

# INDIA-JAPAN MARITIME SECURITY COOPERATION IN INDO-PACIFIC: CREATING A MARITIME POWER NEXUS IN BALANCING CHINA (2012-2017)

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## ABSTRACT

Di abad ke-21, keadaan keamanan Indo-Pasifik mengalami perubahan yang pesat, terutama dikarenakan oleh ekspansi maritim China dan melemahnya pengaruh Amerika Serikat di kawasan. Meresponi situasi ini, India dan Jepang sebagai kekuatan kawasan memutuskan untuk bekerja sama. Berdasarkan pidato Perdana Menteri Shinzo Abe pada 2007, India dan Jepang memiliki titik temu di bidang keamanan maritim. Mengikuti kembali berkuasanya Perdana Menteri Shinzo Abe pada 2012, Jepang telah memperluas lingkup keamannya di mana Jepang memandang pentingnya India sebagai mitra keamanan. Sementara itu, kebijakan ‘Act East’ Perdana Menteri Narendra Modi telah mendorong India untuk mengambil peran yang lebih proaktif ke kawasan bagian timur, termasuk Jepang. India dan Jepang kemudian menyelaraskan kebijakan strategis mereka untuk memperkuat kerja sama maritim. Artikel ini menjelaskan implementasi kerja sama maritim India-Jepang dalam menyeimbangkan China di Indo-Pasifik.

**Keywords:** Maritime security, Maritime security cooperation, India-Japan relations, Indo-Pacific security environment, China’s threat

Geopolitics is often being used to define particular issue in International Relations. The political practice of a state over a territory has become one of the most important aspects in determining the current situation on international politics.<sup>1</sup> Region with strategic location tend to be contested with state actors in order to achieve their national interests. States with geographical advantage will often influence – or included – in the strategic thinking of other states. Meanwhile superpower states in the region will have significant importance to the regional geopolitics.<sup>2</sup> The strategic importance of a region will then result in how state actors plan their territorial

strategies which result to the dynamics of geopolitics.<sup>3</sup>



Figure 1 Map of Indo-Pacific

In the 21st century, many nation states have shifted its attention towards Indo-Pacific.<sup>4</sup> The region sits at the intersection of major international shipping lines and is contested with prominent state

<sup>1</sup> Fox, William. (1985). *Geopolitics and international relations*. In C. E. Zоргbibe, *on geopolitics: classical and nuclear* (pp. 15-44). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

<sup>2</sup> Zoppo, Ciro E.. (1985). *Classical geopolitics and beyond*. In C. E. Zоргbibe, *on geopolitics: classical and nuclear* (pp. 1-14). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

<sup>3</sup> Schlovin, Soren. (2016). *Geopolitics: an overview of concepts and empirical examples from international relations*. *FIIA Working Paper*, 5-7.

<sup>4</sup> Medcalf, Rory. (2013). *The indo-pacific: what's in a name?* *The American Interest*, pg. 58-66.

actors such as China, US, India, Japan, Australia and the ASEAN member states. Within this situation, the geopolitics of Indo-Pacific has become very complex, especially under the notion of power competition between China and the US. China's rise and maritime expansion have urged the US to reengage its Indo-Pacific partners, which then led China to expand its influence even more. Other regional states that are concerned with China's growing influence and perceived the decline of US' power in the region, then seek to comply to China or to increase their power to balance China.

The most notable states affected by China-US competition are India and Japan. The two states are concerned on China's expanding presence and are in close cooperation with the US. However in regards to the shift of balance of power in Indo-Pacific, India and Japan have sought to be less interdependent with US and thus increased their own capability. As maritime nations, the two states prioritized to increase their maritime security operations in the region to preserve the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) for achieving their national interests. In 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered a speech entitled "Confluence of the Two Seas" at the Indian Parliament that highlighted how India and Japan have a converging maritime security perspective in Indo-Pacific.<sup>5</sup> This speech would later become the foundation of India-Japan maritime security cooperation. Concerns on China's expanding maritime presence and commonalities in maritime security have then reinforced the maritime

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<sup>5</sup> Abe, Shinzo. Confluence of the two seas. *Speech by H.E.Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.* August 22, 2007. Accessed October 16, 2017. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html>.

security cooperation between India and Japan.

### **Maritime Security Cooperation as a Balancing Act**

In order to further understand this research, the author tries to explain the theory in the topic discussed. The first one is Neorealism. According to Kenneth Waltz, Neorealism or Structural Realism believes that international politics is depicted by an anarchic structural system where nation states are seen as individual actor seeking for survival.<sup>6</sup> There are three systems in Neorealism: unipolarity where there is only one superpower states, bipolarity where two superpower states competing for hegemony, and multipolarity where there are more than two states competing for power.<sup>7</sup>

Further, Waltz explains that the power relations in international system is defined by the concept of Balance of Power. In Balance of Power, state actors are given two options, which are 'balancing' or 'bandwagoning', towards the emerging power in international system. Through Neorealism perspective, state actors will tend to balance the emerging power that pose the biggest potential threat.<sup>8</sup> In terms of balancing, T.V. Paul argues that states may resort to traditional hard balancing where states tend to create strategic military cooperation and open arms buildup to confront the emerging power.<sup>9</sup> Then there is

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<sup>6</sup> Waltz, Kenneth. (1988). The origins of war in neorealist theory. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4. pg. 615-628.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*


<sup>8</sup> Levy, J. S. (2004). What do great powers balance against and when? In T. Paul, J. J. Wirtz, & M. Fortmann, *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (pp. 29-51). California: Stanford University Press.

<sup>9</sup> T., Paul. (2004). Introduction: the enduring axioms of balance of power theory and their contemporary

soft balancing in which states create bloc or collaborate in regional or international institution to give political pressure to the emerging power.

The author then uses national interest and threat perceptions to further identify states' behavior within Balance of Power concept. National interest and threat perceptions of the certain states will determine the set of approach or policy, either in balancing or bandwagoning act.<sup>10</sup>

As the discussion in this research revolves around the maritime area of Indo-Pacific, the writer uses maritime security as the set of approach. The traditional definition of maritime security is the use of seapower to ensure control of the sea for naval supremacy and commerce.<sup>11</sup> However according to Christian Bueger, maritime security extends beyond the traditional security dimension. Bueger connects the issues relating to maritime security with a matrix as seen in Diagram 1.<sup>12</sup> The matrix explains how maritime security is able address several issues and assist which issue should be prioritized by the maritime actor based on their national interest and threat perceptions.



relevance. In T. Paul, J. J. Writz, & M. Fortmann, *Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century* (pp. 1-28). California: Stanford University Press.

<sup>10</sup> Levy, J. S. (2004).

<sup>11</sup> Mahan, Alfred T. *The influence of sea power upon history, 1660-1783*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. (1918)

<sup>12</sup> Bueger, C. (2015). *What is maritime security*. Cardiff: Cardiff University.

Diagram 1: Maritime security matrix by Christian Bueger.<sup>13</sup>

For the purpose of this article, the authors then combines the maritime security with cooperative security to explain Maritime Security Cooperation. David Dewitt explains that in cooperative security, nation states must first engage in bilateral security cooperation activities that will enable them to create an inclusive relations, which eventually become the foundation for multilateral security frameworks.<sup>14</sup> In terms of maritime security, cooperative security serves as bridge that connects maritime security understanding of one state to the others. Chris Rahman explains that maritime security cooperation has a comprehensive approach to address the growing contemporary maritime security issues.<sup>15</sup> In establishing an effective maritime security cooperation, states need to set up a strategic bilateral relations and later develop it to create an inclusive regional security order.<sup>16</sup>




Diagram 2: Theoretical framework mind map.<sup>17</sup>

From the above diagram, the writer uses Balance of Power concept of international system as the basic theory in

<sup>13</sup> Bueger, C. (2015).

<sup>14</sup> Dewitt, David. (1994). Common, comprehensive, and cooperative security. *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 7. pg. 1-15.

<sup>15</sup> Rahman, Chris. (2009). *Concepts of maritime security: a strategic perspective on alternative visions for good order and security at sea, with policy implications for New Zealand*. Wellington: Victoria University.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>17</sup> The theoretical framework's mindmap is derived from Andrew Heywood's book on Global Politics concepts and theories (Heywood, Andrew. (2011). *Global Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

this research. Balance of Power explains the behavior of state actors in the existing international system. There are two elements that would determine the behavior of state actors, which are the National Interest and Threat Perceptions. Those two elements would later result in set of approach or policy, which in this research is Maritime Security. The concept of Maritime Security would be combined with Cooperative Security framework to explain Maritime Security Cooperation. As a mean of balancing, Maritime Security Cooperation serves as the tool for two or more states to form a partnership in confronting the emerging power.

This theoretical approach would then explain the topic in this research as follows: in a multipolar Indo-Pacific where US power is declining and China is thriving to become the regional hegemon, India and Japan which have commonalities in maritime security and concerned on China have then decided to cooperate in maritime security to balance China.

### Implementation of India-Japan Maritime Security Cooperation to Balance China in Indo-Pacific

The security environment of Indo-Pacific is rapidly changing, mainly due to China's rise as military superpower in the region. China is seeking to assert control in the waters of Indo-Pacific through the "two-ocean" (*liang ge haiyang*) strategy.<sup>18</sup> However China's assertive actions in East and South China Seas have caused security concerns which disturb the SLOCs stability of Indo-Pacific. Unilaterally, China claims

<sup>18</sup> The State Council of the People's Republic of China. *Full text of the Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative*. The state council of the people's Republic of China. June 20, 2017. Accessed December 9, 2017. [http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2017/06/20/content\\_281475691873460.htm](http://english.gov.cn/archive/publications/2017/06/20/content_281475691873460.htm)

the territorial water of those regions which are still debated by the regional states. The claims have then sparked tension with Japan in East China Sea and with the Southeast Asia littoral states in South China Sea. Beyond that, China is also keen to increase their naval presence across the Indian Ocean. China has built naval ports in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and most notably in Pakistan, then opened up its first military base overseas in Djibouti.<sup>19</sup>




Figure 2: The Chinese naval routes that span across the Indo-Pacific maritime region.<sup>20</sup>

The growing security concerns in Indo-Pacific have then prompted the US to reengage its Indo-Pacific partners through the Rebalance policy. The US is seeking to ensure the American influence in the region, while checking on China's rise and expansion.<sup>21</sup> The US cooperation with Japan, Australia, ROK, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines remain as the foundation of strategic actions in Indo-Pacific. Albeit the Rebalance policy, the US influence in the region is declining vis-à-vis China.<sup>22</sup> Moreover under the new leadership of

<sup>19</sup> Scott, David. Chinese maritime strategy for the Indian ocean. *Center for International Maritime Security*. November 28, 2017. Accessed December 9, 2017. <http://cimsec.org/chinese-maritime-strategy-indian-ocean/34771>

<sup>20</sup> Kaneda, Hideki. (2016). Chain of maritime security coalitions. *DPG Conference Reports*, Vol.1 Issue 1. pg 55-66

<sup>21</sup> Campbell & Andrews. (2013). *Explaining the US 'pivot' to Asia*. London: Chatam House

<sup>22</sup> Mishra, Vivek. (2016). US power and influence in the Asia-Pacific region: the decline of 'alliance mutuality'. *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 40 Issue 3. pg 159-172

President Donald Trump, uncertainty looms over the US commitment in Indo-Pacific.<sup>23</sup> Under the notion of shifting balance of power from US to China in Indo-Pacific, other regional states have to take certain actions in responding the situation, including India and Japan. As prominent maritime nation, India has vast amount of interest in the region. India heavily depends on SLOCs of Indo-Pacific, particularly for protecting its territorial sovereignty and commercial interests such as energy and merchandise trades.<sup>24</sup> Another important maritime actor in Indo-Pacific is Japan. In 2016, Japan has released the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ which prioritizes Japan’s maritime interest in the region.<sup>25</sup> Japan sees that the security environment surrounding the nation is declining, especially with China roaming around in Japan’s territorial water and the nuclear activity in Korean Peninsula. With the threats looming in Japan’s surrounding environment, thus they need to enhance their maritime force capability.<sup>26</sup> Japan also depends on seaborne economic activities, as around 80% of its energy imports are transported through the sea.<sup>27</sup>

As two largest maritime democracies in Indo-Pacific, India and Japan have recognized their common maritime interests. The commonalities were first unveiled

during Prime Minister Abe’s ‘‘Confluence of the Two Seas’’ speech.<sup>28</sup> Both states recognize the strategic imperative of each other’s maritime capacity in preserving the maritime region with rules-based order.<sup>29</sup> India and Japan also have a rather similar threat perceptions towards China. Both India and Japan have historical disputes with China. China also has border conflict with India in Doklam Plateau and with Japan in Senkaku/Diayou Islands. Then, China’s increasing naval modernization has at least been mentioned in both India and Japan’s perception towards China.<sup>30</sup> Lastly, the two states are also concerned on the growing tension in South China Sea, emphasizing on prevention of ‘unilateral actions that raise tensions’ in which it pointed towards China’s assertiveness.<sup>31</sup>

In their respective maritime security strategy, both India and Japan committed to take larger security roles in the region. India through *Ensuring Secure Seas* strategy seeks to become a maritime net security provider for its maritime.<sup>32</sup> Thus incorporating the

<sup>23</sup> Marston, Hunter. Forecasting U.S.-Asia relations under Trump. *Brookings Institution*. April 10, 2017. Accessed December 13, 2017. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/10/forecasting-u-s-asia-relations-under-trump/>.

<sup>24</sup> India Ministry of Defence (Navy). (2015). *Ensuring secure seas: Indian maritime security strategy*. pg. 9.

<sup>25</sup> International Cooperation Bureau. (2017). *Priority policy for development cooperation FY2017*. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>26</sup> Japan Ministry of Defense. (2017). *Defense of Japan 2017*. pg. 45-47.

<sup>27</sup> International Energy Agency. (2016). *Energy policies of IEA countries: Japan 2016 review*. Paris: OECD/IEA.

<sup>28</sup> Abe, Shinzo. *Confluence of the Two Seas*. Speech by H.E.Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. August 22, 2007. Accessed October 16, 2017. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html>.

<sup>29</sup> Garege, Ramanand. (2016). The India-Japan strategic partnership: evolving synergy in the Indo-Pacific. *Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs*, 8:3. pg. 257-266.

<sup>30</sup> Based on India Ministry of Defence. (2017). Annual Report 2016-2017. pg. 4 and Japan Ministry of Defense. (2017). pg. 108.

<sup>31</sup> India Ministry of External Affairs. *India-Japan joint statement during the visit of Prime Minister to Japan*. November 11, 2016. Accessed December 14, 2017. <http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27599/IndiaJapan+Joint+Statement+during+the+visit+of+Prime+Minister+to+Japan>.

<sup>32</sup> Limaye, Satu. (2017). *Weighted West, focused on the Indian ocean and cooperating across the Indo-Pacific: the Indian navy's new maritime strategy, capabilities, and diplomacy*. Arlington: CNA Analysis and Solutions.



‘Act East’ policy, India Security and Growth for All (SAGAR) concept to develop the Indian Ocean littoral states, as well as to provide maritime security in Indian Ocean.<sup>33</sup>

As for Japan, the reinterpretation of the Article 9 of the Constitution has expanded the scope of its security activities to include military operations when armed attack occurred to foreign country in close relationship with Japan.<sup>34</sup> Under the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’, Japan is set to provide collective maritime security to the Asian countries and beyond to African continent.

Following the return of Prime Minister Abe for his second premiership, Japan reaffirmed its stance to acknowledge India as important security partner.<sup>35</sup> India’s engagement to Japan was also accelerated under Prime Minister Modi’s Act East policy. The two prime ministers share similar interest in expanding their respective nations as maritime power in the region to eventually maintain the stability in the Indo-Pacific. Under Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister Modi, India and Japan have begun to intensify their maritime security cooperation.<sup>36</sup>



Figure 3: India-Japan Maritime Security Cooperation Timeline.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> Japan Ministry of Defense. (2013). *National security strategy*.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> Shutaro Sano. (2017). *Japan-India security cooperation: building a solid foundation amid uncertainty*. Washington DC: CSIS.

<sup>37</sup> Based on the Joint Statements of India and Japan.

As can be seen in the timeline in Figure 3, India and Japan have always expanded their scope of maritime security cooperation. In 2014, they elevated their relations to ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’, then followed by establishing ‘India and Japan Vision 2025’ in the next year. The following year, the two states determined to align the Act East policy with Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.<sup>38</sup> The purpose of this alignment is to create a regional framework in pursuance of connected and stable Indo-Pacific. The strategic alignment was finalized last September in India, with the Act East and Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy synergized in maritime security, Indo-Pacific connectivity, improving cooperation with ASEAN and its member states as maritime partners, and strategic information exchanges between India and Japan.<sup>39</sup>

In line with the balancing act, India and Japan have used their maritime security cooperation in hard balancing and soft balancing China. The implementation of India-Japan maritime security cooperation are underlined within their strategic alignments. The table below shows the framework of India-Japan maritime security cooperation in balancing China.




Table 2: Indo-Japan Maritime Security Cooperation as an Act of Balancing

India and Japan underlined the importance to conduct annual bilateral naval exercises, which aim to enhance their maritime operability in Indo-Pacific. Since 2012, India and Japan have conducted annual naval exercises under the name of Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX).<sup>40</sup> Besides the navies, they have also conducted *Sahyog-Kaijin* coast guard exercises.<sup>41</sup> Then in 2015, Japan is included as permanent

<sup>38</sup> Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Japan-India summit meeting*. November 11, 2016. Accessed January 23, 2018. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/s\\_sa/sw/in/page3e\\_000616.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000616.html).

<sup>39</sup> Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Japan-India joint statement: toward a free, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific*. September 14, 2017. Accessed January 23, 2018. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000289999.pdf>.

<sup>40</sup> Press Information Bureau. Visit of INS Sahyadri at Sagami Bay, Japan. *India ministry of defence*. October 14, 2015. Accessed January 30, 2018. <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=128725>.

<sup>41</sup> Dennis S. Jesudasan. India, Japan conduct joint exercise sahyog-kaijin off cenai coast. *The Hindu*. September 23, 2016. Accessed January 30, 2018. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/India-Japan-conduct-joint-exercise-%E2%80%98Sahyog-Kaijin%E2%80%99-off-Chennai-coast/article14001430.ece>.

member in Malabar exercise.<sup>42</sup> Ever since then, India and Japan maritime forces conduct exercise at least three times per year. The joint maritime exercises are intended to prepare themselves against incoming attack from potential adversary, presumably China.<sup>43</sup> This is shown in the latest Malabar exercise, where it focused on Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities. The ASW exercise was aimed at the concern of China's submarines sightings in Indian Ocean.

Besides that, India and Japan are also starting to cooperate in defense industry. India is set to buy 12 US-2 amphibious aircrafts from Japan for USD1.3 billion.<sup>44</sup> Japan is also set to invest on maritime infrastructure in Andaman & Nicobar Islands. Its strategic location overlooking the Strait of Malacca to the east and the Indian Ocean to the west has made it as a suitable location for a surveillance base, especially to track China's naval activities in Indian Ocean.<sup>45</sup> India and Japan will be able to limit China's naval movement in the Indian Ocean and are able to increase their maritime operations in South China Sea.

Under the guise of regional approach in their bilateral cooperation, India and

Japan are trying to push away China's maritime influence in Indo-Pacific. The two states have determined to expand their bilateral cooperation to resolve the South China Sea dispute. Individually, both India and Japan provide maritime capacity building and joint exercise to Southeast Asia littoral states.<sup>46</sup> This is to decrease the Southeast Asia states dependency to China, while increasing India and Japan regional approach to balance China. Cooperatively, India and Japan also established Asia-Africa Growth Corridor which aims to develop and connect the African continent with Asia through the Indian Ocean.<sup>47</sup> The AAGC is simply an alternative option from India and Japan against China's Maritime Silk Road in its Belt and Road Initiative.<sup>48</sup> India and Japan have sought the AAGC to be the alternative and better form than the Belt and Road Initiative.

Lastly, India and Japan also expand their bilateral cooperation to include the US and Australia. The security setup of those four nations are known as Asia's Quadrilateral Security Diamonds.<sup>49</sup> The idea of the Quad was actually born in 2007, however it quickly dissolved after high pressure from China. Then on November 2017, the leaders of those four nations concluded their first meeting since 2007 discussing about the security concerns in

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<sup>42</sup> Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Inaugural U.S.-India-Japan Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue*. September 30, 2015. Accessed January 31, 2018. [http://www.mofa.go.jp/sa/sw/page4e\\_000325.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/sa/sw/page4e_000325.html).

<sup>43</sup> Shamshad A. Khan. (2015). *India-Japan cooperation towards a rule-based order in Asia-Pacific: mapping Indian and Japanese strategic thinking*. Tokyo: Japan Institute for International Relations.

<sup>44</sup> Ankit Panda. Will India and Japan finally conclude a long-pending US-2 amphibious aircraft defense deal?. *The Diplomat*. September 13, 2017. Accessed January 30, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/will-india-and-japan-finally-conclude-a-long-pending-us-2-amphibious-aircraft-defense-deal/>.

<sup>45</sup> Balaji Chandramohan. (2017). *The growing strategic importance of Andaman and Nicobar islands*. Dalkeith: Future Directions International

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<sup>46</sup> Bibek Chand and Zenel Garcia. (2017). Power politics and securitization: the emerging Indo-Japanese nexus in Southeast Asia. *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 2. pg. 310-324

<sup>47</sup> AAGC. (2017). *Asia Africa growth corridor vision document: partnership for sustainable and innovative development*. Ahmedabad: African Development Bank Meeting.

<sup>48</sup> Shahana Tankachan. (2017). *India-Japan AAGC (Asia Africa Growth Corridor): an assessment*. New Delhi: National Maritime Foundation.

<sup>49</sup> Shinzo Abe. *Asia's democratic security diamond*. Project syndicate. December 27, 2012. Accessed February 1, 2018. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe?barrier=accessreg>.



Indo-Pacific. Since then, the idea of Asia's Quad has been revived.<sup>50</sup> The Quad is strongly believed to be concerning on China's maritime expansion and presumably seeks to contain its advancement. In this regard, India-Japan maritime relations has provided the concept of free and open Indo-Pacific which is the aim of the Quad. To the very least, Australia and the US would back up the Indo-Japan maritime nexus, especially in checking the development of China maritime expansion.<sup>51</sup>




Figure 27: The Quadrilateral Chain of Coalition in Indo-Pacific to Balance China.<sup>52</sup>

states, maritime security is strategically important as they could share the responsibility of protecting their respective SLOCs. Through the balancing act, it can be identified that India and Japan use maritime security cooperation to strengthen their bilateral strategic relations and enhance their regional collaboration to balance China's maritime expansion. That being said, this research concluded that maritime security is an area of convergence for India and Japan, and enhancing maritime security cooperation is essential to balance China's maritime expansion on the backdrop of shifting Indo-Pacific security environment.

## Conclusion

This research discussed how India and Japan implement their maritime security cooperation as mean to balance China's expanding maritime influence in Indo-Pacific. China's expansive actions in Indo-Pacific clearly drives India and Japan to cooperate closely in preserving the stability of the region security environment. For both

<sup>50</sup> Harsh V. Pant. Take note: Asia's quad is back. *The Diplomat*. November 10, 2017. Accessed December 13, 2017. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/take-note-asias-quad-is-back/>

<sup>51</sup> Abhijit Singh. India wants a quad to counteract China's expanding influence. *Observer Research Foundation*. January 25, 2018. Accessed February 2, 2018. <http://www.orfonline.org/research/india-wants-quad-counteract-china-expanding-influence/>.

<sup>52</sup> Vice Adm. Hideki Kaneda (Retd.). (2016). Chain of maritime security coalitions. *DPG Conference Reports*, Vol.1 Issue 1, pg 55-66

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