmad Hatta expresses that the verse is about religious duties, such as avoiding idolatry, “guarding the Prophet as one guard themselves”, and in exchange of obedience, one receives Paradise. No hint of violence in Ahmad Hatta’s interpretation as opposed to Al-Baghdadi’s sermon. Thus, Al-Baghdadi manipulated verses from the Qur’an to achieve his own political agenda.

Secondly is the political factor. Al-Chaidar stated that ISIS expresses that Muslims around the world are facing a moral torment by adhering to democracy as a political system. Also, they insist that Western Democracy and other ideologies do not solve the crisis of poverty, economic inequality, and lack of education.\(^6\) For this issue, Al-Baghdadi preached:

[34] *O ummah of Islam, indeed the world today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kafir (disbeliever) [...] being led by America and Russia and being mobilized by the Jews. Indeed, the Muslims were defeated after the fall of their khilafah (caliphate). Then their state ceased to exist, so the disbelievers were able to weaken and humiliate the Muslims, dominate them in every region, plunder their wealth and resources, and rob them of their rights. They accomplished this by attacking and occupying their lands, placing their treacherous agents in power to rule the Muslims with an iron fist, and spreading dazzling and deceptive slogans such as: civilization, peace, co-existence, freedom, democracy, secularism, Baathism, nationalism, and patriotism, among other false slogans.*

In excerpt [34], he insisted that there are only two options; Islam and kafir. Since the Caliphate is abolished, Muslims are forced to conform to the ways of the disbelievers, or forced to be kafir. Moreover the kafir also “plunder their wealth and resources, and rob them of their rights”. Al-Baghdadi also demonizes slogans such as

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“civilization, peace, co-existence, freedom, democracy, secularism, Baathism, nationalism, and patriotism” making a point that Muslims these days fancy made up man-made laws over Sharia law.63

The last is global injustice; Al-Chaidar stated that Muslims all over the world are threatened and persecuted. They are suffering in Burma, Palestine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and so on. Muslims put themselves as a victim of global oppression in the hands of the kafir. They are unable to stand up for themselves because the caliphate that ought to protect the ummah are long gone.64 For this factor, Al-Baghdadi claims:

[35] Those rulers continue striving to enslave the Muslims, pulling them away from their religion with those slogans. So either the Muslim pulls away from his religion, disbelieves in Allah, and disgracefully submits to the manmade shirk (polytheistic) laws of the east and west, living despicably and disgracefully as a follower, by repeating those slogans without will and honor, or he lives persecuted, targeted, and expelled, to end up being killed, imprisoned, or terribly tortured, on the accusation of terrorism. Because terrorism is to disbelieve in those slogans and to believe in Allah. [...].

[36] But terrorism does not include the killing of Muslims in Burma and the burning of their homes. Terrorism does not include the dismembering and disemboweling of the Muslims in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Kashmir. Terrorism does not include the killing of Muslims in the Caucasus and expelling them from their lands. Terrorism does not include making mass graves for the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the slaughter of their children. Terrorism does not include the destruction of Muslims’ homes in Palestine, the seizing of their lands, and the violation and desecration of their sanctuaries and families.

[37] Terrorism does not include the burning of masājid (mosque) in Egypt, the destruction of the Muslims’ homes there, the rape of their chaste women, and the oppression of the mujahidin (jihadist) in the Sinai Peninsula and elsewhere.

[38] Terrorism does not include the extreme torture and degradation of Muslims in East Turkistan and Iran [by the rāfidah], as well as preventing them from receiving their most basic rights. Terrorism does not include the filling of prisons everywhere with Muslim captives. Terrorism does not include the waging of war against chastity and hijab (Muslim women’s clothing) in France and Tunis. It does not include the propagation of betrayal, prostitution, and adultery.

[39] Terrorism does not include the insulting of the Lord of Mightiness, the cursing of the religion, and the mockery of our Prophet (peace be upon him). Terrorism does not include the slaughtering of Muslims in Central Africa like sheep, while no one weeps for them and denounces their slaughter.

[40] All this is not terrorism. Rather it is freedom, democracy, peace, security, and tolerance! Sufficient for us is Allah, and He is the best Disposer of affairs.

[41] [And they resented them not except because they believed in Allah, the Exalted in Might, the Praiseworthy] [Al-Burūj: 8].

In excerpt [35], he reinstated what he said in previous excerpts about Muslim conforming to the ways of the disbelievers or else they will be “persecuted, targeted, and expelled, to end up being killed, imprisoned, or terribly tortured, on the accusation of terrorism...,” which leads to him listing historical events of Muslims being persecuted because they choose to believe in Allah, rather than man-made slogans. In excerpt [36] to [41], Al-Baghdadi pointed out many examples of what constitute of terrorism and what constitute as “freedom, democracy, peace, security, and tolerance”. He explained the definition of terrorism with irony of Muslim killings all over the worlds, including Indonesia, to point out that terrorism is actually a defense mechanism to protect fellow oppressed Muslim brothers and sisters. The Koran verse serves as a cherry-
on-top to convince *ummah* that Muslims, in order to survive, are being antagonized by the *kafir* for believing in and submitting to Allah.\(^{65}\)

Based on interview with INTERPOL, these propaganda tools have been openly taught in sermons all over Indonesia by homegrown Islamist rightist. According to JIL founder, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, NU and Muhammadiyah moderate Islam influence are losing against far-right Islamist organization like FPI, HTI, and Salafi groups. These far-right organizations are penetrating well socially using NU and Muhammadiyah affiliated mosques, spreading rightist views and teachings. These sermons may lead to extremism.\(^{66}\)

The sermon spread by these far rights contains the reasons Sharia is the best way to achieve better living in this Muslim predominated country. The police are aware about these “extremism seed” sermons, but they do not exert the power to intercept because, as mentioned, when someone is radical, it is acceptable because s/he are merely adopting to a certain opinion, and having an opinion does not harm the society. Moreover, what is merely on the mind does not break the law, and exerting authority over Islamic sermon will bring about negative label towards the police as the authority figure that they conspire against the freedom of religion.

In HTI’s case, their sermon are directed towards the the middle-lower class, giving them answer that capitalism is to blame for poverty and inequality, democracy is un-Islamic, etc. During ethnic Chinese Christian Jakarta’s Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) second-term campaign days, FPI was among the loudest to convince *ummah* in Jakarta that Muslims must not be led by *kafir*. For the middle-lower class, these groups use economic inequality as a fuel to strengthen stigma that the ethnic Chinese are greedy, elitist, and “trying to invade the country” (seldom added with conspiracy theory that the atheistic Chinese-affiliated communist party is roaming around and threatening the Muslim community), so a Muslim is not supposed to elect a Chinese as a governor.\(^{67}\)

Hence these groups, along with *Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (GNPF MUI) led by Bahtiar Nasir, arranged multiple colossal demonstration in Jakarta, mobilizing thousands from other cities and rural areas, to persecute Ahok when he was alleged blasphemy for his speech in Kepulauan Seribu.\(^{68}\)

So apparently, these groups are successful at influencing *ummah* in rural areas and many cities other than Jakarta.

In May 2017, during a parade to welcome Muslim Ramadan month, a video of hundreds of Indonesian Muslim children sang the words “kill Ahok, kill Ahok!” with the melody from a local child song *Menanam Jagung di Kebun Kita* gone viral in social media. The singing was similar to the singing Rizieq Shibab initiated during the multiple demonstrations. Many express their concern to Indonesian youth generation that has been influence with rather extremist ideologie.\(^{69}\)

In conclusion, besides having deep influence in rural areas and many big cities, Islamist rightist groups are successful in influencing *ummah* from various

\(^{65}\) Georges, A. M. (2016).


\(^{67}\) Handayani, M. S. (2017, September 21).


4.4. The Spread of Wahhabism & Salafism

The turmoil between the earliest Muslim organizations in Indonesia was mainly caused by the different role between the Muslim prominent figures. While some group, the modernist Muslims, decided to bring about Islamic reform in Indonesia, the rest decided to stay on the traditional Islam that has been practiced hereditarily. These modernist Muslims are inspired by the Islamic teaching of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia and the Salafist movement in Egypt. The term ‘Wahhabism’ and ‘Salafism’ have been used interchangeably to refer to Sunni Islamic reform of returning to the pure ways of Islam. The characteristics of these puritanical and radical reforms are denying superstitious practices in Islam, such as praying to the spirit of ancestors, idolatry, praying to tombs (ziarah), blending local cultural or religion practices to Islam, also denying the teachings of saints and secondhand Koran interpretations by ulama, and the act of praying to Allah through a medium.\(^{70}\)

During his life, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) would urge his followers, the Wahhabi, to deny deviant practices of Islam that was not in line with the Koran and hadith. This radical movement was openly accepted by the House of Saud and later become the official Islamic religion of Saudi Arabia. Salafism occurred a century later when Muhammad ‘Abduh (d. 1905) in Egypt revived al-Wahhab’s teaching by promoting a reformist movement to go back to the fundamental teachings and return to pure Islam. The latter movement is distinguished from the former by adding to its modern Islamic approach to reject Western influences and scientific rationalization.\(^{71}\)

The roots of the Islamic school of Wahhabism and Salafism in Indonesia can be traced back in 1800 when Islamic scholars from Mecca and Cairo arrived back home at Sumatra and Java. These scholars started modernist movement as mentioned earlier. The earliest Islamic organizations in Dutch East Indies such as Muhammadiyah, Sarekat Islam, al-Itsyad, and Persatuan Islam were products of these Islamic reformations in the archipelago. Though later these organizations deny being synonymous with Wahhabism, but their continuous confrontation with NU as traditionalist Muslims show their disagreement of traditionalist’s teachings which accept assimilation to outside influence, like culture and mysticism.\(^{72}\)

In the present, Indonesian government maintains good relations with Saudi Arabia. One of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policies is global campaign for the Wahhabization of the ummah. This ambition was brought up under the context of Arab Cold War, “when Saudi Arabia tried hard to reinforce its position as the center of the Muslim world following the fading influence of Arab Socialist Nationalism developed by Gamal Abdul Nasser in post-Arab Israel War of 1967.” The skyrocketing oil prices in 1970s gave positive impact to Saudi Arabia’s economy, enabling it to fund its ambition reaching countries even further on the map. This way Wahhabism ideology reached ummah from other countries. This ambition later intensified when Ayatollah Khomeini brought down Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah and monarch of Iran, who

\(^{70}\) Ismail, F. (2011).

\(^{71}\) Ismail, F. (2011).

\(^{72}\) Ismail, F. (2011).
at that time showed tendency to “a pro-Western foreign policy.”

Indonesia becomes Saudi Arabia’s special interest for its strategic territory and being the country with most Muslim population. Saudi Arabia sponsors Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) est. 1967 and the Jakarta-based College for the Study of Islam and Arabic (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab, LIPIA) est. 1980. DDII funds the building of thousands of madrasas and mosques and provide scholarship for Indonesian youth to Middle Eastern universities. As an international branch of Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Riyadh, LIPIA intensifies Saudi’s campaign by also providing scholarship to thousands Indonesian Muslim youth and madrasa graduates. “Despite LIPIA’s curricula and teaching materials imbued with Saudi anti-pluralistic Wahhabi ideology and political propaganda, the Indonesian government allowed the institution to operate as it is seen as helping Indonesia to solidify its bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia.”

The allowing of Wahhabization campaign by the Indonesian government either directly and indirectly resulting in the establishment of several paramilitary groups, in which some affiliate with violent jihadism activities (Hasan, 2017).

a. Laskar Pembela Islam (Defenders of Islam Force)

Laskar Pembela Islam is a paramilitary wing of FPI, founded by Rizieq Shibab, a graduate of LIPIA and Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University in Riyadh. Though not directly associating to Salafism or Wahhabism, but it does act based on similar anti-Western & anti-pluralistic ideology, noting the fact that its founder and imam is a LIPIA and Imam Muhammad Ibn Saud University graduate, both institutes incorporate its curricula with Wahhabi ideologies. This group is known for its raids to Western associated places such as cafes, discotheques, bars, casinos, and brothels. Laskar Pembela Islam still operates until now.

b. Laskar Jihad (Holy War Force)

Several men who identify as Salafist initiated Laskar Jihad, the leading figure, Ja’far bin Umar Thalib, is a scholar from LIPIA and Islamic Mawdudi Institute in Pakistan. During his stay in Pakistan in mid-1980s, he had the opportunity to visit Afghanistan and had notable experience in his encounter with Afghanistan mujahidin whom at that time was in a war against the Soviet. This group’s notable success to dispatch paramilitary aid to the conflict in Moluccas (Maluku) in 2002 was fueled with the spirit of jihad. They used jihad as an excuse “for Muslims to protect their Muslim brothers from the attacks of belligerent infidels”. Umar Thalib disbanded Laskar Jihad in 2003.

c. Laskar Mujahidin (Indonesian Holy Warriors Force)

Under the umbrella of MMI, they associate with Salafi-Jihadism. During the Molucca conflict, they mobilized paramilitary aid along with Laskar Jihad. However, when Laskar Jihad deed was about

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protecting, *Laskar Mujahidin* took a hardline turn by stating that Moluccas jihad is “just a preliminary action in a greater jihad against enemies attacking Muslims all over the world.” As quoted from Hasan’s study, “*Laskar Mujahidin*’s successful operations in Ambon convinced JI to strengthen their foothold in Indonesia.” JI has been the loyal offshoot of al-Qaeda. For its cause, JI is believed to be the most ambitious to promote and disseminate Salafi-Jihadism in Indonesia and broader Southeast Asia. *Laskar Mujahidin* still operates in the present.  

Al-Qaeda’s leader Al-Zawahiri’s, decision to cut off ISIS from al-Qaeda body in 2014 is a proof that ISIS holds its own agenda different from al-Qaeda’s vision and mission. As mentioned, al-Qaeda’s main objective is to topple Bashar al-Assad and maintain peaceful relations with other rebels, whilst ISIS kidnapped other rebels, openly killing other rebel’s leaders, and focusing more on seeking the control over Syrian territories. Al-Chaidar explained this phenomenon by saying that ISIS follows Salafi-Takfirism, or purification of Islam by pointing fingers to individuals who do not follow ISIS’s interpretation of Salafi as unbeliever or *kafir* and treating them as rightful enemies.  

In Indonesia, Wahhabism and Salafism are legal and being taught in various *madrasa* (Islamic school). In Wahhabi ideology, there is a cosmography of *darul Islam* (Islamic state) and *darul kafir* (disbeliever state). Whoever does not come from *darul Islam* must be battled. This ideology and movement may lead to extremism. Although Noorhaidi Hasan argued that Wahhabi campaign is a failure in Indonesia, but the rise of Salafi groups with anti-Western sentiments argue otherwise.

### 4.5. The Millennial Generation

Ulil Abshar-Abdalla also mentions the problem with individualism, especially in the cities. Muslim youth who feel separated from social networking in the...
cities may seek the feeling of acceptance and security within communities. Usually religious community is the best facilitator for troubled and alienated youth. With the ever-increasing youth Islamist right activities in big cities, Muslim youth may seek acceptance and security from those communities. Moreover, they may be susceptible to extremist and radical views of Islam given and gain the will to contribute more to their religion by acting violently towards minorities and Western affiliated objects the way Islamist rightist do. Ulil emphasizes the possibility of ISIS radicalization from this problem. He said the youth may resort to drugs, alcohol, and nightlife but also to radical ideologies.

Another problem that may push the millennials away from the spirit of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Unity in Diversity) is the low level of tolerance in cities. According to recent findings by Setara Institute, cities such as Jakarta, Banda Aceh, Bogor, Cilegon, Depok, and Jogjakarta score the lowest in Tolerant City Index 2017. The research was brought to 94 out of 98 cities in Indonesia, acknowledging the heterogeneity degree in cities than in regency (kabupaten). Setara Institute’s tolerance level research uncovers that the bigger populated cities have tendency to be more intolerant than the less populated cities.83

With ISIS sophisticated campaign on social media that appeals to youngsters, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla is not the only person who is concerned with youth tendencies and radicalism. Lisa Blaker, from her study about “ISIS use of social media”, dictated several reasons why ISIS is appealing to Western youngsters. First, “ISIS typically preys on Western youth who are disillusioned and have no sense of purpose or belonging.”84 Just like what Ulil Abshar-Abdalla suggested earlier about individualism and communities, from Islamist right communities, Indonesian Muslim youth may be lured to get involved in the bigger picture of caliphate that has been successful in terrorizing the Western to have even bigger sense of purpose. The sermons delivered by Al-Baghdadi suggest that Muslims “should take up arms and fight against the kafir oppressors”. Where Islamist right communities are not enough to channel anger towards the kafir oppressors, Muslim youth may look for the more extreme and radical groups, that may be ISIS. They may travel to Syria and Iraq or join their network in Indonesia.85

Aside from this, ISIS also operates a sophisticated propaganda machine targeting the Muslim youth specifically. With Hollywood-level propaganda videos with animation, catchy music, and exciting scenes and their easy-to-reach tactic in social media as explained in the previous chapter, ISIS may be the best choice for Muslim youth who have been exposed to radicalization whether online or in real life. The last is “a sense of religious obligation”86 ISIS, through its sermon and internet propaganda use verses from the Koran, as if Allah orders their actions or they may go to hell dishonorably as a Muslim. It is written in the Koran to “fight in the cause of Allah”, ISIS uses the verse as a justification for their


killings and beheadings. Muslim youth may be misguided by the extreme interpretation of the Koran and radicalized. According to INTERPOL, in the deradicalization prison where many homegrown Islamic extremist are jailed, these extremist use verses from the Koran, hadith, and sunnah to justify their actions when interviewed. However, the verses are taken out of context or are in fragments, ignoring the whole verse and the actual messages. Therefore, Muslim youth may believe in ISIS propaganda using the Holy Koran.

4.6. ISIS Targets Southeast Asia

ISIS’s recent loss of their main fronts in Raqqa and Mosul may not signal the death of ISIS. With the headquarters loss, ISIS FTF from Southeast Asian countries may come back, especially when Indonesia deny the condemnation of FTF for humanitarian issues. At home, INTERPOL and Indonesia Police Intelligence Agency said that the authority closely monitors them, however they may still be able to radicalize others while orchestrating a terrorist attack now that they have received training and networks from experienced jihadist in Syria and Iraq. Self-radicalized lone wolves can be inspired to contribute by mounting attacks, although rare, but their attacks are unpredictable and deadly. A report by Jasminder Singh and Muhammad Haziq Jani claim that ISIS defeat in its headquarters may trigger ISIS homegrown counterparts in Southeast Asia, pre-existing Islamic extremist groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS, to open up new fronts in the region since the global jihad are no longer focused on its beacon Syria and Iraq.

Three months after the report was released, ISIS-linked Southeast Asian groups Abu Sayaff (led by Isnilon Hapilon) and Omar Maute group declared a caliphate at Marawi, Southern Philippines on May 2017. Noting the fact that ISIS has been telling its sympathizers in Southeast Asia through a propaganda video released in June 2016 that for those who wished to join ISIS, if they could not travel to Syria and Iraq, they could go to Moro people in Mindanao, Southern Philippines. During the course of 2017, ISIS has been silent in Indonesia. The biggest attack claimed by ISIS is the Kampung Melayu suicide bombing that left at least five dead and ten wounded dating one day after ISIS claimed Marawi. A report by Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium (TRAC) explains the phenomenon that, “The [ISIS] narrative for Indonesians was to do hijrah in the Philippines, not commit attacks at home.”

Since ISIS agenda is to expand its caliphate

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by taking over cities, not conduct terrorism per se.

Since Marawi, the Philippines became the third country with most ISIS-claimed attack besides Iraq & Syria. TRAC reports reveal that ISIS central body provided money, tactics, and fighters for ISIS-pledged groups in Marawi. Marawi became an option for ISIS global fighters if Middle Eastern fronts are too far away. “Therefore, Marawi was at once a testament to the power of the ISIS global communications network in its own right, and at the same time, a prime example of ISIS dependence on local groups and conditions,” the TRAC report reads.

President Duterte declared the liberation of Marawi on October 23, 2017. Future ISIS beacon in Southeast Asia or elsewhere depends on the ummah in the region. Whether local ummah are comfortable under the ruling government or oppose the government using Islamist right ideologies that can evolve into extremism, especially when the government ignore ummah’s aspiration, the way Islamic extremist captured a town in pre-dominated Catholic country, the Philippines, and left over 1000 dead.

Marawi is not the first time Southeast Asia gains the spotlight as a notable actor in ISIS global caliphate jihad. Southeast Asian exclusive wing operating in Iraq & Syria directly under ISIS, the Katibah Nusantara, becomes an evidence for Southeast Asia’s distinctive importance in ISIS agenda. About 30 pre-existing Islamic extremist groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS signals the growing enthusiasm towards the global caliphate in the region. It makes the region arise as the second most important front for ISIS and influence ISIS’s decision-making. Indonesia as the hegemony in the region with most Muslim population plays important role in Katibah Nusantara. The group’s deceased Emir (leader) Bahrumsyah was an Indonesian. Bahrun Naim, the man behind Jakarta 2016 attack is also a significant member of the wing.

Katibah Nusantara has contributed to ISIS by providing translation for Dabiq magazine and making propaganda videos in Malayan/Indonesian language. Its fighting capability should not be underestimated, its major combat success in April 2015 when the Southeast Asian wing captured five Kurd-held territories in Syria signals the group’s considerable fighting skill beyond any doubt.

5. Analysis

Christian Reus-Smit, regarding constructivism, viewing of the origin of actor’s interest mentions, “Instead of treating actors’ interests as exogenously determined, as given prior to social interaction, constructivists treat interests as endogenous to such interaction, as a consequence of identity acquisition, as learned through processes of communication, reflection on experience, and role enactment.” Focusing on the identity acquisition through processes of reflection on experience, the ideas of caliphate and jihadism are constructed deep within Indonesian history, thus among ummah in the present.

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Since Muslim merchants under Abbasid Dynasty spread Islamic religion to Nusantara, Muslims in Indonesia maintain fair relations with the caliphate in the Middle East. As long as the caliphate still reigns, Muslim everywhere has a beacon to look up to, a caliph as successor of the deceased Prophet Muhammad. Sultans in Nusantara, as kings who ruled Muslim kingdoms, respected the caliph as leader of all Muslims. Many Sultans in Nusantara got their titles directly from Sharif of Mecca on behalf of Ottoman Empire. Since Islam religion was perceived positively, it becomes the dominant religion in Nusantara until now. When the Ottoman Empire deteriorated, Islamic organizations in Dutch East Indies gathered to establish caliphate committee in 1924. After some years, the ideas of caliphate and pan-Islamism were abandoned in Dutch East Indies and all over the world. Nation-states are now sovereign, secular doctrines trump religious ideologies. Kemal Ataturk’s secular state ousted the last Ottoman caliph out of the newly adopted Western-style republican country.

The caliphate vanished altogether. This sparked a lot of disagreement within ummah who needs a leading figure, a successor of Prophet Muhammad. However, in order to bring about an Islamic state, there must be a territory, people, and sovereignty to fulfill the requirement of a “state”. Kartosuwiryo saw his chances in the volatile newly established Indonesia nation-state.

Kartosuwiryo established Darul Islam with its army wing, TII, and carried out DI/TII rebellion to proclaim NII. After the rebellion’s repressed, the remnants are still in the move until now. JI and MMI are still trying to proclaim caliphate in Indonesia. JI - thanks to Laskar Mujahidin that convinced it to have bolder impact in Indonesia - uses terrorism tactics such as bombings to various places across the country. JI has declared its link to al-Qaeda. Whilst MMI has been put in the U.S.’ SDGT list for alleged connection with the jihadist organization that once the umbrella organization of ISIS.

MMI, along with FPI, HTI, and Salafi groups are openly promoting jihadism, caliphate, and hate towards democracy, anti-pluralism, and anti-Western views to Muslims all around Indonesia from different backgrounds and ages. Along with Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabization campaign that opens up the gate to Salafi movements and several LIPIA graduates who in turn establish Laskar Pembela Islam and the now-disbanded Laskar Jihad, which is known for resorting violence towards things considered un-Islamic. The moderate Muslims organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah have been idle concerning these matters, except when they supported the government’s decision to disband HTI.

Though not all Indonesians support the establishment ISIS as new caliphate, but ISIS in its glory days had a territory as big as Britain, with ten to twelve million people under its control. It had approximately 200,000 jihadists from five continents and sophisticated social media campaign available in various languages designed to attract the millennial.\textsuperscript{98} Given millennial grow up with the internet and 132.7 million Indonesians from any age and any location via any device use the internet mainly for social media.\textsuperscript{99} Also noting the fact that the alienated youth in society of increasing individualism may fall back to radical


ideologies, the millennial may be more attracted in joining ISIS or ISIS-affiliate groups nearby if their identities are constructed in way that their interest is to join a jihadist struggle, thereby becoming a terrorist.

ISIS also seems to target Southeast Asia in particular. Its exported siege in Marawi was due to the group’s effective globalization and local ISIS-pledge groups being proactive. Considering Southeast Asia has a long history with generations of Islamic extremists, it is indeed a convenient region to focus on. These Islamic extremists or radicalized Indonesians are also eager to contribute to ISIS. Many have fled their countries to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Seeing the flourishing amount of Southeast Asian FTF, ISIS approved the establishment of Katibah Nusantara, an exclusive Malayan-speaking Southeast Asian wing under ISIS central command body.

Therefore, Indonesians are prone to ISIS radicalization because Indonesia, as a member of the world society, are allowing extreme Islamist right, as exogenous influence, to communicate their views about caliphate, using theological, political, and global injustice approach, and bringing people along to support their cause. With the Indonesian history regarding caliphate from the era of kingdoms to Darul Islam movement, and the unfinished debates of the first principle of Pancasila as reflection on experience, it may rationalize the present emergence of caliphate establishment and ignite the feeling of comradeship that some Indonesians have been in the same struggle for caliphate. Ergo, these construct Indonesians’ endogenous identities to accept the new caliphate establishment, ISIS, though it is no more than a terrorist group.

In the end, many questions ISIS’s legitimacy as a caliphate, since its violence is rampant and barbaric, as opposed to core Islamic values of love and peace. A caliphate should be able to protect the minority and not force them to convert to Islam, and its purpose is to spread the Islamic religion. In turn, ISIS action has stained public perception of Islam as a religion, further igniting widespread Islamophobia around the globe.

6. Conclusion

As mentioned, there are two classifications to the reason Indonesians support ISIS, the push and the pull. Push factors includes historical accounts; the Indonesian ummah and the Khilafah and the Darul Islam, and the Resurgence of Islamist Right. Push factors comes endogenously. In the case of supporting ISIS, historical accounts and current social phenomenon in Indonesian are important to consider the push to join the notorious terrorist group. On the other hand, pull factors comes exogenously. The influence from other countries, ISIS’s campaign that appeals to the Millennial, and ISIS’s focus on Southeast Asia are important factors that pull Indonesians to support ISIS.

History of the Indonesian ummah and the Khilafah is a push factor for Indonesian to support ISIS. The historical evidence leading to the theory that Islamization in Indonesia was done during Rashidun era in the 6th century, and again during Abbasid era in the 11th century, also evidence of Indonesian sultanate’s connection with the caliphate, these accounts may be used by ISIS sympathizers who wants to radicalize an Indonesian as a sentiment towards the empty status of the caliphate today. The fact that modernist Muslim introduced the earliest Islamic

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100 Talabong, R. (2017, October 25).
organizations that still exist until today, inspired by the puritanical Wahhabi movement, may also be used by ISIS sympathizers to persuade Indonesian ummah to go back to the purest form of Islam, carrying the spirit of the Islamic leaders of old but with new facts, and denounce everything else to follow ISIS. Lastly, the unresolved caliphate question that the Islamic leaders of old tried to answer in Komite Khilafat, now that ISIS claimed itself a caliphate, they may present themselves as the answer for the lost Islamic leadership successor.

With the Darul Islam case, one of the reasons Kartosuwiryo carried his pan-Islamism vision so far as to declare NII, is the final version of Jakarta Charter or Pancasila, which did not favor Islamic groups as initially planned with the seven words. As mentioned, the spirit of Darul Islam lives on, embodied within other Islamic extremist groups with ties to al-Qaeda and ISIS. Sukarno promised that when the political situation among groups within newly independent Indonesia is averted, he would bring back the seven words. The promise never delivered. Now, ISIS sympathizers may use this fact to rationalize their way of thinking using the conflict of the first principle in Pancasila, that it should show favoritism to the ummah. Then when the fact did not turn out that way, it becomes the reason many Islamic groups retaliate against the government because the government discriminates against the Muslim since day one. They can also use this historical account to incite the feeling of brotherhood, that the struggle have been fought before, and is being fought now to defend Islam. Moreover, since this case is included in school history textbook, one can find out about the rest through the Internet and become radicalized online. Masyumi’s Resolusi Jihad may also be used as an example that it used to be legal to use violence under the flag of Islam to fight against the colonials for the means of independence, but now that the government does not give the Muslim their independence to live under Sharia law, the government becomes the target.

In the resurgence of Islamist Right, groups like FPI, HTI, and MMI are using the propaganda factors to preach about the importance of bringing about caliphate in Indonesia. Since the moderate Islam, NU and Muhammadiyah’s, influence are losing against far-right Islamist organization like FPI, HTI, and Salafi groups that spread rightist views and teachings, they are successful in influencing ummah from various background and ages, including young children. This phenomenon may lead Indonesians to the road of extremism, and ultimately support for ISIS.

On the other hand, pull factors for supporting ISIS are all obvious. In the spread of Wahhabism and Salafism, the government’s acceptance of financial aid from Saudi Arabia hints a few bad side of the result, the graduates of LIPIA and the spread of Wahhabi anti-Pluralistic teaching. When exposed to the teaching, an Indonesian may find that it is in line with ISIS’s ideology, thus they may be radicalized to join them. The individualistic nature in the city and sophisticated ISIS campaign from social media may attract millennial to join the cause. Lastly, ISIS’s interest in making Southeast Asia their second front, and the exclusive Malayan facility inside ISIS’s organizational wing makes it easier for them to lure Indonesian to recognize ISIS as a caliphate.

Constructivism plays part on the identity building through history and communication. ISIS’s influence, particularly towards millennial in Southeast Asia, become endogenous when exposed to an Indonesian, because of historical accounts linking the ummah in the country.
and the caliphate succession, the conflict of interest with the country’s Pancasila, and the activism of Islamic Rightist to implement Sharia law and build a caliphate within Indonesia.
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